Steven Blanco
MSA SafetyAbout Steven C. Blanco
Steven C. Blanco is President and Chief Executive Officer of MSA Safety and has served on the Board since 2024. He became CEO on May 10, 2024 after 12 years in senior operating roles at MSA; he is 58 years old . Company performance context: in 2024, sales were $1,808.1 million and net income was $285.0 million; the five‑year cumulative TSR index ended 2024 at 139.38 (base=100 at 12/31/2019) . For 2024 annual incentives, company performance produced a 97% earnout; with the Enhanced Bonus feature, total payout was 98% of target .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| MSA Safety | President & Chief Executive Officer | May 2024 – present | Leads strategy and execution across global safety portfolio |
| MSA Safety | President & Chief Operating Officer | Jun 2023 – May 2024 | Drove enterprise operations ahead of CEO transition |
| MSA Safety | SVP & President, MSA Americas | 2022 – Jun 2023 | Led regional P&L for Americas |
| MSA Safety | VP & President, MSA Americas | 2017 – 2022 | Oversaw commercial growth and operations in Americas |
| MSA Safety | VP, MSA Northern North America | 2015 – 2017 | Led regional commercial operations |
| MSA Safety | VP, Global Operational Excellence | 2012 – 2015 | Built global manufacturing/operations excellence capability |
External Roles
- Other current public company directorships: None .
Fixed Compensation
| Item | 2024 | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary paid (SEC SCT) | $773,462 | Partial-year CEO |
| Base salary at 12/31/2024 | $900,000 | Raised upon CEO promotion; +63.6% to 89% of market median |
| All other compensation (total) | $101,232 | See breakdown below |
| Perquisites and personal benefits | $33,555 | Financial/tax assist, vehicle/club/physical per policy |
| Company DC plan contributions | $67,677 | 401(k)/SSP matching |
| Pension – Present Value (MSA Pension Plan) | $334,466 | Defined benefit plan |
| Pension – Present Value (Supplemental Pension Plan) | $925,317 | Nonqualified supplemental DB plan |
| Nonqualified deferred comp: Exec contrib. | $62,388 | SSP deferral (employee) |
| Nonqualified deferred comp: Company contrib. | $62,388 | SSP company match |
| Nonqualified deferred comp: 2024 earnings | $98,793 | Plan-directed investments |
| Nonqualified deferred comp: 12/31/2024 balance | $766,303 | SSP balance |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive (EIP) – CEO Structure and 2024 Results
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2024 Actual | Payout Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Consolidated Net Sales ($000) | 30% | 1,673,681 | 1,859,646 | 2,045,611 | 1,815,951 | 97% base; 98% incl. Enhanced Bonus |
| Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA Margin (%) | 30% | 22.2% | 26.2% | 30.1% | 26.5% | 97% base; 98% incl. Enhanced Bonus |
| Working Capital as % of Net Sales | 30% | 29.9% | 26.0% | 22.1% | 26.5% | 97% base; 98% incl. Enhanced Bonus |
| Adjusted Gross Profit Margin (%) | 10% | 47.3% | 48.0% | 48.7% | 48.1% | 97% base; 98% incl. Enhanced Bonus |
Additional details:
- CEO target bonus: 90% of salary; target $676,800 for 2024 .
- Actual 2024 non‑equity incentive paid: $663,102 .
- ESG scorecard modifier applied (±5% range) was 0% in 2024 .
Long-Term Incentives (PSUs and RSUs)
| Element | 2024 Award Value | Metrics / Design | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Stock Units (PSUs) | $1,920,000 | 50% Adjusted EBITDA Margin %, 50% Revenue Growth; TSR modifier vs S&P Midcap 400 Industrials | PSU shares cliff-vest after 3 years (e.g., 3/8/2027 for 2024 grant) subject to performance |
| Time‑vesting RSUs | $480,000 | Time-based only | 3‑year cliff vest (e.g., RSUs vest 3/8/2027 for 2024 grant) |
PSU outcomes history:
- 2022 PSU grant paid at 220% of target; relative TSR at 64th percentile (1.10x modifier) .
- 2023 PSU grant achieved 50% of target through year two; final vest 3/8/2026 subject to year-three determination .
