Brian Archbold
Senior Vice President of Operations and Continuous Improvement at MESA LABORATORIES INC /CO/
Executive
About Brian Archbold
Brian Archbold is Senior Vice President of Operations and Continuous Improvement at Mesa Laboratories (MLAB). He joined Mesa in January 2018; he is age 48, holds a B.S. from Central Michigan University and an MBA from Michigan State University, and previously held senior operations roles at Quadion, Beckman Coulter/Danaher, Thermo Fisher, and IBM Supply Chain Management . Company performance metrics that influence his pay include organic revenues, adjusted operating income (AOI), inventory reduction, and relative TSR: FY2023 adjusted AOI was $44.7 million (+17.9% YoY), yielding a 39% bonus payout; FY2024 CPF achieved 40% due to mixed results; FY2025 CPF improved to 140% as operating income rose sharply . Long-term PSUs incorporate a TSR modifier (+/-20%) for FY2024 and relative TSR versus the S&P 1500 Healthcare Index in FY2025, emphasizing alignment with shareholder returns .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quadion LLC (global medical and automotive components) | Vice President, Global Operations | Jan 2015–2018 | Led global operations for a diversified manufacturer |
| Beckman Coulter (Danaher) | Director of Operations | Sep 2012–Jan 2015 | Operations leadership within Danaher operating system |
| Thermo Fisher Scientific | Senior leadership roles in Operations | — | Progressive operations responsibility |
| IBM | Supply Chain Management | — | Early career supply-chain experience |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 297,018 | 387,307 | 404,000 |
| Stock Awards ($) | 430,549 | 748,210 | 910,936 |
| Option Awards ($) | 260,064 | 226,725 | 198,042 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan ($) | 200,680 | 81,120 | 97,200 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 12,195 | 17,165 | 12,442 |
| Total ($) | 1,200,506 | 1,460,527 | 1,622,620 |
| Bonus Target and Actual | FY 2023 | FY 2024 | FY 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Target Award ($) | $208,000 | $243,000 | $252,000 |
| Target Award (% of Salary) | 54% | 60% | 60% |
| CPF (%) | 39% | 40% | 140% |
| IPF (%) | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Payout % (CPF × IPF) | 39% | 40% | 140% |
| Actual Bonus Paid ($) | $81,120 | $97,200 | $352,800 |
| Base Salary Change | FY 2024 Base | FY 2025 Base | % Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Archbold | $404,000 | $420,000 | 4% |
Performance Compensation
| STIP Metric (FY2024) | Weighting | Target definition | Actual | Payout impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Organic Revenues | 40% | GAAP revenues excluding acquisitions consummated in year | $206.9M, achieved 0% of target | 0% contribution to CPF |
| Adjusted Operating Income (AOI) | 40% | AOI excluding amortization, SBC, impairment; excludes GKE contribution/costs | Adjusted AOI $42.8M; no payout for AOI metric | 0% contribution to CPF |
| Inventory Reduction | 20% | Target inventory excl. post-3/31/23 acquisitions; threshold $32.7M | Inventory $31.2M (excl. $4.1M GKE), achieved 200% | 200% for strategic metric |
| Overall CPF | n/a | Weighted average of metrics | 40% overall achievement | Determined bonus payout |
| LTIs (Program) | FY 2024 | Vesting | Design details |
|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | 50% of LTI mix | Earned based on FY2024 (rev, AOI%) with 3-yr TSR modifier; vests 6/21/2026 | 50% total revenues; 50% AOI% vs revenues; if revenue <95% or AOI% <90%, no vest; TSR modifier up to ±20% |
| Options | 18% of LTI mix | Vest ratably 6/21/2024, 6/21/2025, 6/21/2026 | FMV strike at grant |
| RSUs | 32% of LTI mix | Vest 9/1/2024, 6/21/2025, 6/21/2026 | Time-based, pro-rata vesting |
| LTIs (Program evolution) | FY 2025 | Vesting | Design details |
|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | 50% of LTI mix | Vest 6/18/2027 | 50% GAAP revenues over 3 years (4/1/2024–3/31/2027); 50% relative TSR vs S&P 1500 Healthcare (6/18/2024–6/18/2027); revenue threshold 92.5% target; TSR threshold 25th percentile |
| RSUs | 50% of LTI mix | Pro-rata over 3 years | Shifted from options to RSUs to improve retention; supported by FW Cook benchmarking |
| Equity Grants (Archbold) | FY 2024 (Grant Date) | Shares/Units | Strike ($) | Vesting | Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 9/1/2023 | 2,533 | — | 9/1/2024, 6/21/2025, 6/21/2026 | 352,011 |
| PSUs (Target) | 6/21/2023 | Threshold 2,113; Target 4,225; Max 10,140 | — | Earn FY2024; vest 6/21/2026 | 558,925 |
| Options | 6/21/2023 | 4,579 | 131.67 | 6/21/2024, 6/21/2025, 6/21/2026 | 198,042 |
| PSUs | FY2025 awards | — | — | — | 675,125 |
| RSUs | FY2025 awards | — | — | — | 675,087 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Beneficial Ownership | Date | Shares Beneficially Owned | Percent of Class |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brian Archbold | 6/16/2023 | 9,650 | * (<1%) |
| Brian Archbold | 6/14/2024 | 11,130 | * (<1%) |
| Brian Archbold | 6/3/2025 | 17,564 | * (<1%) |
| Ownership Guidelines | Requirement | Compliance Status |
|---|---|---|
| NEOs (non-CEO) | 3× base salary; RSUs count; options/unearned PSUs do not | All directors/executives comply or are on track within 5 years |
| Insider policy | No hedging, short sales, margin, or pledging | Enforced |
