Emmanuelle Lee
About Emmanuelle Lee
Emmanuelle Lee is Mirion’s Chief Legal Officer and Chief Compliance Officer, serving in this role since 2018 after joining Mirion in 2011 as Deputy General Counsel . Her background includes corporate counsel roles at FrontRange Solutions (now Ivanti) and PeopleSoft (now Oracle), attorney-at-law at Ropers Majeski, Kohn & Bentley, and early service as a parliamentary aid to French Senator Xavier de Villepin; she holds a Juris Doctor from Santa Clara University and a French graduate law degree from Université de Paris II Panthéon-Assas . Company performance used in executive pay decisions for 2024 included revenue of $860.9M (+7.5% YoY) and adjusted EBITDA of $203.6M (+12.7% YoY), with a net loss of ($36.6)M .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mirion Technologies | Deputy General Counsel | 2011–2018 | Supported legal function during growth and pre-public phases |
| Mirion Technologies | Chief Legal Officer & Chief Compliance Officer | 2018–present | Led legal and compliance, governance practices and policies |
| FrontRange Solutions (Ivanti) | Corporate Counsel | — | Enterprise software legal counsel |
| PeopleSoft (Oracle) | Corporate Counsel | — | ERP software legal counsel |
| Ropers Majeski, Kohn & Bentley | Attorney-at-law | — | Private practice legal experience |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| French Senate (Xavier de Villepin) | Parliamentary Aid | — | Exposure to foreign affairs and governance |
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Target Bonus (%) | Target Bonus ($) | Actual Bonus Paid ($) | Stock Awards ($) | All Other Compensation ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 430,000 | 50% | 215,000 | 247,530 | 299,995 | 22,111 | 994,636 |
Notes:
- 2024 base salary increase from $410,000 to $430,000 effective April 1, 2024 .
- Eligible for deferred compensation plan; perquisites include $5,000 annual financial/tax advisory allowance and up to $5,000 for annual physical exam .
Performance Compensation
Annual STIP (2024) – Corporate Metrics and Outcomes
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout Level (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adj. EBITDA Margin % | 35% | 21.81% | 23.56% | 24.06% | 23.79% | 50.75% |
| Adj. Organic Revenue Growth | 25% | 4.00% | 6.00% | 8.00% | 6.61% | 32.63% |
| Adj. Free Cash Flow ($M) | 40% | 64.00 | 80.00 | 96.00 | 73.40 | 31.75% |
| Total Weighted Payout | — | — | — | — | — | 115.13% |
| Executive | Target Incentive Opportunity (%) | Target Bonus ($) | Payout Level (%) | Actual Bonus ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Emmanuelle Lee | 50% | 215,000 | 115.13% | 247,530 |
Long-Term Incentive (2024 Grants and Structure)
| Grant Type | Grant Date | # of Units | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting/Performance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSU | 3/1/2024 | 15,060 | 149,998 | Vests in 3 equal annual tranches from 1st anniversary; service condition |
| PSU (Target) | 3/1/2024 | 15,060 | 149,998 | 3-year performance (1/1/2024–12/31/2026) on Adjusted EBITDA (50%) and Management Adjusted FCF (50%), ±10% Relative TSR modifier; cap 200% |
PSU 2024 Adjusted EBITDA performance curve:
| Metric ($M) | Payout (% of Target PSUs) |
|---|---|
| Minimum: 250 | 50% |
| Target: 265 | 100% |
| Maximum: 280 | 200% |
Acceleration provisions (RSU/PSU):
- Termination without Cause or for Good Reason (no CIC): RSUs accelerate if scheduled to vest within 6 months; PSUs accelerate if performance period ends within 6 months (target or actual, greater) .
- Termination in connection with CIC: Full acceleration of RSUs and PSUs for Ms. Lee if termination occurs within 12 months post-CIC .
- Death/Disability: Full acceleration of RSUs and PSUs at target for all NEOs .
