Paul De Cock
About Paul De Cock
Paul F. De Cock is President and Chief Operating Officer of Mohawk Industries (effective February 1, 2025) and previously led the Flooring North America segment from November 2018 to February 2025; age 52 . Company 2024 performance context tied to his incentive formulas: net sales ~$10.8B, adjusted EBITDA ~$1.4B, free cash flow ~$680M, adjusted EPS 9.70 (up ~5.5% YoY), and TSR ranked at the 10th percentile for the three-year period ending 2023, which zeroed out the TSR LTIP component .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mohawk Industries | President & Chief Operating Officer | Feb 2025–present | Promoted following successful leadership of Flooring North America; tasked to execute strategic operational initiatives |
| Mohawk Industries | President — Flooring North America | Nov 2018–Feb 2025 | Drove operational excellence and enhanced customer experience in the largest segment |
| Mohawk/Unilin | President — Unilin Flooring | Nov 2008–Nov 2018 | Led Unilin Flooring operations post-acquisition integration |
| Mohawk/Unilin North America | President — Unilin North America | ~2006–2008 | Helped integrate Unilin into Mohawk in North America |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | $751,900 | $774,457 | $824,797 |
| Bonus ($) | — | — | — |
| Stock Awards ($) | $922,855 | $491,623 | $837,453 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation ($) | $338,355 | $716,065 | $1,059,561 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $22,180 | $21,973 | $21,541 |
| Total ($) | $2,035,290 | $2,004,118 | $2,743,352 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (SEAIP) — 2024 Structure and Outcomes
| Item | Details |
|---|---|
| Award opportunity (as % of base salary) | Threshold 42%; Target 70%; Maximum 140% |
| Metrics & Weighting | Company EPS (25%) and Flooring North America segment EPS (75%) for De Cock |
| Goal Levels (Company EPS) | Threshold 7.14; Target 9.23; Max 10.61; Actual 9.70* |
| Goal Levels (FNA Segment EPS) | Threshold 0.50; Target 1.49; Max 1.95; Actual 1.99* |
| Payout (2024 award) | $1,059,561 (paid; reported in Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation) |
*Adjustments exclude miscellaneous non-operating expenses .
Long-Term Incentive Plan (Senior Executive LTIP) — 2024 Grants and Mechanics
| Component | Key Terms | Quantification |
|---|---|---|
| Fixed Component (RSUs) | Based on % of 2023 base salary; designed for retention; vests ratably over 3 years | De Cock received 2,998 RSUs under fixed component in 2024 |
| Variable Component — TSR | TSR vs S&P 500 over 2021–2023; 0–200% of target; linear interpolation; TSR 10th percentile resulted in 0 RSUs for TSR in 2024 | TSR percentile outcome: 10th; TSR awards: 0 |
| Variable Component — Business Unit | Based on Company EPS and Business Unit EPS/Operating Income (for De Cock: Company EPS and FNA EPS); opportunity: Threshold 10%, Target 20%, Max 40% of base salary; vests ratably over 3 years | Opportunity range for De Cock: 10%/20%/40% |
| 2024 RSU Grant (aggregate) | Granted Feb 23, 2024 under 2017 Plan; vest ratably over 3 years; per-unit fair value $114.94 | 7,286 RSUs; grant date fair value $837,453 |
2023 Business Unit Financial Goals used to determine 2024 Business Unit RSUs:
| Metric | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2023 Performance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Company EPS ($) | 6.10 | 9.29 | 12.11 | 9.19* |
| Flooring North America EPS ($) | 0.59 | 1.72 | 3.01 | 1.30* |
*Adjusted to exclude miscellaneous non-operating expenses .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership and Guidelines
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Shares beneficially owned | 37,176 shares of common stock |
| Ownership as % of class | <1% (asterisked “less than one percent” in table footnote) |
| Stock ownership guideline (role-based multiple) | COO: 3x base salary; CFO & segment leaders: 2x; compliance period 5 years |
| Compliance status (as of Apr 1, 2025) | All directors and executive officers have met requirements |
| Hedging/derivatives policy | Directors/officers prohibited from short sales and options (anti-hedging policy) |
| Pledging | No pledge disclosed for De Cock; one director noted pledged shares in footnote (not De Cock) |
Outstanding Equity Awards (Unvested RSUs) at 12/31/2024
| Grant | Shares Unvested (#) | Market Value ($) | Vesting Terms |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs (Mar 4, 2022) | 2,239 | $266,732 | Vests ratably over 3 years on each anniversary |
| RSUs (Feb 28, 2023) | 3,186 | $379,548 | Vests ratably over 3 years on each anniversary |
| RSUs (Feb 23, 2024) incl. 2023 AIP RSUs | 9,221 | $1,098,498 | Vests ratably over 3 years on each anniversary |
| RSUs (Jul 28, 2021 — retention) | 7,042 | $838,913 | Vests ratably over the 3rd, 4th, and 5th anniversaries |
Market value based on $119.13 closing price on Dec 31, 2024 .
