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Steven Zanella

Director at PLAYSTUDIOSPLAYSTUDIOS
Board

About Steven J. Zanella

Steven J. Zanella, age 55, has served on the MYPS Board since December 21, 2021; he previously served on the board of Old PLAYSTUDIOS from June 2020 to June 2021 . He is President of Operations at MGM Resorts International, overseeing regional properties, sports/sponsorships, and strategic partnerships; prior roles include Chief Commercial Officer, President & COO of CityCenter, President of Core Properties, and President & COO of MGM Grand Detroit . Education: B.S. in Hotel Administration (UNLV) and MBA (Michigan Ross, 2014) . The Board cites his 30+ years in hospitality and gaming as core credentials .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleTenureCommittees/Impact
MGM Resorts InternationalPresident of Operations; previously President of MGM Resorts OperationsCurrent; prior progression since 1991Leads regional operations, sports, sponsorships, strategic partnerships; drives Citywide Event Strategy and Marriott relationship
MGM Resorts InternationalChief Commercial OfficerPrior to President rolesOversaw Sports & Sponsorships, Brand Marketing, Direct Marketing, Group Sales, Revenue Management, Social Media, Loyalty and Commercial Strategy
CityCenter (ARIA & Vdara)President & COO2019–2020Managed daily operations and strategic direction of ultra-luxury resorts
MGM Grand DetroitPresident & COO2013–2016Led day-to-day operations; culture and service initiatives
MGM Grand Las VegasSVP MarketingPriorSenior marketing leadership
Beau RivageVP Slots; Director Slot Marketing & Player DevelopmentPriorOperations and player development leadership
The MirageDomestic Marketing Administrator, Table GamesEarly careerMarketing administration

External Roles

OrganizationRolePublic company?Notes
MGM Resorts InternationalPresident of OperationsYes (NYSE: MGM)Senior operating executive; MGM is a MYPS stockholder and commercial partner (marketing/IP)

Board Governance

  • Board size/votes: Zanella re-elected at 2025 Annual Meeting; votes “For” 361,308,535; “Withheld” 2,714,543; broker non-votes 32,543,970 .
  • Independence: MYPS is a “controlled company” (Pascal/affiliates >50% voting power), but the Board states it is not using exemptions; independent directors in 2024: Murren, Krikorian, Horowitz, Mencher (4 of 6); in 2025: Krikorian, Horowitz, Mencher (3 of 5). Zanella is not listed as independent in 2024 or 2025 .
  • Board meetings: Meetings held—2022: 7; 2023: 4; 2024: 5; all incumbent directors attended ≥75% of Board and committee meetings each year .
  • Leadership: CEO also serves as Chair; Jason Krikorian serves as Lead Independent Director with executive session duties .
  • Committees (2025): Audit—Krikorian, Mencher (chair resigned March 7, 2025; currently no chair); Compensation—Horowitz (member), Mencher (Chair); Nominating & Corporate Governance (2024)—Horowitz, Krikorian (Chair). Zanella is not listed as a member on any standing committee in 2024–2025 .

Committee Assignment Status (Zanella)

Committee2024 Membership2025 Membership
AuditNot listed Not listed; committee is Krikorian & Mencher, no chair after 3/7/25
CompensationNot listed Not listed; members Horowitz & Mencher (Chair)
Nominating & Corporate GovernanceNot listed Not disclosed for 2025; 2024 members were Horowitz (member) & Krikorian (Chair)

Fixed Compensation

YearCash Retainer ($)Committee Fees ($)Lead Independent ($)Non-Exec Chair ($)Equity RSU Grant ($)Total ($)
202240,000 Included in director comp program; per-role fees: committee member $10k; chair $5k Not applicable to Zanella N/A 150,000 (grant date fair value) 190,000
202340,000 Program: member $10k; chair $5k; lead independent $15k Not applicable to Zanella N/A 150,000 190,000
202440,000 Program: member $10k; chair $5k; lead independent $15k; ad hoc committee retainers possible Not applicable to Zanella N/A 150,000 190,000
  • Structure: Non-employee directors receive annual cash retainer ($40k), committee member ($10k) and chair ($5k) retainers, lead independent ($15k), plus RSUs targeted at $150k, vesting quarterly over one year; ad hoc committee retainers may be added (2025 program update) .
  • RSU valuation: Grant-date fair value per ASC 718 .

Performance Compensation

  • No performance-based director compensation is disclosed; RSUs vest time-based (monthly in 2022 program; quarterly in 2023–2025) with no stated performance metrics for directors .

Other Directorships & Interlocks

EntityRelationshipDetails
MGM Resorts InternationalMajor stockholder and commercial partnerMYPS issued 19.2M shares to MGM for IP; prior profit-share (terminated Oct 2020) replaced with $20M commitment funded via issuance of 2.0M PIPE shares at Closing; MGM still holds 16,647,124 Class A shares (2024–2025). Zanella is an MGM executive, constituting a potential related-party interlock .