- Retirement: RSUs accelerate if scheduled within 6 months; PSUs accelerate if performance period ends within 6 months (target or actual, greater) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership (as of March 17, 2025)
| Holding | Shares | Ownership % |
|---|---|---|
| Class A Common Stock (total) | 232,890 | <1% (“*”) |
| Class B Common Stock (total) | 170,941 | 2.7% |
| RSUs expected to vest/settle within 60 days | 18,859 | — |
Breakdown (footnote detail):
- Class A directly: 43,090
- Class B directly: 138,193
- Class B held by Lee Revocable Living Trust: 32,748
Outstanding Equity Awards (Unvested at 12/31/2024)
| Grant Date | Vesting Commencement | Unvested RSUs (#) | Market Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 12/27/2021 | 12/27/2022 | 11,928 | 208,144 |
| 4/1/2022 | 4/1/2023 | 9,418 | 164,344 |
| 3/29/2023 | 3/29/2024 | 18,882 | 329,491 |
| 3/1/2024 | 3/1/2025 | 15,060 | 262,797 |
| Grant Date | Performance Period End | Unearned PSUs (Target #) | Payout Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3/1/2024 | 12/31/2026 | 15,060 | 262,797 |
Notes:
- Market values based on $17.45 closing price on 12/31/2024 .
Ownership Policy, Hedging/Pledging
- Minimum stock ownership multiples: Section 16 Officers 3x base salary; CFO/Group President 4.5x; CEO 6x; Directors 5x; retention of net shares until compliant; all participants currently in compliance .
- Company prohibits hedging and pledging; as of the record date, no outstanding pledges by any officers or directors .
Employment Terms
Core Employment Agreement Terms (Amended Aug 7, 2023)
| Scenario | Cash | Bonus Treatment | Benefits | Equity |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination w/o Cause or for Good Reason (outside CIC) | Base salary continuation for 12 months | Pro-rata annual incentive bonus for year of termination | COBRA premiums paid during severance period (or until eligible at new employer) | RSUs/PSUs acceleration per award agreements (6-month window) |
| Termination w/o Cause or for Good Reason (in CIC period) | 1x (base salary + target bonus) | Pro-rata annual incentive bonus | COBRA premiums paid during severance period | Full acceleration of RSUs/PSUs if terminated within 12 months post-CIC |
| Death or Disability | Salary through termination date; pro-rata bonus | Pro-rata annual incentive bonus | — | Full acceleration at target |
| 280G Cutback | Payments reduced to avoid 4999 excise tax if after-tax benefit is greater | — | — | — |
Confidentiality/Non-Interference:
- Non-solicit of employees/consultants for 12 months post-termination; perpetual confidentiality; restrictions on using confidential information to solicit/divert customers or suppliers; IP assignment to company .
Potential Payments (Assuming Event Occurs 12/31/2024)
| Scenario | Cash Severance ($) | Equity Acceleration ($) | Deferred Comp Payout ($) | Health Benefits ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination w/o Cause or Good Reason (no CIC) | 677,530 | 416,689 | 69,462 | 19 | 1,163,700 |
| Termination w/o Cause or Good Reason (in CIC) | 892,530 | 1,227,573 | 69,462 | 19 | 2,189,584 |
| Death or Disability | 247,530 | 1,227,573 | 69,462 | — | 1,544,565 |
| Retirement | — | 416,689 | 69,462 | — | 486,151 |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Lee’s 2024 cash bonus paid at 115.13% of target on corporate metrics (EBITDA margin, organic growth, FCF), consistent with the program’s formulaic design and no discretionary adjustments . LTI mix favors RSUs/PSUs with multi-year performance tied to adjusted EBITDA and FCF, plus ±10% TSR modifier, reducing short-term risk-taking and aligning with long-term value creation .
- Retention and selling pressure: Unvested tranches across 2021–2024 RSUs and 2024 PSUs provide continued retention hooks; near-term RSU vesting of 18,859 shares within 60 days of 3/17/2025 is noted, but hedging/pledging is prohibited and participants must retain net shares until ownership requirements are met, mitigating forced selling signals .
- Severance/CIC economics: Outside CIC, cash severance equals 12 months’ salary plus pro-rata bonus and COBRA; within CIC, 1x salary+target bonus with full equity acceleration if terminated within 12 months post-CIC—moderate protection (no single-trigger; 280G cutback; no excise tax gross-ups), balancing retention and shareholder-friendliness .
- Alignment and risk controls: Stock ownership multiples, clawback policy compliant with NYSE/Dodd-Frank, and prohibition of hedging/pledging indicate strong governance and alignment; as of record date, no pledges outstanding by officers/directors . Company performance inputs used in pay decisions (revenue +7.5% YoY; adj. EBITDA +12.7% YoY) support incentive payouts while net loss underscores the importance of non-GAAP targets in compensation constructs .