Daniel Rabinovich
MERCADOLIBREAbout Daniel Rabinovich
Daniel Rabinovich (age 47) is Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer at MercadoLibre, serving as COO since August 2020 after roles as COO (Product & Technology) in 2019–2020, CTO from 2011, VP of Product Development from 2009, and joining MELI in March 2000 as an application architect; he previously worked in the application architecture team at PeopleSoft . He holds a Master’s in Technological Services Management (Universidad de San Andrés) and an Information Systems degree with honors (University of Buenos Aires) . Company performance context relevant to his incentive metrics: 2024 Net revenues and financial income were $21,940.4M vs $21,420.0M target (102.4%); Income from operations was $4,864.1M vs $5,232.2M target (84.2%); TPV-adjusted $200,118.4M vs $191,402.1M target (104.6%); Competitive NPS 66.2% vs 63.1% target (105.0%), yielding a weighted overall performance of 96.6%; his individual performance multiplier was 1.0 . Over 2019–2024, a $100 investment in MELI grew to $297 vs $215 for the Nasdaq Composite peer index, illustrating strong long-term TSR used in pay-versus-performance analysis and LTRP calibration .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| MercadoLibre | Executive Vice President & COO | Aug 2020–present | Company-wide operating leadership across commerce and fintech; alignment of operations with growth and profitability goals . |
| MercadoLibre | COO (Product & Technology) | 2019–Aug 2020 | Led technology/product operations, scaling platform capabilities ahead of current COO remit . |
| MercadoLibre | Chief Technology Officer | Jan 2011–2019 | Architected technology backbone supporting MELI’s e-commerce and fintech scaling . |
| MercadoLibre | VP, Product Development | Jan 2009–Jan 2011 | Drove product roadmap and feature velocity in marketplace and fintech . |
| MercadoLibre | Application Architect | Mar 2000–Jan 2009 | Early technical leadership during MELI’s formative scaling years . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| PeopleSoft | Application Architecture Team | Pre-2000 | Enterprise application architecture experience prior to MELI joining . |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary (USD) | $558,473 | Paid in Argentine pesos, presented in USD at average 2024 FX per policy . |
| Company-Paid Life Insurance | $3,396 | Premium paid by company; $1,132,000 coverage plus additional $1,132,000 for accidental death/disability for eligible NEOs . |
| Retirement Contributions | $71,328 | Defined contribution equal to 11.5% of base salary + annual bonus; credited with interest; estimated accumulated value at 12/31/2024 $396,007 if retired . |
| Perquisites | None | MELI provides no executive perquisites; broad-based benefits only . |
Multi-year SEC “Summary Compensation Table” presentation:
| Metric (USD) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | $537,875 | $558,511 | $558,473 |
| Bonus (fixed LTRP portion) | $615,667 | $948,377 | $1,198,999 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan (annual bonus + variable LTRP) | $1,700,817 | $1,863,338 | $2,942,720 |
| All Other Compensation | $100,969 | $64,334 | $74,724 |
| Total | $2,955,328 | $3,434,560 | $4,774,916 |
Executive-friendly disclosure of actual 2024 cash paid by element:
| Component (USD) | 2024 Amount |
|---|---|
| Base Salary | $558,473 |
| Annual Bonus (paid 2025 for 2024 performance) | $157,730 |
| LTRPs (cash paid across current/prior LTRPs) | $3,983,989 |
| All Other Compensation | $74,724 |
| Total | $4,774,916 |
Performance Compensation
Annual bonus structure and outcomes (2024):
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual | Achievement | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net revenues & financial income (USD MM, const. $) | 40% | 21,420.0 | 21,940.4 | 102.4% | Venezuela excluded; Argentina deflated; reclassification effective 2024 . |
| Income from operations (USD MM, const. $) | 35% | 5,232.2 | 4,864.1 | 84.2% | Measured by applying actual country shares in USD . |
| Total Payment Volume – adjusted (USD MM, const. $) | 10% | 191,402.1 | 200,118.4 | 104.6% | Excludes P2P; includes marketplace and off-platform . |
| Competitive NPS (%) | 15% | 63.1 | 66.2 | 105.0% | Independent surveys across countries . |
| Weighted Overall Performance | 100% | — | — | 96.6% | Capped rules: metric ≤120%, overall ≤110% (payment capped at 100%) . |
| Individual Performance Multiplier (Rabinovich) | — | — | — | 1.0 | Meets expectations (vs 1.5 for CEO/CFO/Fintech President) . |
| Formula | — | — | — | Target Bonus × Consolidated Performance × Individual Multiplier | Payment in following year . |
Long-Term Retention Plan (LTRP) design (2024 cohort):
- Six-year cash program split into fixed and variable tranches paid annually; each year pays 16.66% of half the nominal grant (fixed) plus 16.66% of half multiplied by the ratio of Applicable Year Stock Price over $1,426.11 (the 60-day average price baseline from late 2023) .
- Daniel’s 2024 LTRP nominal target value: $3,500,000; portion paid in respect of 2024: $689,347 .
- Grant date for 2024 variable portion disclosure: April 18, 2024; disclosed “variable portion” sizing $1,750,000 as plan-based award input (actual payout depends on stock price ratio each year) .
