Osvaldo Giménez
MERCADOLIBREAbout Osvaldo Giménez
Osvaldo Giménez is MercadoLibre’s Fintech President (since August 2020), overseeing Mercado Pago after leading its operations since 2004; he joined MercadoLibre in 2000 as Country Manager for Argentina and Chile. He is 54, holds an MBA from Stanford and a B.S. in Industrial Engineering from Buenos Aires Technological Institute, with prior experience at Booz Allen & Hamilton and Santander Investments in New York . Company performance metrics that drive his incentive pay included 2024 net revenues and financial income of $21,940.4 million, income from operations of $4,864.1 million (constant dollars), adjusted total payment volume of $200,118.4 million, competitive NPS of 66.2%, and a five‑year TSR value of $297 vs. Nasdaq Composite $215 . Fintech monthly active users grew 34% YoY in Q4’24, reflecting execution momentum in his segment .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| MercadoLibre | Fintech President | 2020–present | Leads Mercado Pago; accountable for fintech growth and monetization |
| MercadoLibre | Head of Mercado Pago operations | 2004–2020 | Built and scaled payments platform across LATAM |
| MercadoLibre | Country Manager (Argentina & Chile) | 2000–2004 | Drove early market expansion and operations |
| Booz Allen & Hamilton | Associate | Pre-2000 | Strategy consulting experience in finance/operations |
| Santander Investments (NY) | Professional staff | Pre-2000 | Capital markets exposure and financial expertise |
External Roles
No public company directorships or external board roles disclosed for Giménez .
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year compensation (SEC Summary Compensation Table):
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | 450,314 | 527,858 | 565,053 |
| Bonus ($) | 666,423 | 958,089 | 1,249,755 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Compensation ($) | 1,541,505 | 2,044,375 | 3,069,467 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 11,436 | 3,396 | 3,396 |
| Total ($) | 2,669,678 | 3,533,718 | 4,887,671 |
2024 “elements of compensation actually paid” (company’s cash view):
- Base salary: $565,053
- Annual bonus paid: $212,303
- LTRP cash paid (aggregate from prior and current LTRPs): $4,106,919
- All other (life insurance premium): $3,396
- Company states no executive perquisites; broad-based benefits only .
Performance Compensation
Annual bonus structure and results (2024):
- Metrics and weighting: Net revenues & financial income (40%); Income from operations (35%); Adjusted Total Payment Volume (10%); Competitive NPS (15%) .
- 2024 actual vs. target and weighted outcome: Weighted average overall performance 96.6%; Giménez individual performance multiplier = 1.5 (“Above Expectations”) .
| Metric | Weight | Target (FY2024) | Actual (FY2024) | Achievement (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net revenues & financial income ($MM) | 40% | 21,420.0 | 21,940.4 | 102.4% |
| Income from operations ($MM, constant $) | 35% | 5,232.2 | 4,864.1 | 84.2% |
| Total Payment Volume – adjusted ($MM) | 10% | 191,402.1 | 200,118.4 | 104.6% |
| Competitive NPS (%) | 15% | 63.1 | 66.2 | 105.0% |
| Weighted Average – Overall Performance | 100% | — | — | 96.6% |
| Individual Performance Multiplier (Giménez) | — | — | — | 1.5 |
| Annual Bonus Paid (USD) | — | Target $159,207 | Actual $212,303 | Derived via formula |
Long-Term Retention Plan (LTRP):
- Structure: six annual fixed payments equal to 16.66% of half the award, plus a variable payment each year equal to 16.66% of the other half multiplied by the ratio of the “Applicable Year Stock Price” to $1,426.11 (60‑day average closing price baseline), subject to continued employment and forfeiture for specified conduct .
- 2024 nominal target LTRP (Giménez): $3,500,000; portion paid in respect of 2024: $689,347 .
- Equity awards: none granted to NEOs in 2024; company ties management compensation to capital markets via LTRPs rather than equity grants .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership | 18,402 shares; less than 1% of outstanding |
| Ownership breakdown | 18,385 shares via Mare Nostrum Group Inc.; 17 shares via Delne Company S.A.; 17 shares from Kaszek Ventures Opportunity II pro rata distribution |
| Shares outstanding baseline | 50,697,375 shares (as of Apr 14, 2025) |
| Options/RSUs | No option or equity awards to NEOs in 2024; LTRPs are cash-based |
| Pledging/Hedging | Company strongly discourages pledging and hedging; short sales prohibited; pre-clearance required for certain transactions . No pledging by Giménez disclosed; a board member (Passos Tolda) disclosed a pledged PVF contract covering 20,000 shares (context for policy enforcement) . |
| Ownership guidelines | No executive stock ownership guidelines disclosed . |
| Section 16 compliance | One late Form 4 (filed Aug 28, 2024) attributed to CCC code delay . |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Economics / Terms |
|---|---|
| Local law severance (termination without cause) | $435,584 |
| Change-in-control (CIC) acceleration | 50% of outstanding LTRPs upon CIC (based on 60‑day average price) → $5,074,498 |
| CIC plus termination without Cause or resignation with Good Reason (within 120 days prior/on or after CIC) | 100% of outstanding LTRPs + local severance → $10,148,995 non‑equity incentive + $435,584 severance; total $10,584,579 |
| 2001 Management Incentive Bonus Plan (sale bonus) | Group sale bonus = 5.5% of purchase price; stay bonus = 7.1%; combined cap $78,335,000, allocated by participation percentages; lump-sum payout |
| Non-compete / non-solicit (LTRP-related) | For one year post-employment; violations trigger automatic forfeiture of LTRP benefits |
| Clawback policy | SEC Rule 10D-compliant clawback for erroneously awarded incentive-based comp, regardless of misconduct |
| Life insurance | Coverage up to $1,132,000; additional $1,132,000 for accidental death/disability (third-party carrier) |
| Retirement benefits | Retirement benefit estimated at $69,111 if retired as of last business day of 2024 |
Compensation Committee Analysis
- Committee independence and composition in 2024: Emiliano Calemzuk (Chair), Richard Sanders, Susan Segal; 3 of 3 independent; 1 meeting, 2 unanimous written consents .
- Peer group used for benchmarking (Mercer study, continued into 2024): Airbnb, Block, Booking Holdings, Discover Financial Services, eBay, FIS, Fiserv, Global Payments, Intuit, PayPal, Pinterest, ServiceNow, Shopify, Uber, Workday, Zoom, Coupang, Naspers .
- Say‑on‑pay support: 83.81% approval at 2024 meeting for 2023 executive compensation .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: 83.8%+ of non‑CEO target direct pay is performance‑based; Giménez received a 1.5 individual performance multiplier, signaling above‑expectations execution and strong linkage to company KPIs (revenues, operating income, TPV, NPS) .
- Insider selling pressure: Absence of equity grants and use of cash LTRPs reduces forced equity sales; LTRP variable leg ties payouts to 60‑day average stock price, aligning with TSR while spreading vesting over six years and including forfeiture and clawback provisions—supportive of retention and disciplined risk-taking .
- Retention and CIC economics: Six-year payout schedule and post-employment restrictions create retention hooks; significant CIC acceleration (50%/100%) could influence executive stability in strategic scenarios; local-law severance provides baseline protection .
- Governance risk flags: One late Form 4 (administrative reason) ; strong anti‑hedging/pledging policies; no pledging disclosed for Giménez .
- Strategic execution: Fintech MAU growth of 34% YoY in Q4’24 under his remit underscores value creation potential; compensation metrics incorporate both growth and profitability signals (net revenues & financial income, income from operations), reinforcing balanced execution incentives .