Cindy Alekson
MERCER INTERNATIONALAbout Cindy Alekson
Cindy Alekson, age 51, is Vice President, Controller of Mercer International (MERC). She was promoted to this role in April 2023 after serving as Director, External Reporting since joining Mercer in November 2011; she holds a B.Sc. from the University of British Columbia and is a Chartered Professional Accountant (British Columbia) . During her tenure as a senior finance leader, MERC’s 2024 Operating EBITDA was $243.7 million with a net loss of $85.1 million, and its 2019–2024 TSR (value of $100 invested) was $62.33; in Q3’25, the company reported Operating EBITDA of negative $28.1 million amid industry headwinds .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mercer International Inc. | Vice President, Controller | 2023–Present | Senior controllership leadership; finance reporting oversight |
| Mercer International Inc. | Director, External Reporting | 2011–2023 | Led SEC/external reporting since joining MERC in Nov 2011 |
| Public companies (mining, high‑tech, consumer products) | Management positions in financial reporting | Pre‑2011 | Cross‑industry financial reporting experience for public issuers |
External Roles
- No public company directorships or external board roles were disclosed for Ms. Alekson in MERC’s 10-K or DEF 14A .
Fixed Compensation
- Cindy Alekson is not a named executive officer (NEO); thus, her individual base salary, target bonus, and realized bonus are not disclosed in the Summary Compensation Table (NEO-only). The compensation framework below applies to executives broadly, but specific 2024 figures for Ms. Alekson are not disclosed .
Performance Compensation
Short-Term Incentive Plan (STIP) – Structure (Fiscal 2024)
| Component | Weighting | Target construct | Payout curve / notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate Operating EBITDA | 40% | Target set using mid-cycle pricing assumptions | <55% of target EBITDA=0%; 55%=50%; 100%=100%; >150%=200% of target |
| Safety (TRIR) | 10% | TRIR thresholds (min/target/max) | Pro‑rata between thresholds; higher safety performance pays more |
| GHG emissions (fuel oil intensity) | 5% | Company metric (not applied to COO Wood Products) | Pro‑rata between thresholds |
| Productivity | 15% | Mill‑weighted; pulp production/sawmill productivity/mass timber orders | Pro‑rata between thresholds |
| Costs / Profitability | 10% (15% for COO Wood) | Pulp: cash cost/tonne; Sawmills: EBITDA/m3; Mass timber: total EBITDA | Pro‑rata; thresholds vary by site (min/target/max) |
| Individual | 20% | Annual goals approved by Committee | Committee discretion to assess goals |
STIP outcomes for NEOs in 2024 (for reference on corporate payout level) were 73–79% of bonus target; Cindy’s specific payout was not disclosed:
| NEO | Total STIP Achievement (% of bonus target) |
|---|---|
| Juan Carlos Bueno (CEO) | 79% |
| Richard Short (CFO) | 79% |
| Adolf Koppensteiner (COO, Pulp) | 79% |
| Carsten Merforth (COO, Wood) | 73% |
| Wolfram Ridder (SVP, Innovation & Gov’t Relations) | 79% |
Long-Term Incentive Program (LTIP) – PSUs
| Element | Detail |
|---|---|
| Vehicles | Performance Share Units (PSUs) are primary LTIP awards for executives |
| Performance metrics | Two equally weighted components: ROAA (absolute) and Relative TSR vs a defined global pulp/paper peer set; 0–200% payout scale with interpolation |
| Peer group for TSR (FY24 grant) | Borregaard, Canfor Pulp, CMPC, ENCE, International Paper, Klabin, Metsä Board, Rayonier AM, Rottneros, Stora Enso, Suzano, SCA, UPM-Kymmene, West Fraser |
| 2024 PSU grant cadence | Granted Feb 14, 2024; performance period: Jan 1, 2024–Dec 31, 2026; vests after 3-year period based on criteria above |
| 2022 PSU outcome | 0% vested for period ended Dec 31, 2024 (ROAA −0.81%; TSR 14th percentile) |
Note: Aggregate 2024 PSU amounts are disclosed for NEOs; Cindy’s individual LTIP grants are not itemized as she is not an NEO .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Direct share ownership | Latest Form 4 indicates 5,153 shares held directly (reported Feb 15, 2024) |
| Ownership as % of outstanding | ~0.0077% of 66,870,774 shares outstanding as of record date (5,153 / 66,870,774) |
| Hedging policy | Hedging by executive officers/directors is prohibited (e.g., options, collars, swaps, exchange funds) |
| Pledging policy | 2024 proxy: prohibits executives from holding stock in margin accounts or pledging as collateral; 2025 proxy: cautions executives against margin/pledging (tight policy; wording softened) |
| Ownership guidelines | NEO Share Ownership Policy: CEO=5x salary; other NEOs=3x salary with 5/3‑year compliance windows; not specified for non‑NEOs like the VP, Controller |
| Upcoming vesting pressure | Company‑wide 2024 PSU cohort (for executives) vests post‑12/31/2026; 2022 PSUs paid 0% (reduces 2025 selling pressure) |
| Insider sales | No open‑market sales were identified in the cited Feb 15, 2024 Form 4; filing shows derivative/award reporting and direct holdings disclosure |
Employment Terms
- Individual employment agreement, severance multiples, or change‑of‑control (CoC) terms for Ms. Alekson are not disclosed. Company plan terms apply to participants: under the Amended & Restated 2022 Stock Incentive Plan, upon a termination with a triggering event within 12 months of a change of control, performance awards are deemed achieved at 100% of target and become immediately payable (double‑trigger acceleration) .
Governance, Policies, and Shareholder Feedback
- Clawback: Amended/re‑stated clawback aligned with SEC/NASDAQ rules; allows recovery for accounting restatements and specified misconduct .
- Securities compliance: Insider trading controls and trading windows; policy applies to all directors/employees .
- 2025 Say‑on‑Pay: Approved (For 50,455,258; Against 118,623; Abstain 192,756; broker non‑votes reported) .
- 2025 Equity Plan Amendment: Shareholders approved amendment to the 2022 Plan to add 2.5 million shares; post‑approval availability disclosed .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Strong pay‑for‑performance design (EBITDA‑weighted STIP and 3‑year ROAA/relative TSR PSUs) reduces windfalls; 2022 PSU 0% payout underscores rigor. For 2024, corporate STIP paid ~75–80% to NEOs, signaling modest cash incentive outcomes in a tough year; Ms. Alekson’s specific payout not disclosed .
- Selling pressure: Limited near‑term vesting pressure from 2022 PSUs (0% payout); 2024 PSU cohort vests after FY26—monitor for 2026/2027 potential supply; Ms. Alekson’s specific award overhang not disclosed .
- Governance risk: Hedging prohibition and tight stance on pledging reduce misalignment/credit risk; NEO ownership guidelines enhance skin‑in‑the‑game, but non‑NEO guidelines are not specified, implying less formal alignment requirements for roles like VP Controller .
- Retention/realized pay: Negative 2025 EBITDA prints and industry stress could depress realized LTIP; Committee noted retention considerations in pay decisions, but individual terms for Ms. Alekson are not published—monitor STIP/LTIP calibration and any retention or make‑whole awards in future proxies/8‑Ks .
- Shareholder stance: Say‑on‑pay and the 2022 Plan amendment passed in 2025, suggesting investors broadly accept current compensation architecture despite cyclical headwinds .
Note: As Ms. Alekson is not an NEO, MERC’s proxy omits her individual compensation specifics, severance economics, and detailed equity award schedules. Where data is unavailable, this report relies on company‑level plan design and disclosed insider filings to assess alignment, retention risk, and potential trading signals.