Sanjay Singh
MANNKINDAbout Sanjay Singh
Sanjay Singh (age 58) is Executive Vice President, Technical Operations at MannKind, serving since October 2022. He holds an M. Pharm in Pharmaceutical Chemistry (LM College of Pharmacy, Ahmedabad) and an MBA (Institute of Management Studies, Indore), with prior senior technical operations leadership across Aurobindo, Cipla, Glenmark, Nicholas Piramal, and Cadila . MannKind’s compensation framework ties his incentives to company performance: 2024 corporate STI achievement was 125% on objectives spanning Tyvaso DPI production, endocrinology, pipeline, and finance/quality; LTI is majority performance-based (relative TSR vs Russell 3000 Pharma & Biotech over 3 years) with payouts between 0–300% of target and Dodd‑Frank-compliant clawback coverage .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aurobindo Pharma | Sr. Vice President & Associate President, Technical Operations (India & USA) | 2011–2022 | Led large-scale technical operations across geographies; senior manufacturing and operations leadership |
| Cipla Ltd | Various leadership roles | 2000–2007; 2008–2011 | Progressively senior operations roles at a global generics leader |
| Glenmark Pharma | Leadership role | 2007–2008 | Technical/operations leadership in inhaled/generics context |
| Nicholas Piramal India Ltd | Leadership role | 1992–2000 | Early career manufacturing/technical responsibilities |
| Cadila Laboratories | Early career role | 1990–1991 | Entry-level technical role |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Parenteral Drug Association (PDA), India Chapter | Founding President | pre‑2015 | Founded PDA India chapter; moved to US in 2015 |
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Target Bonus (%) | Actual Bonus Paid ($) | Perquisites/Other ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 53,846 | 50% of base (Exec VP guideline) | 26,923 | 14,530 (401k + relocation) |
Note: 2022 reflects partial-year service after appointment on Nov 1, 2022 .
Performance Compensation
Short‑Term Incentive (STI) – Company Framework and 2024 Outcome
| Objective | Target Weight | Assessment Method | Result (as % of STI pool) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tyvaso DPI production | 30% | Quantitative vs. production goals; qualitative expansion actions | 57.5% |
| Endocrinology business | 30% | Financial metrics; clinical milestones | 35.0% |
| Pipeline advancement | 30% | Development milestone achievements | 21.5% |
| Finance/Quality | 10% | Qualitative | 11.0% |
| Total Company STI Achievement | — | — | 125.0% |
- Executive Vice Presidents have a 50% of base salary STI target; payouts are scaled by company achievement (125%) and individual performance .
Long‑Term Incentives (LTI) – Awards and Vesting
| Year | Award Type | Target Shares | Vesting | Performance Metric | Payout Range |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Performance RSUs (PSUs) | 158,000 | Cliff vest July 2027 | Relative TSR vs Russell 3000 Pharma & Biotech (7/1/2024–6/30/2027) | 0% (<25th), 50% (25th), 100% (50th), 200% (75th), 300% (≥90th) |
| 2024 | Time‑based RSUs | 129,000 | 25% annually (commencing 7/15/2024 → fully by 7/15/2028) | N/A | N/A |
| 2022 | Time‑based RSUs | 218,500 | 25% annually on each anniversary of 11/01/2022 (2023–2026) | N/A | N/A |
- LTI mix: ~55% performance‑based (PSUs) and ~45% time‑based RSUs for executives granted in 2024 .
- Company’s prior PSU (2021 grant) paid at 198% of target based on TSR performance; Singh did not receive 2021 awards given his 2022 start .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (3/23/2023) | Listed with “*” (<1% ownership); no material direct share count disclosed in the table |
| Unvested Equity (12/31/2022) | 218,500 RSUs outstanding; market value $1,151,495 at $5.27 close |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | Exec VPs: 2× base salary; 5‑year compliance window |
| Compliance Status | All executive officers currently in compliance |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited: no short sales, options, margin, or pledging of Company stock |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment start | EVP, Technical Operations since Oct 2022 (appointment Nov 1, 2022 referenced) |
| Severance | No individual severance agreement disclosed for Singh; the only such agreement among execs is with Mr. Thomson |
| Change‑of‑Control (CoC) | Double trigger: termination without cause or resignation for good reason following CoC |
| CoC triggers | ≥50% voting stock change; merger where pre‑CoC holders own <50% post‑CoC; sale of substantially all assets; liquidation; board reconstitution (as defined) |
| CoC cash benefits | 18 months base salary continuation + 150% of average annual bonus (3‑year lookback), plus pro‑rata current‑year bonus if earned |
| CoC health benefits | Medical/dental coverage for ~18 months (COBRA rates) |
| Equity acceleration under CoC | Unvested awards valued per SEC rules; company discloses accelerated values for NEOs; Singh was not a 2024 NEO and thus not tabulated, but CoC agreements cover executive officers |
| Clawback | Dodd‑Frank‑compliant incentive compensation recovery policy covering financial metrics, stock price, TSR (applies to awards received on/after Oct 2, 2023) |
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Singh’s pay mix is heavily performance‑based via PSUs tied to relative TSR with 0–300% payout, plus time‑based RSUs that build ownership and retention; hedging/pledging prohibitions and executive ownership guidelines (2× salary) support alignment and reduce speculative behaviors .
- Vesting overhang and selling pressure: Time‑based RSUs from 2022 vest annually each Nov 1 through 2026; 2024 time‑based RSUs vest annually July 2025–2028; PSUs cliff‑vest July 2027 based on TSR. Potential delivery events around these dates could modestly add insider supply, subject to blackout windows and policy constraints .
- Retention risk: Multi‑year PSU cliff vesting and annual RSU cadence create retention hooks; CoC protections (18‑month salary and bonus multiple) mitigate transition risk in M&A scenarios but are standard‑market and double‑trigger (shareholder‑friendly) .
- Pay‑for‑performance: Company STI scored 125% for 2024; PSU design is purely relative TSR. This indicates compensation levered to value creation rather than guaranteed cash; clawback provisions further protect investors .
Key data sources: MannKind DEF 14A 2025, 2024, 2023 for executive biography, compensation structures, awards, ownership, policies, and employment terms .