Lars Ullrich
About Lars Ullrich
Lars Ullrich is Senior Vice President, Global Automotive Business at Methode Electronics, appointed effective December 2, 2024. He is 54, with over 20 years of leadership experience across Infineon Technologies and Robert Bosch, and most recently served as Head of Region Americas and Chief Business Officer for Larsen & Toubro Semiconductor Technologies in 2024 . Compensation performance metrics are tied to company pre-tax income (70%), free cash flow (30%), and multi‑year total shareholder return (TSR) targets for equity awards .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Larsen & Toubro Semiconductor Technologies | Head of Region Americas and Chief Business Officer | Feb–Nov 2024 | Oversaw regional commercialization and strategy for a semiconductor start‑up entering automotive markets |
| Infineon Technologies Americas | Vice President → Senior Vice President, Automotive Division Americas | 2019–2024 | Led automotive business development and operations in the Americas, focused on growth and customer engagement |
| Robert Bosch | Manager/Director/Vice President roles (marketing, chief of staff, product management) | 2000–2019 | Multi‑regional leadership across product and marketing functions; operational excellence and customer solutions |
Education: Aeronautical engineering degree, University of Applied Science, Aachen .
External Roles
- No public company board directorships disclosed .
Fixed Compensation
| Component (FY2025 unless noted) | Detail |
|---|---|
| Base Salary | $475,000 |
| Target Annual Bonus | 66% of base salary (prorated for FY2025) |
| Bonus Target Amount | $129,287 (FY2025) |
| Actual Bonus Paid | $123,258 (FY2025; individual performance modifier recipient) |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive (FY2025)
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Threshold | Maximum | Payout (Ullrich) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre‑Tax Income | 70% | $3,140,000 (100% payout) | $0 (50%) | $22,065,000 (200%) | Included in $123,258 total bonus | No payout if below threshold; individual modifier ±20%, capped at 200% |
| Free Cash Flow | 30% | Company‑set FCF target (not numerically disclosed) | 50% of target | 200% of target | Included in $123,258 total bonus | Subject to same modifier structure |
Equity Awards (Granted FY2025)
| Award Type | Grant Date | Shares/Units | Fair Value | Vesting | Performance Conditions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sign‑On RSUs | 12/2/2024 | 26,224 | $300,000 | One‑third on each of 1st, 2nd, 3rd anniversaries of start date | Service‑based |
| Time‑Based LTIP RSUs | 12/2/2024 | 12,544 | $143,397 | One‑third on each of 1st, 2nd, 3rd anniversaries of start date | Service‑based |
| Performance‑Based LTIP PSUs | 12/2/2024 | Target 12,544; Threshold 6,272; Max 25,088 | $143,397 (target) | Vests after fiscal 2027 upon certification | Annualized TSR 2024–2027: Threshold 10% (50%), Target 15% (100%), Max 20% (200%) |
| Combined RSUs (sign‑on + LTIP) | 12/2/2024 | 38,768 | $443,506 | One‑third per year from Dec 2, 2025–2027 | Service‑based |
Later LTI program grants in Aug 2025 introduced ROIC (60%) and annualized TSR (40%) measures for certain employees (CEO explicitly named); PSUs vest on the third anniversary through FY2028. Ullrich’s participation in that August 2025 grant is not disclosed in the retrieved records .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 15,150 shares, held jointly with spouse; less than 1% of outstanding shares |
| Unvested RSUs at FY2025 Year‑End | 38,768 units (sign‑on + LTIP), market value ~$258,970 at $6.68 close on May 2, 2025 |
| Unvested PSUs at FY2025 Year‑End (target) | 12,544 units, market/payout value ~$83,794 at $6.68 (target basis) |
| Vested During FY2025 | 0 shares vested for Ullrich |
| Ownership Guidelines | Other executive officers: 3× salary; 50% compliance within 3 years, 100% within 5 years; if not met, 75% net shares retention until compliant. Executives in compliance subject to phase‑in |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited: no options trading, short sales, derivatives/hedging; no margin accounts or pledging of Methode stock |
Upcoming vesting cadence creates periodic supply: time‑based RSUs on each anniversary of 12/2/2024; PSUs settle post‑FY2027 performance certification .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Ullrich Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment Start | December 2, 2024 |
| Severance (No Cause) | 1× annualized salary + 1× target bonus, paid over 1 year; 12 months COBRA premiums; 1 year of additional vesting credit for service‑based LTI awards |
| Change in Control (CIC) Agreement | Double‑trigger: if terminated without cause or resigns for good reason within 24 months post‑CIC (or during period pending CIC), lump sum 2× annual salary + 2× target bonus; Company‑paid COBRA up to 24 months; equity awards per underlying agreements |
| Potential Payments (Illustrative as of May 2, 2025, stock at $6.68) | Resignation for good reason/termination without cause following CIC: Salary+Bonus Severance $1,577,000; Health & Welfare $54,009. Termination without cause (no CIC): Salary+Bonus Severance $788,500; Time‑based RSUs vesting $196,126; Performance RSUs vesting $53,007; Health & Welfare $27,004. Death/Disability: Annual bonus $129,287; Time‑based RSUs $269,825; Performance RSUs $87,306 |
| Clawback | Incentive Compensation Recovery Policy on restatements (3‑year lookback) |
| Tax Gross‑Ups | Company does not provide excise tax gross‑ups for CIC severance |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and leverage: Significant equity component (RSUs/PSUs) alongside cash salary/bonus with capped max payout at 200% supports at‑risk pay orientation .
- Metric rigor: Annual bonus tied to pre‑tax income and free cash flow with zero payout below threshold; PSUs linked to multi‑year TSR with 50/100/200% outcomes at 10/15/20% annualized TSR .
- Retention features: Time‑based RSUs with three‑year vesting and severance credit for one additional year of service‑based vesting reduce near‑term attrition risk .
- Governance controls: Prohibitions on hedging/pledging, ownership guidelines at 3× salary, and clawback policy strengthen alignment and mitigate risk .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Large unvested RSU/PSU balance and 3× salary ownership guideline (with retention of 75% net shares if not yet compliant) align incentives with TSR and cash generation outcomes; hedging/pledging prohibitions reduce misalignment risks .
- Retention risk: Low near‑term given multi‑year vesting and severance protections (1× salary+bonus; double‑trigger CIC at 2× salary+bonus) that also limit forced turnover risk while avoiding excise tax gross‑ups .
- Trading/overhang: Anticipated annual RSU vesting on Dec 2 in 2025–2027 and PSU settlement post‑FY2027 could create episodic selling pressure, moderated by ownership retention requirements .
- Pay for performance: Cash incentive metrics (pre‑tax income, FCF) and TSR‑based equities institute measurable performance gates; FY2025 bonus near target ($123,258 vs $129,287 target) indicates payouts were tied to achieved performance and modifiers, not discretionary awards .