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Jeff Stutz

Chief Operating Officer at MILLERKNOLLMILLERKNOLL
Executive

About Jeff Stutz

Jeffrey M. Stutz served as MillerKnoll’s Chief Financial Officer (NEO) through FY2025 and transitioned to Chief Operating Officer in September 2025; he has been an executive officer since 2009 . His compensation and incentives were tightly linked to EBITDA and revenue performance with an rTSR modifier, while annual cash incentives used EBITDA as adjusted (FY2025) and operating earnings (FY2023) . Company TSR moved from 66.45 (FY2023) to 132.65 (FY2024) before retracing to 83.91 (FY2025) . Say‑on‑pay support remained strong (95.6% “For” at the Oct. 2025 AGM; ~96% support noted for 2024) .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
MillerKnollChief Financial Officer (NEO)FY2023–FY2025Led finance through a period emphasizing EBITDA-driven incentives and PSU metrics (EBITDA/Revenue with rTSR), and oversaw programs such as 2024 RSU-in-lieu-of-cash AIP election for liquidity and alignment .
MillerKnollChief Operating OfficerSep 2025–PresentTransitioned from CFO to COO in Sep 2025, supporting operational execution as the company expanded retail footprint and continued post‑Knoll integration momentum .

External Roles

  • No external directorships or outside roles disclosed for Jeff Stutz in the proxies or 8‑Ks reviewed.

Fixed Compensation

MetricFY 2023FY 2024FY 2025
Base Salary ($)577,615 580,000 601,538
Target Bonus (% of Salary)70% 70% 80%
Actual AIP Payout ($)$0 $421,834 (paid as RSUs at 200% of cash equivalent; see note) $233,878
Actual AIP Payout (% of Target)— (0%) 103.9% 48.6%

Note: In FY2024, NEOs could elect RSUs in lieu of cash for the AIP with a 2x multiplier; Stutz elected RSUs (grant on July 16, 2024; cliff vest July 22, 2025) .

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive (AIP) – FY2025 Structure and Result

MetricThresholdTargetMaximumActualPayout (% of Target)
EBITDA, As Adjusted ($mm)305.8 407.7 509.6 355.3 48.6%

Long‑Term Incentives (LTI) – Mix and Metrics

  • FY2025 LTI mix (Other NEOs): 60% PSUs, 40% RSUs; PSUs measured 50% EBITDA (as adjusted) and 50% Revenue over three one‑year periods with a 25% rTSR modifier (75th percentile = x1.25; 25th = x0.75; overall cap 200%) .
  • RSU vesting: FY2025 grants vest 33.3%, 33.3%, 33.4% on July 22 each year; prior RSUs vest 25%, 25%, 50% on August 1 .

LTI Grants Detail (Units)

Grant DetailFY 2023FY 2024FY 2025
PSUs (#)17,844 13,309 28,608
RSUs (#)9,264 21,566 20,696
Stock Options (#)27,248; strike $27.75; 10‑yr term; 3‑yr ratable vest 150,894; strike $20.00 (≈16% premium at grant); 10‑yr term; 3‑yr ratable vest None (options removed from FY2025 mix for other NEOs)

PSU Cycle Outcomes

  • FY2023–FY2025 cycle for FY2023 grants: final payout 35.6% of target after rTSR multiplier (23rd percentile → 75.0% modifier) .
  • FY2021–FY2023 cycle (historical reference): final payout 51.0% of target (rTSR 31st percentile → 80.8% modifier) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Total Beneficial Ownership (Aug 18, 2023)265,690 shares; <1% of outstanding; includes 202,281 options exercisable within 60 days and 4,289 deferred stock units .
Outstanding Awards (May 31, 2025)RSUs: 54,244 units (market value $915,096 at $16.87); PSUs (unearned): 20,644 units (value $348,264); multiple legacy options outstanding from prior years .
Vesting SchedulesRSUs granted FY2025 vest July 22 (33.3/33.3/33.4); older RSUs vest August 1 (25/25/50); PSUs vest based on performance with rTSR modifier post the 3‑year period .
Ownership Guidelines4x base salary for executives with LTIP target ≥100% of salary; all NEOs in compliance; 40% net‑after‑tax retention until guidelines met .
Hedging/PledgingProhibited for directors and executive officers (anti‑hedging, anti‑pledging policy) .

Insider vesting activity: FY2025 vestings for Stutz included 20,532 shares vested (value realized $612,570), indicating scheduled supply around vest dates rather than open‑market selling pressure .

