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Christopher L. Blanchard

EVP for Mine Planning and Development at Ramaco ResourcesRamaco Resources
Executive

About Christopher L. Blanchard

Christopher L. Blanchard is EVP for Mine Planning and Development at Ramaco Resources (METC) since May 2024; he previously served as Chief Operating Officer from December 2017 to May 2024 . He is 50 years old and holds a B.S. in Mining Engineering (Virginia Tech), an MBA (University of Charleston), and an M.S. in Systems Engineering (Missouri University of Science and Technology) . Company pay-versus-performance data during his executive tenure shows Total Shareholder Return (TSR) values of 387.59 in 2024 and 601.92 in 2023, with net income of $11.2M and $82.3M and Adjusted EBITDA of $105.8M and $186.1M, respectively . Annual bonus metrics for NEOs include Adjusted EBITDA, cost per ton, safety (TRIR), and environmental compliance; in 2024 Blanchard’s total annual bonus payout was $1,000,000 (100% of target) .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Ramaco ResourcesCOODec 2017–May 2024Led operations scale-up; transition to EVP role in 2024
Cutlass Collieries (Cline Group), Nova ScotiaVP – Operations & DevelopmentNot disclosedOperations development at Cline Group asset
Alpha Natural Resources (subsidiary)Director of Operations SupportNot disclosedOperations support leadership
Massey Energy (subsidiary operating UBB)President (UBB mine)Apr 2010Was President at time of explosion; not charged

Fixed Compensation

Multi-year cash and equity compensation for Blanchard:

Metric202220232024
Base Salary ($)580,000 610,000 630,000
Discretionary Bonus ($)278,400 347,700 400,000
Stock Awards (Grant-Date FV, $)1,640,625 2,090,747 1,351,867
Non-Equity Incentive ($)417,600 521,550 600,000
All Other Compensation ($)12,200 13,200 13,800
Total ($)2,928,825 3,583,197 2,995,667

Additional targets:

  • 2024 non-equity bonus target $600,000; threshold $300,000; maximum $1,200,000 .
  • 2023 annual bonus target percentage: 150% of base salary for Blanchard .

Performance Compensation

Annual Bonus Design and Outcomes

MetricWeightingThresholdTargetMaximumActualPayout as % of Target
Adjusted EBITDA (2022)25% $208M $260M $312M $214M 56%
Cost of Coal Sales per Ton (2022)15% $68.6 $64.1 $59.6 $85.6 0%
Safety – TRIR (2022)10% 4.05 3.68 3.31 3.29 200%
Environmental (2022)10% 30 23 20 8 200%

Bonus payouts:

  • FY2023: Blanchard $869,250 (95% of target) .
  • FY2024: Blanchard $1,000,000 (100% of target) .

2024 definitions:

  • Adjusted EBITDA definition and components for 2024; cash mine costs per ton sold = $93 based on specified cost components and 3.6M tons sold .

Equity Awards and Vesting

Award YearTypeShares (Blanchard)Vesting TermsNotes
2024RSUs29,198 Vest 1/3 on Jan 31, 2025/2026/2027, subject to continued employment Granted under LTIP
2024PSUs (target)29,198; max 58,396 Time-vests Dec 31, 2026; performance-vests on TSR vs peer; 0–200% CIC: deemed vested at max if employed at closing; or accelerate at max upon Qualifying Termination
2023RSUs65,631 Vest 1/3 on Jan 31, 2024/2025/2026 Grant-date FV $696,345
2023PSUs (target)65,631; max 131,262 Time-vests Dec 31, 2025; performance-vests on TSR vs peer; 0–200% 2023 PSU plan modification added peer changes; incremental fair value $207,137

Options/stock vested and realized value:

YearClassShares Vested (#)Value Realized ($)
2024Class A285,725 3,595,798
2024Class B57,144 619,626
2023Class A199,739 1,782,145
2023Class B39,947 429,327

Equity Ownership & Alignment

As-of DateClass A SharesClass B SharesTotal Common% of Class
Apr 29, 2024454,669 91,510 546,179 1.0%
Dec 31, 2024 (Proxy table date)416,020 96,902 512,922 <1% (each class)

Outstanding equity awards (12/31/2024):

TypeShares/UnitsMarket/Payout Value ($)
Unvested RSUs (2024 grant)29,198 295,484
Unearned PSUs (2024 grant, at max)58,396 590,968
Unvested RSUs (2023 grant)43,754 442,790
Unearned PSUs (2023 grant, at max)131,262 1,328,371
Class B related units (RSU-linked)8,751 86,460
Class B related units (PSU-linked)26,252 259,370

Notes:

  • Class B stock dividend in June 2023: NEOs entitled to 0.2 Class B shares per Class A share ultimately vesting under 2022/2023 awards .