| Outstanding Equity (Archbold, as of 3/31/2024; $109.57 close) | Grant Date | Exercisable (#) | Unexercisable (#) | Strike ($) | Expiration | Unvested RSUs (#) | MV ($) | Unearned PSUs (#) | MV ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Options | 6/21/2023 | — | 4,579 | 131.67 | 6/21/2029 | — | — | — | — |
| Options | 6/15/2022 | 1,284 | 2,568 | 185.57 | 6/15/2028 | — | — | — | — |
| Options | 9/1/2021 | 2,282 | 1,139 | 268.85 | 9/1/2027 | — | — | — | — |
| Options | 6/15/2020 | 1,780 | — | 226.72 | 6/15/2026 | — | — | — | — |
| Options | 6/10/2019 | 1,064 | — | 203.54 | 6/10/2025 | — | — | — | — |
| Options | 4/2/2018 | 420 | — | 142.40 | 4/2/2024 | — | — | — | — |
| RSUs | 9/1/2023 | — | — | — | — | 2,533 | $277,541 | — | — |
| RSUs | 6/15/2022 | — | — | — | — | 1,070 | $117,240 | — | — |
| RSUs | 9/1/2021 | — | — | — | — | 354 | $38,788 | — | — |
| PSUs | FY2024 award (55% achieved + potential +20% TSR) | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2,789 | $305,536 |
| Vests/Exercises and Realized Values | FY 2023 | FY 2024 | FY 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Options exercised (#) | — | — | — |
| Value realized on option exercise ($) | — | — | — |
| Shares vested (RSUs) (#) | 2,186 | 1,226 | 1,734 |
| Value realized on vesting ($) | $398,470 | $165,509 | $194,400 |
Upcoming vesting cadence: FY2024 RSUs vest 9/1/2024, 6/21/2025, 6/21/2026; FY2024 PSUs vest 6/21/2026 (post TSR modifier); FY2023 strategic PSUs vest 6/15/2025; FY2023–FY2024 options vest annually through 2026 .
Employment Terms
- Employment agreements executed 9/29/2021; indefinite term, termination by either party . In June 2025, “normal retirement” definition adjusted; at normal retirement (age ≥65), equity continues to vest and performance awards earned at actual performance; options remain exercisable full term .
- Severance (no CoC): 1× base salary + 1× target bonus paid over 12 months; pro-rata bonus at greater of target or actual; 24 months employer-subsidized COBRA; equity: awards with >3-yr vest fully vest; <3-yr vest schedule: RS/Options due to vest in next 12 months vest and options exercisable 14 months; PSUs vest at higher of actual or target .
- Severance (with CoC, double trigger): 2× (base + target bonus) paid lump-sum within ~60 days; pro-rata bonus; 24 months COBRA; equity acceleration (see below) .
- Equity on CoC: all unvested equity immediately vest; performance awards deemed earned at higher of actual or target; options remain exercisable for full term (single-trigger for equity) .
| Estimated Termination Benefits (as of 3/31/2024) | Termination for Cause | Without Cause/Good Reason | After Change in Control |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash (salary + bonus) | $0 | $647,000 | $1,294,000 |
| Equity (accelerated value) | — | $549,694 | $793,342 |
| Benefits continuation | — | $46,240 | $46,240 |
| Total | — | $1,242,934 | $2,133,582 |
Governance and Program Design
- Share ownership guidelines: CEO 5× salary; other NEOs 3× salary; RSUs count; options/unearned PSUs excluded; all directors/executives comply or are on track .
- Insider trading policy: hedging, pledging, short sales, margin transactions prohibited .
- Clawback policy in place; caps on short-term incentives; engage independent consultants; benchmark against peers; no tax gross-ups (incl. 280G excise), no option repricing, minimal perquisites; no supplemental executive retirement or deferred compensation plans .
- Compensation Committee membership: FY2025—Shannon M. Hall (Chair), R. Tony Tripeny, Mark C. Capone; independent with no related-party conflicts . Consultants: Pay Governance (FY2023); FW Cook (FY2025) .
Performance & Track Record
- FY2023 IPF achievements: facility capacity expansions; operations org build-out; supply chain/on-time delivery improvements; interim HR leadership support .
- FY2024 IPF achievements: inventory reduction project exceeded targets; scaled global operations team; supply chain continuity; Scope I/II GHG emissions calculation to advance ESG mission .
- FY2025 IPF achievements: breakthrough Kaizen events; global ops org scaling; continuity across plants; executive sponsor of Corporate Responsibility .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Hedging/pledging prohibited, reducing misalignment risk .
- No tax gross-ups (162(m), 280G), and clawback policy exists—shareholder-friendly .
- Equity accelerates on single-trigger at CoC, though severance cash requires double trigger—potential windfall risk if CoC occurs .
- No material legal proceedings disclosed for executives .
- No option repricing; minimal perquisites .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is evident: low payouts in FY2023–FY2024 (39–40%) and a step-up to 140% in FY2025 as operating income rebounded, indicating incentive sensitivity to fundamentals .
- Shift in FY2025 LTI mix away from options toward 50/50 RSUs/PSUs raises retention and reduces risk, while TSR-based PSUs strengthen shareholder alignment; expect predictable vesting-driven supply from RSUs with limited option exercises historically .
- Ownership remains small (<1%); however, stringent 3× salary ownership guidelines and prohibition of hedging/pledging mitigate alignment concerns and selling pressure risk .
- Change-in-control terms are moderate on cash (2× base+bonus) but include single-trigger equity acceleration, which could be dilutive in a transaction scenario; clawback and capped STIP help constrain excessive risk-taking .