Shin Young Park
MAGNACHIP SEMICONDUCTORAbout Shin Young Park
Shin Young Park is Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and Principal Financial Officer/Principal Accounting Officer of Magnachip Semiconductor Corporation (MX). She is 44, became CFO in January 2022, previously Chief Accounting Officer from March 2020, Corporate Controller from November 2018 to February 2020, and SEC Reporting & Accounting Director from April 2015 to October 2018; prior to joining Magnachip in April 2014 she held senior advisory and audit roles at Deloitte across Chicago, Seoul, and London. She holds a B.A. in business administration from Sogang University (Seoul) and a Master’s in hospitality industry studies from New York University. Recent performance-linked outcomes include 0% payout of 2022 TSR PSUs after Magnachip recorded TSR of -78.64% (8th percentile vs S&P Semiconductor Index), and 0% payout of 2024 short-term cash incentives as thresholds were not met, while 2025 compensation adjustments tie salary restoration to sustained positive operating income for two consecutive quarters .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Magnachip Semiconductor Corporation | Chief Financial Officer | Jan 2022–present | Principal financial officer and principal accounting officer; SOX 302 certification of controls and reporting |
| Magnachip Semiconductor Corporation | Chief Accounting Officer | Mar 2020–Jan 2022 | Led accounting policy and internal control over financial reporting |
| Magnachip Semiconductor Corporation | Corporate Controller | Nov 2018–Feb 2020 | Consolidation, reporting, close processes |
| Magnachip Semiconductor Corporation | SEC Reporting & Accounting Director | Apr 2015–Oct 2018 | SEC filings and technical accounting |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deloitte & Touche (Chicago, IL) | Senior advisory/audit | 2005–2009 | U.S. GAAP audit and advisory foundation |
| Deloitte (London, U.K.) | Senior advisory/audit | 2011–2013 | IFRS/UK reporting exposure |
| Deloitte Anjin (Seoul, Korea) | Senior advisory/audit | 2009–2011; 2013–Mar 2014 | Korea-market audit, cross-border coordination |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 (current terms) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 284,497 | 344,202 (CFO salary increased from $310,000 to $350,000 effective Mar 1, 2024; amount reflects FX) | 360,000 effective Apr 1, 2025 (Amended & Restated Executive Service Agreement) |
| Target Bonus (% of Base) | 75% | 75% | 75% confirmed in 2025 agreement |
| Target Bonus ($) | — | 262,500 | — |
| Actual Bonus Paid ($) | 1,011 | 0 (threshold not met) | — |
| Salary Reduction | — | 10% deferral of receipt in 2024, paid Jan 2025 (NEOs’ voluntary deferral program) | CFO Salary Reduction: -10% until operating income > 0 for two consecutive quarters; automatically returns to original base upon change of control |
2024 Perquisites (selected items)
| Perquisite | Amount ($) |
|---|---|
| Health insurance premiums | 10,377 |
| Personal use of car service | 2,844 |
| Annual health exam for spouse | 1,046 |
| Fitness allowance | 804 |
| Meal allowance | 1,239 |
| Medical support, welfare points and similar | 4,318 |
Performance Compensation
Plan-Based Awards and Outcomes
| Incentive | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting/Performance Period |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Short-Term Cash Incentive (2024) | Company financial performance vs annual operating plan (aligned with MSK CBA payout approach) | — | Threshold required for >0% payout | Threshold not met | 0% | FY 2024 |
| Stock Price PSUs (granted 06/01/2024; 75,000 at target) | Trailing 30-day VWAP thresholds: $14.14 (100%), $21.21 (200%), $28.28 (300%), straight-line interpolation | — | 100%=$14.14; 200%=$21.21; 300%=$28.28 | Not yet determined | — | Ends Jan 31, 2027; requires continued service |
| TSR PSUs (granted 02/16/2023) | TSR vs S&P Semiconductor Index; 2023–2025 period; continued service condition | — | Target level per plan | Not yet determined | — | 2023–2025 |
| TSR PSUs (granted 02/28/2022) | TSR vs S&P Semiconductor Index; threshold: 35th percentile | — | ≥35th percentile | -78.64% TSR; 8th percentile | 0%; 4,500 shares forfeited (Park) | 2022–2024 (concluded) |
2024 Equity Grants (grant-date values)
| Award Type | Grant Date | Shares/Units (#) | Grant-Date FV ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 06/01/2024 | 75,000 | 377,250 |
| Stock Price PSUs (target) | 06/01/2024 | 75,000 | 377,250 (reported at 100% vesting level) |
2024 Vesting Activity and Option Exercises
| Item | Quantity/Value |
|---|---|
| RSUs vested (shares) | 42,508 |
| Value realized on vesting ($) | 170,882 |
| Stock options exercised (count) | None in 2024 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Category | Detail | Amount |
|---|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (as of Apr 24, 2025; 36,063,605 shares outstanding) | Shares | 71,568; less than 1% of class |