Employment Terms

Severance and change-in-control economics (Severance Plan/CIC Plan):

  • Non-CIC termination without cause: Cash severance equals 2.0×(base salary + greater of target bonus or 3-year average bonus), plus prorated target bonus, accelerated vesting of time-based equity, 401(k) equivalent, and up to 18 months COBRA at employee rate .
  • CIC protected period (90 days before to 24 months after CIC): Qualifying Termination (double trigger: without cause or for good reason) increases cash multiple to 2.5× and accelerates equity per plan terms; COBRA and 401(k) payment apply .
  • Restrictive covenants: 12-month post-termination non-competition and non-solicitation required for severance eligibility .

Potential payments for Blanchard:

Scenario (as of date)Aggregate Cash ($)Accelerated Equity ($)COBRA ($)
Qualifying Termination (12/31/2024)5,102,600 3,880,523 47,276
CIC without Qualifying Termination (12/31/2024)3,055,789
Qualifying Termination (12/31/2023)4,755,100 10,001,816 47,276
CIC without Qualifying Termination (12/31/2023)4,324,140

Performance & Track Record

  • Background includes leadership roles at Cline Group (Cutlass Collieries), Alpha Natural Resources, and Massey Energy’s UBB mine; he was not charged in connection with the April 2010 UBB explosion .
  • Bonus metrics emphasize operations and safety; 2022 safety (TRIR) and environmental targets paid at 200% due to performance exceeding maximum thresholds (TRIR 3.29 vs max 3.31; environmental exceedances 8 vs max 20) .
  • Company TSR and financials show volatile outcomes: TSR 601.92 (2023) with net income $82.3M and Adjusted EBITDA $186.1M; TSR 387.59 (2024) with net income $11.2M and Adjusted EBITDA $105.8M .

Compensation Committee Analysis

  • Compensation Committee members (FY2023): Patrick C. Graney III (Chair), David E.K. Frischkorn Jr., Richard M. Whiting .
  • The company uses Meridian Compensation Partners as independent compensation consultant; compensation is not formally benchmarked but informed by peer practices and CEO recommendations for non-PEO NEOs .
  • Introduction of PSUs in 2022 to align with peer group practices and TSR performance measurement; peer group revised in 2023 to include additional energy/mining companies (e.g., Peabody, Arch, Alpha Metallurgical, CONSOL, Warrior Met Coal, SunCoke, etc.) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment (Additional)

  • Pay mix emphasizes at-risk compensation: significant equity (RSUs/PSUs) and performance-based cash; base salary increases from $580k (2022) to $630k (2024) reflect market alignment and performance growth considerations .
  • No disclosure found on share pledging or hedging by Blanchard in the proxy excerpts returned; Class B dividend mechanics add alignment via additional vesting-linked shares .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Strong pay-for-performance architecture with PSU TSR-based vesting (0–200%), multi-year RSU schedules, and operational/safety metrics driving cash bonuses; this supports long-term value creation alignment .
  • Retention risk: Material unvested RSUs/PSUs outstanding (e.g., 2024 RSUs 29,198 and 2023 RSUs 43,754; 2024 PSUs max 58,396 and 2023 PSUs max 131,262) provide retention hooks; however, CIC terms accelerate at maximum upon Qualifying Termination, which can reduce retention power in a sale scenario .
  • Selling pressure: Periodic RSU vesting dates (Jan 31, 2025/2026/2027) and PSU settlements at performance period ends could create supply overhang around those dates; 2023 and 2024 vesting produced sizable realized values ($2.21M combined in 2023; $4.22M combined in 2024), which may correlate with potential share dispositions for tax/liquidity .
  • Design changes: 2023 PSU modification (peer group methodology change) carried incremental ASC 718 fair value ($207,137 for Blanchard), a governance watchpoint for award calibration and potential pay inflation .
  • Reputational context: UBB mine history (no charges) is a background consideration for safety stewardship, but 2022 metrics indicate strong safety and environmental performance outcomes at the company level .