Gregory A. LaBerge
Marcus & MillichapAbout Gregory A. LaBerge
Senior Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) at Marcus & Millichap (MMI) since 2015; joined MMI in 2005 as an investment broker, became a regional manager in 2008, and was appointed National Director, National Hospitality Group in 2012. Education: B.A. in Economics (Northwestern University) and M.B.A. (Indiana University Kelley School of Business) . Company performance context for FY2024: revenue $696M (+8% y/y) and net loss of $12M; pre-tax net loss of $13M used as the company-selected measure for pay-versus-performance; 5-year TSR index value $109.31 vs peer group $172.38 . Governance and alignment: executive stock ownership guidelines (LaBerge as “Other NEO” requirement 3x base salary), anti-hedging/anti-pledging policies, and compensation recovery (clawback) policy are in place; all NEOs met ownership guidelines at year-end 2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Marcus & Millichap (MMI) | Investment Broker | 2005–2008 | Production role; foundation for later leadership |
| Marcus & Millichap (MMI) | Regional Manager | 2008–2012 | Led regional operations; talent development |
| Marcus & Millichap (MMI) | National Director, National Hospitality Group | 2012–2015 | Built national vertical; sector expertise |
| Marcus & Millichap (MMI) | SVP, Chief Administrative Officer | 2015–Present | Firmwide operational initiatives, technology and retention |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ernst & Young LLP | Management Consultant | ~5 years (pre-2005) | Fortune 500 strategic/operational initiatives |
| Diamond Technology Partners (now PwC) | Management Consultant | ~5 years (pre-2005) | Technology-enabled strategy; large-scale operations |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $337,500 | $350,000 | $350,000 |
| Perquisites/Other ($) | $19,000 | $7,750 | $30,250 (Auto $26,250; 401(k) match $4,000) |
Performance Compensation
| Component | Design | Weighting | Target | Actual/Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 Annual Incentive – Financial | Company pre-tax net income; target set 50% above internal plan due to anticipated rate cuts (which did not occur) | 35% (LaBerge) | Pre-tax net income $30M vs plan $20M | Company pre-tax net loss $(13)M → 0% payout on financial component |
| 2024 Annual Incentive – Strategic | Individual strategic goals: retention, technology initiatives, operational initiatives firmwide | 65% (LaBerge) | Committee-established priorities | Committee assessed “met/largely achieved”; total annual incentive $273,488 (59% of $467,500 target) |
| 2025 Long-Term PSUs | 50% PSUs with 3-year performance period (FY25–FY27); 1/3 Revenue, 2/3 Adjusted EBITDA; payout 0–200% at 3-year vest date | PSU sub-metrics weighting: Rev 33%, Adj. EBITDA 67% | Committee-certified 3-year goals | Earned PSUs vest at year 3; no payout until certification |
Equity Grants and Vesting
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs Granted (#) | 6,590 | 6,195 | 5 equal annual installments; 2024 grant first vests 3/10/2025 |
| Grant Date Fair Value ($) | $235,790 | $201,709 | Time-based vest contingent on continuous service (change-in-control exceptions) |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 9,430 shares (includes 1,000 RSUs vesting 5/10/2025; 2,307 held by Gregory & Meredith LaBerge Trust) |
| Ownership % of SO | ≈0.024% of 39,198,040 shares outstanding (9,430 ÷ 39,198,040) |
| Outstanding Unvested RSUs at 12/31/2024 | 611; 2,032; 16,062; 5,272; 1,000; 6,195 units; aggregate market values for each grant shown at $38.26/share |
| Options | None (no NEO holds stock options) |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for officers/directors/employees and designated consultants |
| Ownership Guidelines | Other NEOs and senior executives: 3x base salary; 5-year compliance window |
| Compliance Status | All NEOs satisfied ownership guidelines at end of 2024 |
| 10b5-1 Plan | Adopted 5/22/2023 for up to 8,201 shares; expires earlier of 5/19/2024 or when all shares sold |
| Pledging Disclosure | No pledging disclosed for LaBerge in beneficial ownership table; Phoenix entity of Chair has pledged shares (context) |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | No individual severance agreement disclosed for LaBerge; participates in company-wide policies |
| Change-in-Control Policy (Double Trigger within 12 months) | Cash severance equal to 12 months base salary + target annual incentive; COBRA reimbursement up to 12 months; RSU acceleration; up to $25,000 outplacement; no 280G/4999 tax gross-ups |
| Estimated CIC Economics (as of 12/31/2024) | Cash severance $817,500 (=$350,000 + $467,500); COBRA $33,757; Outplacement $25,000; RSU acceleration $1,192,641 |
| Death/Disability | RSU vesting acceleration after ≥1 year of service; disability COBRA up to 12 months |
| Clawback (Compensation Recovery Policy) | Recovery of erroneously awarded performance-based incentive comp upon restatement; discretionary recovery of time-based incentives; recovery for improper conduct over current + prior 3 years |
| Insider Trading | Quarterly blackout; prohibits hedging/short selling/derivatives; pledging/margin purchases generally prohibited; Rule 10b5-1 programs allowed under policy |
Multi-Year Compensation Summary (LaBerge)
| Metric | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | $337,500 | $350,000 | $350,000 |
| Stock Awards ($) | $1,265,764 | $235,790 | $201,709 |
| Non-Equity Incentive ($) | $471,625 | $255,044 | $273,488 |
| All Other ($) | $19,000 | $7,750 | $30,250 |
| Total ($) | $2,093,889 | $848,584 | $855,447 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Target annual incentive opportunities for NEOs (including LaBerge) were reduced by 15% in 2024 due to challenging business conditions, reducing LaBerge’s target from $550,000 to $467,500 .
- Long-term incentives historically time-based RSUs; beginning in 2025, 50% PSUs with revenue and Adjusted EBITDA three-year goals (payout 0–200%) reflecting shareholder feedback and stronger pay-for-performance alignment .
Compensation Peer Group and Say-on-Pay
- Peer group (13 companies) includes B. Riley Financial, Brown & Brown, Douglas Elliman, Houlihan Lokey, Moelis, Newmark Group, Oppenheimer, Piper Sandler, PJT Partners, Ryan Specialty, SelectQuote, Walker & Dunlop, Crawford & Co; larger direct competitors (CBRE, Colliers, Cushman & Wakefield, JLL) excluded due to scale/diversification .
- 2024 say-on-pay support ~71% vs ~93% in 2023; shareholder outreach led to PSU introduction in 2025 LTI and no further off-cycle one-time grants planned .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- No executive tax gross-ups in change-in-control; double-trigger design mitigates windfall risk .
- Prohibitions on hedging/pledging reduce misalignment risk; no pledging disclosed for LaBerge .
- Off-cycle 2023 CEO retention grant was flagged by shareholders; company committed to avoid further off-cycle grants; PSU addition addresses pay-for-performance concerns .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is strengthening with 2025 PSU design tied to revenue and Adjusted EBITDA; this raises the proportion of at-risk comp for LaBerge and may curb discretionary payouts in weak macro environments .
- Change-in-control economics for LaBerge are moderate (1x salary + 1x target bonus) with full RSU acceleration, suggesting manageable retention risk but possible selling pressure at vest dates; note prior 10b5-1 plan adoption in 2023 for up to 8,201 shares .
- Ownership guideline compliance and anti-hedging/anti-pledging policies support alignment; absence of individual severance agreement beyond policy indicates standardized governance controls .