| Vested/exercisable within 60 days (as of Jun 23, 2025) | Shares and options | 69,068 shares; 2,500 options |
| Options (exercisable) | 08/11/2015 grant: 1,000 @ $8.45; expires 08/11/2025 | 1,000 |
| Options (exercisable) | 03/11/2016 grant: 1,500 @ $5.53; expires 03/11/2026 | 1,500 |
| Unvested RSUs | 02/16/2023 grant | 12,508 units; market value $50,282 at $4.02 (12/31/2024) |
| Unvested RSUs | 06/01/2024 grant | 50,000 units; market value $201,000 at $4.02 (12/31/2024) |
| Unvested PSUs (target) | 02/16/2023 grant (TSR PSUs) | 11,257 units; market/payout value $45,253 at $4.02 (12/31/2024) |
| Unvested PSUs (target) | 06/01/2024 grant (Stock Price PSUs) | 75,000 units; market/payout value $301,500 at $4.02 (12/31/2024) |
| Forfeited PSUs | 02/28/2022 TSR PSUs | 4,500 forfeited in full (0% payout) |
| Hedging/Pledging policy | Pledging prohibited; short sales and options prohibited; long-term hedges only with pre-clearance | Policy in effect; anti-hedging/pledging restrictions |
Employment Terms
| Scenario | Cash Severance ($) | Equity Acceleration Value ($) | Continuation Benefits ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination by Company without Cause / by Executive for Good Reason (Non-CIC) | 350,000 | 140,386 (assuming target-level vesting of eligible TSR PSUs and Stock Price PSUs; after March 1, 2025 TSR PSU forfeiture, value would be $122,296) | — | 490,386 |
| Termination without Cause / Good Reason in connection with a Change in Control (CIC Termination) | 525,000 | 616,125 (includes immediate vesting of RSUs granted on/after Jan 1, 2023 and vesting of TSR PSUs/Stock Price PSUs at target; after March 1, 2025 forfeiture adjustment: $598,035) | — | 1,141,125 |
| Change in Control (without termination) | — | 616,125 (assumes Committee accelerates all equity awards) | — | 616,125 |
- 2025 Amended & Restated Executive Service Agreement: Base increased to $360,000 effective April 1, 2025; confirms annual cash bonus opportunity at 75% of base; adds CIC window enhancement—if termination qualifies and occurs after June 30, severance includes an additional month of base salary for each month since July 1 through termination date; confirms agreement to company clawback policy .
- Clawback: Company’s Compensation Recovery Policy (NYSE-compliant) applies to incentive-based compensation for executive officers in restatement scenarios, with methods for recovery determined by the Compensation Committee .
- Statutory severance (Korea): Present value of accumulated benefit as of Dec 31, 2024—$171,702 for 6 years of credited service; accrues approx. one month of base salary per year .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and changes: 2024 saw no cash bonus payout despite target bonus of 75% of base, indicating high at-risk cash component linked to operating performance; equity shifted to stock price PSUs with three-year performance horizon and explicit price hurdles ($14.14/$21.21/$28.28), reinforcing long-term stock price alignment .
- Performance awards discipline: 2022 TSR PSUs paid 0% (TSR -78.64%, 8th percentile), demonstrating strict adherence to external TSR benchmarking without discretionary adjustments .
- Governance safeguards: No option repricing permitted; prohibition on hedging/pledging; annual executive compensation review with responsiveness to shareholder feedback (79.9% say-on-pay approval; 2025 PSUs revised to emphasize stock price goals) .
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 say-on-pay approval: Approximately 79.9% approval; Compensation Committee revised 2025 PSU structure to emphasize significant stock price goals to better align with shareholders; annual say-on-pay frequency affirmed .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and upside leverage: Park’s unvested RSUs (62,508 units) and Stock Price PSUs (75,000 target units) create substantial equity-linked retention and performance leverage through Jan 2027, directly aligned to achieving aggressive VWAP thresholds .
- Near-term selling pressure: RSUs vest on December 31 (42,508 vested in 2024), suggesting an annual vesting cadence that could produce periodic sell-to-cover activity; however, hedging/pledging prohibitions and 2024 absence of option exercises mitigate speculative selling risk .
- Transaction economics: CIC termination economics (1.5x base salary plus full equity vesting per plan terms) and possibility of equity acceleration upon change in control without termination (Committee discretion) increase the attractiveness of strategic transactions; salary automatically restores upon change of control, supporting continuity .
- Execution risk signals: The 0% payout of 2022 TSR PSUs highlights prior underperformance versus peers; the 0% 2024 cash incentive payout and 2025 salary reduction tied to sustained positive operating income indicate disciplined pay-for-performance and a potential pivot toward profitability focus, with incentives aligned to both operational turnaround and stock price recovery .