Employment Terms

ProvisionKey Terms
At‑Will Status & Severance“At will”; if terminated without cause: 18 months base salary, health continuation; requires release, non‑compete, and non‑solicit during salary continuation period .
Without‑Cause (Illustrative)As of May 31, 2025: Cash severance $907,500; Health/Welfare $32,390; RSU/PSU treatment per plan (proration; actual performance payout) .
Change‑in‑Control (CIC)Double‑trigger; 2x base salary + greater of avg. prior 3‑yr bonus or current‑year target + prorated current‑year target; 24 months benefits; up to $25,000 outplacement; full vesting of LTI awards (per vehicle rules). No excise tax gross‑ups .
ClawbacksDual policies: mandatory recovery for restatements (SEC/Nasdaq 10D) and discretionary recovery for improper conduct .
Deferred CompensationExecutive Equalization Retirement Plan: FY2025 contributions and balance for Stutz—Exec contrib $46,262; Company contrib $9,838; FY2025 earnings $109,066; balance $1,231,446 .
PerquisitesComprehensive executive physical ($4,100 for Stutz in FY2025) .

Company Performance Context (Pay‑for‑Performance linkage)

Metric ($USD)FY 2023FY 2024FY 2025
Revenues$4,087.1mm*$3,628.4mm*$3,669.9mm*
EBITDA$371.0mm*$399.9mm*$383.0mm*
Cash from Operations$162.9mm* $352.3mm* $209.3mm*

Values retrieved from S&P Global.
TSR reference (initial $100 investment): Company TSR moved 66.45 → 132.65 → 83.91 across FY2023–FY2025; peer group TSR 140.06 → 208.21 → 186.95 .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Increased equity emphasis: Shift from options (FY2024) to higher PSU/RSU weighting (FY2025) raises long‑term, performance‑linked pay and retention through time‑based RSUs .
  • AIP metric tightening: FY2025 AIP solely on EBITDA (as adjusted) reduced payouts versus FY2024, aligning cash incentives with profitability amid margin pressures .
  • RSU in‑lieu cash (FY2024) conserved liquidity and increased alignment; cliff vest created a potential vest‑date supply event but signals management confidence and retention focus .
  • Governance safeguards: No option repricing, no excise tax gross‑ups, robust clawbacks, and anti‑pledging policies reduce red‑flag risks .

Say‑On‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • Say‑on‑pay approval at Oct. 13, 2025 AGM: 56,495,979 For; 2,623,598 Against; 130,507 Abstain; 4,664,217 broker non‑votes (≈95.6% For) .
  • Committee noted ~96% support in 2024 and sustained best‑practice features (ownership requirements, clawbacks, no single‑trigger CIC) .

Compensation Peer Group (FY2025)

American Woodmark; Floor & Decor; Fortune Brands Innovations; HNI; JELD‑WEN; La‑Z‑Boy; Leggett & Platt; Masonite; MasterBrands; RH; Sleep Number; Somnigroup; Steelcase; UFP Industries; Wayfair; Williams‑Sonoma .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: High equity mix (PSUs with EBITDA/Revenue and rTSR) and RSU retention plus stock ownership rules foster long‑term alignment; anti‑pledging reduces collateral risk .
  • Vesting‑date supply: Notable vesting windows (July 22 and August 1) can create technical selling pressure around those dates; FY2025 vest realizations evidenced scheduled supply (no Form 4 data reviewed here) .
  • Retention & continuity: Stutz’s move to COO in Sep 2025 signals operational depth; CIC is double‑trigger, avoiding windfalls without termination and preserving continuity in strategic events .
  • Pay‑for‑performance: Lower FY2025 AIP payout (48.6%) reflects under‑target EBITDA; PSU structures modulate payouts via rTSR, reducing overpayment risk in down markets .

Overall, Stutz’s incentives are predominantly performance‑ and retention‑oriented with governance controls that mitigate common executive compensation risks, while scheduled vesting windows warrant monitoring for short‑term technical flow impacts.


References:
Executive status and compensation tables ; AIP and LTI design ; Ownership, policies, severance/CIC ; Deferred comp ; TSR/Pay‑vs‑Performance ; AGM voting ; FY2024 program and grants ; FY2023 program and grants ; COO transition .

S&P Global disclaimer: Revenues, EBITDA, Cash from Operations marked with asterisks were retrieved from S&P Global.