Karina Chavez
3MAbout Karina Chavez
Karina Chavez, 51, is Group President of 3M’s Consumer Business Group (appointed in 2023) after serving as SVP & Chief Strategy Officer (2021–2023), SVP, Customer Operations (2020–2021), and Global Business Director, Home Improvement (2017–2020) . She is identified as a presenter at 3M’s 2025 Investor Day, underscoring her leadership of the Consumer segment . Company performance context during her tenure includes 2024 adjusted organic sales growth of 2.3% and a 46.1% one‑year TSR, with management highlighting portfolio simplification and renewed advertising/merchandising investment in Consumer under her team’s direction . Management also cited 2024 operating margin expansion of 280 bps and EPS growth of 21%, framing the broader execution environment for her business .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3M | Group President, Consumer Business Group | 2023–present | Leads Consumer portfolio, brand focus, and commercial execution |
| 3M | SVP & Chief Strategy Officer | 2021–2023 | Enterprise strategy oversight and transformation planning |
| 3M | SVP, Customer Operations | 2020–2021 | Global customer operations and service model discipline |
| 3M | Global Business Director, Home Improvement | 2017–2020 | P&L and growth for Home Improvement brands and channels |
External Roles
Not disclosed in 3M filings reviewed.
Fixed Compensation
Not individually disclosed for Karina Chavez. For context, 3M’s executive pay framework comprises base salary plus an Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) and long‑term equity. In 2024, Group President NEOs (Transportation & Electronics and Safety & Industrial) had AIP targets set at 100% of base salary, illustrating typical program design at this leadership tier .
| Role (NEO examples) | AIP Target (% of Base Salary) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Group President, Transportation & Electronics (Wendy Bauer) | 100% | Program design reference (Karina’s specific target not disclosed) |
| Group President, Safety & Industrial (Christian Goralski) | 100% | Program design reference (Karina’s specific target not disclosed) |
Performance Compensation
3M’s executive incentives tie to rigorous, pre‑set metrics. In 2024, AIP business performance was measured on company‑wide Local Currency Sales vs. Plan, Operating Income vs. Plan, and Operating Cash Flow vs. Plan (equal weighting), and the long‑term PSAs were based on Adjusted EPS Growth, Relative Organic Sales Growth vs. a macro benchmark (S&P Global IPI/GDP blend), and Free Cash Flow Growth .
Annual Incentive Program — 2024 Company‑Level Results and Payout Framework
| Metric | Threshold | Target | Actual (vs Target) | Payout % | Weighting | Weighted Payout % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Local Currency Sales vs Plan (Company) | 23,607 ($mm) | 25,660 ($mm) | 101% | 112.5% | 33.3% | 37.5% |
| Operating Income vs Plan (Company) | 4,548 ($mm) | 5,350 ($mm) | 103% | 120.0% | 33.3% | 40.0% |
| Operating Cash Flow vs Plan (Company) | 5,010 ($mm) | 5,762 ($mm) | 108% | 153.3% | 33.3% | 51.1% |
| Business Performance Factor (Company) | — | — | — | — | — | 128.6% |
Additional AIP features: Individual performance multiplier (±20%) and a Sustainability modifier (±10% of target) were available; the Committee did not apply the Sustainability modifier for 2024 despite meeting/exceeding 7 of 8 goals .
Performance Share Awards (PSAs) — 2024 Design and Targets
| Metric | 2024 Threshold | 2024 Target | 2024 Maximum | Accrual Weighting (Year 1/2/3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EPS Growth | 10.0% | 14.0% | 18.0% | 50% / 30% / 20% |
| Relative Organic Sales Growth (vs IPI/GDP blend) | -1.0% | 0.0% | 1.0% | 50% / 30% / 20% |
| Free Cash Flow Growth | $3,430 ($mm) | $3,810 ($mm) | $4,195 ($mm) | 50% / 30% / 20% |
2024 accrual outcomes summarized by 3M: Year‑1 total accrued at 98.3% of target across the three metrics . Prior 2022 PSA cycle paid 48.7% amid mixed 3‑year TSR (-0.6% annualized) .
Forward Changes (2025 PSAs)
Beginning 2025, PSAs shift to cumulative 3‑year goals (Adjusted EPS and Free Cash Flow, each 50%) with a ±20% relative TSR modifier (S&P 500 Industrials peer set) to better align payouts to shareholder experience .
Company Pay‑for‑Performance (Context)
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EPS Growth (%) | -0.2% | -0.4% (post adjustments for 2023 PSA) | 20.0% |
| Free Cash Flow % Change | -21.5% | 30.3% | 4.9% |
| 1‑Year TSR | — | — | 46.1% |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Stock ownership guidelines: Executives are subject to robust ownership multiples; in 2024 the guideline multiples shown for NEOs included CEO 6x, Group Presidents 3x, and Controller 2x, with compliance reviews and grace periods; individual holdings and compliance for Karina are not disclosed in the proxy .
- Hedging/Pledging: Hedging, short sales, margin accounts, standing orders, and pledging of 3M securities are prohibited for executive officers and directors; discretionary transactions must be pre‑cleared and executed in trading windows .
- Beneficial ownership: The proxy tabulates directors and NEOs; it does not disclose Karina Chavez’s shareholdings, so ownership % and pledged shares for her are not available in the reviewed filings .
Employment Terms
- No fixed‑term employment or change‑in‑control agreements: 3M does not maintain employment or CIC agreements for senior executives; there are no single‑trigger accelerations or excise tax gross‑ups .
- Executive Severance Plan: For eligible U.S. executives (includes NEOs), severance provides continued base salary for 24 months (CEO) and 18 months (other NEOs), prorated AIP tied to actual results (capped at 100% for the post‑termination period), pro‑rata vesting of RSUs, and pro‑rata PSAs, plus outplacement; “Good Reason” and “Misconduct” definitions apply, including enhanced CIC protections (immediate vesting of options/RSUs and pro‑rated PSAs if terminated without misconduct or resign for Good Reason within 18 months post‑CIC) .
- Protective covenants: 3M requires protective covenant agreements (confidentiality, non‑compete, non‑solicit) for new senior executives (examples: CEO/CFO/Group President hires in 2024); Karina’s specific agreement terms are not disclosed .
- Clawback policy: Broad recovery mechanisms for restatements (stock price/financial reporting measures), noncompliant financial reports due to misconduct, significant misconduct causing financial/reputational harm, and significant risk‑management failures; covers cash and equity incentives .
Investment Implications
- Compensation alignment: 3M’s shift to cumulative 3‑year PSAs with a relative TSR modifier should tighten pay‑for‑performance linkage and reduce discretion risk—positive for alignment and signal discipline as Consumer initiatives scale under Chavez .
- Retention risk: Executive Severance Plan and broad equity participation offer retention levers; however, Karina’s individual grant mix/vesting and holdings are undisclosed, limiting precision on near‑term selling pressure or vest cliffs .
- Governance signals: 2024 say‑on‑pay support was 45.3%, prompting program changes and enhanced transparency—suggests active investor influence on incentive rigor (watch execution vs. macro and TSR) .
- Execution track: Management commentary credits Chavez and Consumer leadership with portfolio simplification and renewed ad/merchandising focus, setting conditions for outperformance as macro improves; investors should monitor Consumer vitality metrics and margin capture from commercial excellence .
Note: Karina Chavez’s personal compensation amounts, specific vesting schedules, and beneficial shareholdings are not disclosed in the reviewed filings; analysis references 3M’s company‑wide executive program design and NEO data for structural context.