2024 Equity Vesting and Option Activity
| Item | Quantity/Value |
|---|---|
| Shares acquired on vesting (2024) | 9,412 RSUs |
| Value realized on vesting | $1,270,146 |
| Option exercises | None |
Deferred Compensation
| Item | Status |
|---|---|
| Nonqualified Deferred Compensation (2024) | No executive/registrant contributions; no balance reported for De Cock |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Details |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement (Dec 29, 2018) | Base salary $640,000; annual bonus up to 112.5% of base; severance = 2× base salary + 2× target annual bonus; 2-year non-compete and non-solicit; terminated upon promotion to COO effective Feb 1, 2025 |
| Severance plan participation | Named executive officers generally participate in employee severance plan; De Cock’s separate agreement governed severance until 2/1/2025 |
| Potential payments (as of 12/31/2024) — Involuntary Termination | Cash severance $2,804,310 (sum of 2× 2024 base salary + 2× target bonus); payable quarterly over eight installments |
| Potential payments — Change in Control (equity acceleration) | $2,583,691 value of unvested RSUs; single-trigger if awards not assumed; if assumed, double-trigger vesting on termination without cause or good reason within 1 year |
| Insurance benefits (death/disability) | Life insurance equal to 1× then-current annual salary ($824,797 in 2024); AD&D equal to 1× annual salary |
| Clawback policy | Adopted Oct 2, 2023; applies to incentive-based compensation upon accounting restatement |
| Insider trading & hedging | Directors/officers restricted from hedging and options; policy filed with 2024 Form 10-K |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Peer benchmarking: De Cock’s total direct compensation above 50th percentile; base salary above 75th; total cash above 75th; long-term incentive below 50th (suggests higher cash orientation vs peers) .
- AIP levers emphasize operational accountability: For De Cock, 75% weight on segment EPS and 25% on Company EPS; achieved above-target segment EPS (1.99 vs 1.49 target) and Company EPS (9.70 vs 9.23 target) driving the $1.06M payout .
- LTIP mix: Fixed RSUs for retention plus variable RSUs tied to TSR and business unit performance; TSR at 10th percentile zeroed the TSR award, increasing reliance on business-unit and personal performance within LTIP .
- Ownership alignment: COO guideline 3× salary and hold requirements; all executives met ownership requirements by April 1, 2025; hedging prohibited; no pledging disclosed for De Cock .
Investment Implications
- Alignment vs shareholder returns: TSR underperformance (10th percentile) eliminated TSR LTIP awards, signaling compensation sensitivity to long-horizon shareholder outcomes; continued reliance on EPS-based awards may overweight accounting performance vs market returns .
- Near-term selling pressure: Significant RSU vesting cadence (2021 retention grant and 2022–2024 annual RSUs vesting through 2026–2029) plus 9,412 shares vested in 2024 suggests ongoing supply from vestings; no option exercises, but vesting creates potential liquidity events even with ownership hold requirements .
- Retention risk: Historical retention RSU grant (2021) and fixed LTIP component indicate deliberate retention; promotion included a $2.0M time-vesting RSU with 5-year cliff, further anchoring tenure in role .
- Change-in-control economics: Equity acceleration and double-trigger protection if awards are assumed provide meaningful downside protection; involuntary termination cash severance equals ~$2.8M based on 2024 levels, lowering exit friction but not excessive relative to role .
- Pay-for-performance design: AIP focus on Company and segment EPS with defined thresholds/targets and discretion within a bonus pool; 2024 positive Company performance produced sizeable payouts, aligning cash incentives to operational results .
All information above is sourced from Mohawk’s 2025 DEF 14A and related 8-Ks as cited.
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