Marcelo Melamud
MERCADOLIBREAbout Marcelo Melamud
Marcelo Melamud is Senior Vice President and Chief Accounting Officer at MercadoLibre (MELI), a role he has held since August 2008. He previously served as Vice President — Administration and Control from April–August 2008, holds an MBA from Babson College’s Olin Graduate School of Business, and is a Certified Public Accountant in Argentina . As of April 28, 2025, he was 54 years old . Company performance context for his tenure is included below.
Company Performance During Tenure (select recent years)
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($USD Millions) | $10,780* | $15,107* | $20,777 |
| EBITDA ($USD Millions) | $1,484* | $2,731* | $3,248 |
| *Values retrieved from S&P Global. |
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| MercadoLibre | VP — Administration & Control | Apr 2008–Aug 2008 | Finance and control leadership ahead of appointment as CAO |
| MercadoLibre | Chief Accounting Officer | Aug 2008–present | Accounting policy and reporting oversight; long-tenured finance leadership |
| MDM Hotel Group (Marriott developer/owner/operator, Miami) | Director of Finance | Jul 2004–Mar 2008 | Property finance leadership, hotel operations finance |
| Fidelity Investments | Various finance roles; Director of Finance at World Trade Center Boston/Seaport Hotel; Director of Finance at MetroRed Telecom Group Ltd. | Jul 1998–Jul 2004 | Financial management across hospitality and LATAM telecom; operational finance |
External Roles
- None disclosed in company proxy statements for 2023–2025 .
Fixed Compensation
- Individual fixed compensation (base salary) for Marcelo Melamud is not disclosed in the NEO tables; he is an executive officer but not a named executive officer (NEO) in 2023–2025 proxies. MELI’s executive pay elements for NEOs comprise base salary, annual bonus, and a Long-Term Retention Plan (LTRP) paid over six years .
Performance Compensation
MELI’s 2024 annual bonus framework for NEOs is weighted across company metrics plus an individual performance multiplier. While applicable to NEOs, the company does not disclose Melamud’s specific targets/payouts.
| Metric (Consolidated Performance) | Weight |
|---|---|
| Net revenues and financial income (constant dollars, Argentina deflated) | 40% |
| Income from operations (constant dollars with country share weighting) | 35% |
| Total payment volume - adjusted (Mercado Pago, excluding P2P; constant dollars, Argentina deflated) | 10% |
| Competitive NPS (independent surveys) | 15% |
| Individual Performance Multiplier | Value |
|---|---|
| Above Expectations | 1.5 |
| Meet Expectations | 1.0 |
| Below Expectations | 0.5 |
Long-Term Retention Plan (LTRP) structure (2024 program for NEOs; similar design across senior management in prior LTRPs):
- Annual fixed payment: 16.66% of half of target LTRP, paid annually for six years
- Annual variable payment: 16.66% of half of target LTRP multiplied by (Applicable Year Stock Price / baseline average closing price)
- For 2024 LTRP, baseline average closing price was $1,426.11 (final 60 trading days of 2023); payments require continued employment and subject to forfeiture in specified circumstances .
Equity awards policy:
- Management compensation is tied to capital markets performance through LTRPs; no equity awards to NEOs in 2024 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Anti-hedging/anti-pledging: Insiders are strongly discouraged from hedging and pledging Company securities; short sales are prohibited; pre-clearance required even during trading windows .
- Beneficial ownership:
- Marcelo Melamud beneficially owned 55 shares as of April 9, 2024 (less than 1%) .
- 2025 proxy itemizes directors/NEOs and group holdings but does not list Melamud individually; group total for all current directors and executive officers was 124,968 shares as of April 14, 2025 .
| Holder | FY 2024 (as of Apr 9, 2024) | FY 2025 (as of Apr 14, 2025) |
|---|---|---|
| Marcelo Melamud – Shares Owned (#) | 55 | — (not itemized) |
| Marcelo Melamud – Ownership % | <1% | — |
| All directors and executive officers as a group (#) | 29,373 | 124,968 |
Stock ownership guidelines:
- No explicit executive stock ownership multiple/guideline disclosure identified in 2024–2025 proxies .
Employment Terms
- Clawback policy (effective Oct 2, 2023): Company must recover erroneously awarded incentive-based compensation from current/former executive officers upon an accounting restatement, regardless of misconduct; prohibits indemnification; defines restatement scope and recovery mechanics .
- Non-compete/non-solicit linked to LTRP: For named executive officers, engaging in competitive activity or soliciting employees during employment and for one year after termination results in automatic forfeiture of LTRP benefits .
- Severance: Termination “without just cause” entitles NEOs to local-law severance; “just cause” results in no severance beyond statutory obligations . “Cause” and “Good Reason” are defined in the 2024 LTRP with detailed criteria (e.g., material diminution of duties, pay reduction, relocation >50 miles) .
- Change-in-control economics: Under the historical Incentive Plan (2001), eligible officers as a group receive “sale” and “stay” bonuses based on purchase price (5.5% sale; 7.1% stay; combined cap $78,335,000), divided per participation percentages set by the CEO; payments in lump sum . Additionally, under 2024 LTRP, 50% of outstanding awards are payable based on average closing price methodology upon a change in control; NEO amounts illustrated in proxy; Melamud not itemized .
- Indemnification agreements: Executed with each director and executive officer to fullest extent permitted by Delaware law .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Melamud’s equity stake is minimal (55 shares in 2024; <1%), but MELI’s policy strongly discourages hedging/pledging and prohibits short sales, reducing misalignment risk from derivatives or margin collateral .
- Incentives: Senior management compensation emphasizes long-term, stock-price-linked cash LTRPs with six-year payout schedules and forfeiture triggers, which support retention and alignment to shareholder value; however, lack of disclosed individual targets/payouts for Melamud limits direct pay-for-performance evaluation .
- Retention risk: LTRP structure, non-compete/non-solicit provisions tied to benefit forfeiture, and the clawback policy reduce exit incentive and misconduct risk, suggesting stable retention dynamics for executive officers .
- Performance context: Strong multi-year revenue and EBITDA growth underpins the incentive framework; continued growth supports LTRP variable payouts tied to stock price performance (Revenues/EBITDA; see S&P Global note above).