- Equity grants to NEOs were not used in 2024; MELI ties executive long-term incentives to capital markets via LTRPs, not new equity awards .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | Daniel Rabinovich beneficially owns no shares (—) . |
| Shares Outstanding | 50,697,375 as of April 14, 2025; Rabinovich’s ownership as % outstanding ≈ 0.00% . |
| Vested/Unvested Equity | No NEO equity awards granted in 2024; program emphasizes cash LTRPs . |
| Options | Not disclosed/none granted under 2024 policy . |
| Pledging/Hedging | Company strongly discourages pledging and hedging; requires pre-clearance; short sales prohibited; insider trading policy filed with 10-K . |
| Section 16 Compliance | All officers complied timely in 2025-to-date; in 2024 only one late Form 4 (Osvaldo Giménez); no issues noted for Rabinovich . |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Economics/Terms |
|---|---|
| Local-law severance (termination without cause) | $1,192,028 for Rabinovich . |
| Change-in-control (CIC) – standalone | Payment equals 50% of outstanding LTRP awards; Rabinovich amount: $4,935,099 (based on 60-day average price at year-end 2024) . |
| CIC with termination without cause or resignation for Good Reason (within 120 days pre/post CIC) | 100% of outstanding LTRP awards plus local-law severance; Rabinovich: $9,870,198 (non-equity incentive/LTRPs) + $1,192,028 (severance) = $11,062,226 total . |
| “Cause” and “Good Reason” definitions | Detailed in LTRP (e.g., material disregard, misconduct; material diminution of duties/salary/bonus or relocation >50 miles) . |
| 2001 Management Incentive Bonus Plan (sale/stay bonuses) | Group-level sale bonus 5.5% and stay bonus 7.1% of purchase price if sale ≥$20M; combined cap $78,335,000; allocated by CEO-set participation percentages to eligible officers . |
| Non-compete / Non-solicit (LTRP) | One-year post-employment non-solicit and non-compete; violation triggers automatic forfeiture of LTRP benefits received . |
| Life Insurance | $1,132,000 benefit (plus $1,132,000 for accidental death/disability) for covered NEOs . |
| Retirement Benefit | Company contributions equal to 11.5% of base salary + annual bonus; estimated accumulated benefit at 12/31/2024 if retired: $396,007 for Rabinovich . |
| Clawback Policy | SEC/Nasdaq-compliant recoupment of erroneously awarded incentive compensation for current/former executive officers upon accounting restatement, regardless of misconduct; effective Oct 2, 2023 . |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Cash-heavy, equity-light design: No NEO equity grants in 2024; long-term alignment achieved via multi-year cash LTRPs with a 60-day average stock price multiplier, directly tethering payouts to TSR while preserving retention through six-year vesting/pay schedules .
- Annual bonus rigor and caps: Weighted multi-metric corporate scorecard with caps to prevent excessive cross-subsidization; 2024 overall achievement 96.6% with Rabinovich at a 1.0 multiplier, indicating disciplined payout calibration .
- CIC protections: Standard double-trigger economics (full LTRP acceleration plus severance) mitigate executive flight risk amid strategic events; single-trigger CIC pays 50% of outstanding LTRPs .
- Governance controls: Robust anti-hedging/anti-pledging framework and SEC/Nasdaq clawback reduce misalignment and restatement risk .
Performance & Track Record
| Indicator | Data |
|---|---|
| TSR (value of $100 investment) | 2020: $293; 2021: $236; 2022: $148; 2023: $275; 2024: $297; peer (Nasdaq Composite) 2024: $215 . |
| Pay vs Performance linkage | Company-selected measure: Income from operations (constant $); key driver of CAP is 60-day average TSR via LTRP variable component, aligning executive pay with shareholder returns . |
| 2024 Scorecard achievements | Net revenues & financial income 102.4% of target; Income from operations 84.2%; TPV-adjusted 104.6%; NPS 105.0%; overall 96.6% . |
Compensation Peer Group (Benchmarking)
Mercer-assisted peer set used for 2023–2024 decisions includes: Airbnb, Block, Booking Holdings, Discover Financial Services, eBay, FIS, Fiserv, Global Payments, Intuit, PayPal, Pinterest, ServiceNow, Shopify, Uber, Workday, Zoom, Coupang, Naspers .
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
Say-on-pay approval at the 2024 Annual Meeting for 2023 compensation was 83.81%, indicating investor support for MELI’s pay-for-performance approach and use of LTRPs; the committee continues to consider feedback in future decisions .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Hedging/pledging discouraged with pre-clearance; short sales prohibited; no pledging disclosed for Rabinovich; Section 16 compliance shows no late filings for him .
- LTRP variable payouts can amplify cyclical exposure to market swings but are capped in annual bonus calculations, and clawback mitigates restatement risk .
Equity Ownership & Alignment (Detail Table)
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Shares Beneficially Owned | — (none) |
| Ownership % of Outstanding | 0.00% of 50,697,375 shares |
| Unvested/Exercisable Equity | Not applicable; no 2024 NEO equity grants |
| LTRP Variable Linkage | 60-day average stock price ratio vs $1,426.11 baseline |
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Despite zero share ownership, Rabinovich’s six-year LTRPs are tightly linked to stock performance via a transparent TSR multiplier, creating meaningful pay-for-performance sensitivity without dilution from equity grants .
- Retention: Multi-year fixed/variable LTRP cash flows and double-trigger CIC protections reduce near-term attrition risk; non-compete/non-solicit forfeiture enhances retention posture .
- Payout quality: 2024 corporate performance achieved 96.6% on a diversified scorecard, yielding modest annual bonus for Rabinovich (1.0 multiplier) while long-term value accrues through LTRPs; suggests balanced incentive discipline .
- Governance: Strong anti-hedging/anti-pledging and clawback policy, plus supportive say-on-pay outcome (83.81%), underpin compensation credibility and reduce red-flag risk for investors tracking insider alignment and potential selling pressure .