Expertise & Qualifications

  • Industry: 30+ years in hospitality/gaming operations and commercial strategy; extensive brand, loyalty, and partnership experience (Marriott) .
  • Education: UNLV B.S. (Hotel Administration) and Michigan Ross MBA (2014) .
  • Board Qualification Statement by MYPS: Management experience in public company operations and entertainment/gaming industry understanding .

Equity Ownership

As-of DateClass A Shares% of Class ANotes
Apr 12, 202325,510* (less than 1%)Includes RSUs granted June 8, 2022, vesting in 12 equal monthly installments; disclaims beneficial ownership of MGM’s 16,647,124 shares .
Apr 10, 202457,424*Beneficial ownership per SEC rules; total Class A outstanding: 118,313,557; Class B: 16,457,769 .
May 28, 2025124,992*Beneficial ownership per SEC rules; Class A outstanding: 109,438,356; Class B: 16,457,769 .
  • Hedging/Pledging: Company discloses prohibition on hedging and policy on stock pledging; specifics by director not detailed in excerpts provided .

Governance Assessment

  • Strengths:

    • Strong investor support: 2025 vote “For” >361M for Zanella, highest among nominees, indicating shareholder confidence despite controlled structure .
    • Board maintains majority independence (3 of 5 in 2025; 4 of 6 in 2024) and uses independent compensation consultant (Compensia) without other material services, supporting governance process quality .
    • Directors’ attendance at/above 75% threshold in 2022–2024; structured committee charters and regular meetings indicate active oversight .
  • Risks and potential conflicts (RED FLAGS):

    • Non-independence: Zanella is not designated independent; his concurrent role as an MGM executive creates a clear related-party proximity given MGM’s equity stake and commercial agreements (marketing/IP), elevating conflict-of-interest risk. Audit Committee reviews related-party transactions per policy, but the interlock remains a structural risk .
    • Audit Committee chair vacancy: Following Murren’s resignation effective March 7, 2025, Audit Committee currently has no chair, which may impair audit oversight effectiveness until rectified .
    • Controlled company: Pascal/affiliates control combined voting power; while exemptions are not currently utilized, the structure can reduce minority shareholder influence on governance outcomes .

Board & Meeting Activity

YearBoard MeetingsAttendance Disclosure
20227All incumbents ≥75% of Board and committee meetings .
20234All incumbents ≥75% of Board and committee meetings .
20245All incumbents ≥75% of Board and committee meetings .

Director Compensation Program Details

  • Annual cash: $40,000; committee member $10,000; committee chair $5,000; lead independent $15,000; non-executive chair $20,000; ad hoc committee retainers as determined (2025 update) .
  • Equity: Annual RSU grants targeted at $150,000 for directors after six months of service; vesting quarterly (2023–2025) vs monthly (2022) .

Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2025 Annual Meeting proposals were director elections and auditor ratification; no advisory “say-on-pay” item listed in the 8-K summary provided .

Related-Party Transactions & Policy

  • Policy: Audit Committee reviews transactions >$120,000 involving directors, officers, 5% stockholders; considers arm’s-length comparability; pre-approves certain categories (e.g., director/exec compensation disclosures) .
  • MGM agreements: Terminated profit-share in Oct 2020; issued 2,000,000 shares to satisfy $20M PIPE commitment at Business Combination closing; continuing marketing/IP relationship; MGM remains a significant holder (16,647,124 Class A in 2024–2025) .

Fixed Compensation (Zanella detail)

YearFee Earned/Paid in Cash ($)Stock Awards ($)Option AwardsAll Other ($)Total ($)
202240,000 150,000 190,000
202340,000 150,000 190,000
202440,000 150,000 190,000

Performance Compensation (Zanella)

  • No performance metrics tied to director RSUs disclosed; awards are time-based .

Equity Ownership (Zanella)

Year/Record DateShares Beneficially Owned (Class A)Ownership %Notes
Apr 13, 2022Began Board service Dec 21, 2021; ownership table did not list him with shares at that date .
Apr 12, 202325,510*Includes June 8, 2022 RSUs vesting monthly; disclaims MGM beneficial ownership .
Apr 10, 202457,424*Based on shares outstanding at that date .
May 28, 2025124,992*Based on shares outstanding at that date .

Governance Signals for Investors

  • Independence and conflicts: Zanella’s concurrent MGM executive role, in the context of MGM’s equity stake and commercial agreements, is a persistent conflict-of-interest vector; ensure robust recusal practices and Audit Committee oversight on MGM-related matters .
  • Committee coverage gap: Absence from all three standing committees limits direct influence on audit/compensation/governance processes; combined with an Audit Committee chair vacancy, this warrants monitoring until the chair role is refilled .
  • Ownership alignment: Director equity is modest (<1% ownership) but consistent annual RSU grants promote some alignment; no pledging/hedging allowed per company policies, though individual compliance specifics are not detailed here .

Overall, Zanella brings deep operational and commercial expertise from MGM that is relevant to MYPS’s rewarded play and loyalty model, but the MGM interlock and his non-independent status require vigilant conflict management to sustain investor confidence .