Grant sizing reference (2024):
- Stock multiplier 436% of salary; mix 87% RSUs / 349% PSUs for CEO .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership/Guideline | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficially owned common shares | 24,930 shares |
| Shares outstanding (record date) | 39,260,624 |
| Ownership as % of shares outstanding | ≈0.06% (24,930 / 39,260,624) |
| CEO ownership guideline | 5.5x base salary; requirement $4,950,000 at $900,000 salary |
| Compliance status (12/31/2024) | Not yet met (recent appointment) |
| Hedging/pledging policy | Prohibited for directors/officers receiving equity awards |
Unvested equity and vesting schedule (as of 12/31/2024):
| Instrument | Shares | Vest Date |
|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 1,107 | 3/8/2025 |
| RSUs | 1,214 | 3/8/2026 |
| RSUs | 1,612 | 6/12/2026 |
| RSUs | 2,707 | 3/8/2027 |
| PSUs (2022 cycle) | 4,426 | 3/8/2025 (performance achieved; time-vest) |
| PSUs (2023 cycle) | 4,855 | 3/8/2026 (50% achieved through year two) |
| PSUs (2024 cycle) | 10,829 | 3/8/2027 (no interim lock-in) |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms for Steven C. Blanco |
|---|---|
| Severance (company-initiated, U.S. salaried plan) | Up to 52 weeks base salary based on service; as of 12/31/2024 “Involuntary Termination Without Cause” cash severance example: $294,231; outplacement $25,000 |
| Change-in-Control (CIC) | Double trigger; lump sum up to 2x (salary + average bonus last two years) plus up to 24 months of medical/dental/accident/life benefits; no excise tax gross-ups; equity vests upon CIC+qualifying termination |
| CIC example (12/31/2024) | Cash severance $3,074,516; health & welfare $36,888; outplacement $25,000; equity shown separately below; earned EIP $663,102 |
| Death/Disability – equity vesting | RSUs and PSUs vest per plan; 12/31/2024 equity values: RSUs $1,100,712; PSUs $3,333,634 |
| Clawback policies | Mandatory recoupment for accounting restatements (3 prior fiscal years) and discretionary clawback for misconduct/financial irregularities; updated for NYSE Rule 10D‑1 |
Board Governance (Director Service, Committees, Independence)
- Board: Director since 2024; no committee assignments (employee-director) .
- Board leadership: Non-Executive Chairman; Lead Independent Director; four fully independent committees (Audit; Compensation & Talent Management; Nominating & Corporate Governance; Law), all chaired by independent directors .
- Attendance: All directors attended ≥75% of Board and committee meetings in 2024 .
- Independence: Board lists independent directors; as CEO, Mr. Blanco is not listed among independents .
- Say‑on‑pay: 2024 approval 97.2%; Board considered this in 2025 program design .
Director Compensation (for Board Service)
- Non‑employee director program (cash retainer $85,000; equity $145,000 RSAs/RSUs vesting after one year; chair/lead retainers) applies to non‑employee directors; Mr. Blanco is not included among non‑employee directors receiving these fees .
Compensation Peer Group and Philosophy
- Program targets middle (50th percentile) of market; significant at‑risk pay; ownership culture and clawbacks in place .
- 2024 peer group (20 companies) includes Albany International, Barnes, Brady, ESCO, Federal Signal, Graco, IDEX, ITT, Littelfuse, Masimo, Nordson, Simpson, TriMas, Zurn Elkay, among others .
Say‑on‑Pay & Pay vs Performance Context
| Year | CEO(s) | SCT Total Comp (PEO) | Compensation Actually Paid (CAP) | TSR Index | Net Income ($MM) | Sales ($MM) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Blanco (PEO from 5/10/24) | $4,242,990 | $3,218,826 (Blanco) | 139.38 | 285.0 | 1,808.1 |
Note: 2024 Say‑on‑Pay support was 97.2% .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and leverage: High at‑risk pay (65.3% of CEO target comp at risk) with annual metrics (Net Sales, Adj. EBITDA Margin, Working Capital %, Gross Margin) and PSU metrics (Adj. EBITDA Margin %, Revenue Growth with relative TSR modifier) supports pay‑for‑performance and capital discipline .
- Vesting/supply overhang: Significant scheduled vesting windows around March 8, 2025/2026/2027 (unvested RSUs: 1,107/1,214/2,707; PSUs: 4,426/4,855/10,829), which can create sell‑to‑cover activity; monitor Form 4s near those dates .
- Retention/COC protection: Double‑trigger CIC (up to 2x salary+bonus; 24‑month benefits; no excise gross‑ups) balances retention with shareholder‑friendly features; standard severance plan in non‑CIC scenarios .
- Governance mitigants: Chair/CEO separation; fully independent committees; hedging/pledging prohibited; robust clawbacks—lower governance risk premium .
- Capital returns backdrop: Board authorized a new $200 million share repurchase program on May 10, 2024, which can help offset equity issuance dilution and support EPS/TSR .