Andy Duvall
About Andy Duvall
Andrew R. Duvall (“Andy”) is an executive at NCR Atleos (NATL). He served as Chief Accounting Officer (Principal Accounting Officer) from October 16, 2023 until March 31, 2025, when he transitioned to Global Corporate Controller; Traci Hornfeck succeeded him as SVP & CAO effective March 31, 2025 . He is 47, a CPA (Georgia), with an audit and controllership background across PwC (12 years) and NCR/Atleos (joined 2012), including roles as VP, Assistant Controller; Executive Director of FP&A (Banking Software); Corporate Revenue Controller; and Americas Region Controller; he holds an undergraduate degree from Mercer University and a Master of Accountancy from USC Marshall School of Business . Company performance context for the 2024 incentive year (metrics used for NEOs) included Adjusted EBITDA of $781M vs $780M target, Free Cash Flow of $242M vs $200M target, and Revenue of $4.32B vs $4.30B target, driving a 129% STI funding outcome after CHRC negative discretion .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| NCR Atleos (Atleos) | Chief Accounting Officer (Principal Accounting Officer) | Oct 16, 2023 – Mar 31, 2025 | Principal accounting officer through post-separation period; led accounting/control functions during spin-out integration . |
| NCR Atleos | Global Corporate Controller | Mar 31, 2025 – present | Transitioned to controller role concurrent with appointment of new CAO, ensuring continuity of global accounting operations . |
| NCR Corporation | VP, Assistant Controller | Jun 2021 – Sep 2023 | Led corporate controllership in pre-separation period . |
| NCR Corporation | Executive Director, FP&A – Banking Software | 2019 – 2021 | Directed FP&A for Banking Software business, linking operations to financial planning . |
| NCR Corporation | Corporate Revenue Controller; Americas Region Controller | 2012 – (various) | Revenue recognition and regional controllership for Americas; operational finance leadership . |
| PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) | Audit professional (Senior Manager incl. 3 years in Finland) | ~2000 – 2012 (12 years) | Led audits for large software/technology clients; international experience on PwC’s largest client in Finland . |
External Roles
- No public company directorships or committee roles disclosed for Mr. Duvall .
Fixed Compensation
- Individual base salary, target bonus, and actual bonus for Mr. Duvall are not disclosed; he was not a Named Executive Officer (NEO) in the 2025 Proxy Statement .
Performance Compensation
- Atleos’ executive incentive design for 2024 (applied to NEOs) emphasizes pay-for-performance: STI metrics were Adjusted EBITDA, Free Cash Flow, and Revenue; LTI mix 60% PSUs (three-year rTSR vs S&P SmallCap 600) and 40% time-based RSUs. Mr. Duvall’s specific targets/grants are not disclosed; the table below shows company STI metrics and outcomes for 2024 used for NEO payouts .
| 2024 STI metric design | Weight | Threshold (50%) | Target (100%) | Maximum (200%) | Actual FY2024 | STI attainment pre-adj | Payout after CHRC adjustments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA ($M) | 35% | 725 | 780 | 835 | 781 | 101% | 98% |
| Free Cash Flow ($M) | 35% | 150 | 200 | 250 | 242 | 184% | 152% |
| Revenue ($B) | 30% | 4.15 | 4.30 | 4.45 | 4.32 | 112% | 138% |
| Total | 100% | — | — | — | — | 133% | 129% (funded) |
LTI program mechanics (company-wide, 2024 grants to NEOs):
- RSUs: time-based, vest 1/3 annually starting in 2025; 12-month post-vest holding requirement .
- PSUs: three-year rTSR vs S&P SmallCap 600; payout curve: 0% <25th, 50% at 25th, 100% at 50th, 200% at ≥75th; cliff vest at grant+3 years (2027 for 2024 awards), subject to continued service and performance .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (as of Mar 7, 2025) | “Other Executives (4)” group, which includes Andy Duvall (and Andrew Wamser and Andrea Burson), collectively owned 20,694 shares; individual breakdown for Mr. Duvall not disclosed . |
| Shares outstanding (Table Date) | 73,392,031 shares . |
| Group ownership as % outstanding | ≈0.028% (20,694 / 73,392,031) – calculation based on disclosed figures . |
| Executive stock ownership guidelines | CEO: 6x salary; Other Named Executives: 3x salary; 5 years to attain; 100% net shares must be held until in compliance (counts RSUs; excludes options and unearned performance awards). Executives Messrs. Oliver, Mackinnon, and Nuñez met criteria as of 12/31/2024; others on track. Mr. Duvall’s status not disclosed . |
| Hedging/pledging | Company prohibits hedging and pledging of Company equity securities . |
| Trading controls | Pre-clearance and/or 10b5-1 plan required for executive officers . |
Employment Terms
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
| Current role | Global Corporate Controller effective March 31, 2025; previously Corporate Vice President & Chief Accounting Officer through March 30, 2025 . |
| Severance plans (company-wide framework) | Executive Severance Plan provides 1.0x salary + target bonus, pro-rata bonus, welfare benefits continuation (COBRA up to 18 months), life insurance for 12 months, and outplacement upon termination without cause/for good reason (terms summarized for NEOs; availability for non-NEO executive officers not individually enumerated) . |
| Change in control (CIC) | Company maintains a CIC Severance Plan with double-trigger vesting for assumed equity; tiers vary by executive (e.g., CEO Tier I = 3.0x for a defined period post-separation; others Tier II = 2.0x). Applicability to non-NEO executive officers not individually enumerated in the proxy . |
| CAO role precedent (successor) | Successor CAO offer letter (Hornfeck) includes: base $400,000; target bonus 50% of salary; new-hire RSUs $750,000 (3-year cliff); 2025 annual LTI target 75% of salary; eligibility for Executive Severance Plan (1.0x salary+target bonus) and participation in CIC Severance Plan; customary restrictive covenants. This indicates typical economics for the CAO role, though Mr. Duvall’s letter is not disclosed . |
| Clawback | NYSE/SEC-compliant clawback policy covering incentive compensation for three prior fiscal years in the event of a restatement, subject to impracticability exceptions outlined by CHRC . |
Performance Compensation (Plan Design Tables)
2024 LTI design (company-wide NEO framework; for reference on structure used across executives):
- Mix and vesting
| Award type | Mix | Vesting | Holding |
|---|---|---|---|
| Time-based RSUs | 40% | 1/3 each anniversary starting 2025 | 12-month post-vest hold |
| Performance-based RSUs (rTSR vs S&P SmallCap 600) | 60% | 3-year performance period (2024–2026), cliff vest in 2027 | N/A; payout based on rTSR curve |
- PSU payout curve (rTSR vs S&P SmallCap 600):
| Percentile | Earned % of Target |
|---|---|
| ≥75th | 200% |
| 50th | 100% |
| 25th | 50% |
| <25th | 0% |
Note: Mr. Duvall’s individual LTI grant amounts are not disclosed; tables reflect company program mechanics for 2024 .
Track Record, Value Creation, and Execution Risk
- Tenure and transitions: Mr. Duvall led Atleos’ accounting function through the separation and its first full fiscal year as CAO, then transitioned to Global Corporate Controller in March 2025, a continuity-focused move coincident with installing a new CAO; no departure or severance disclosed for Mr. Duvall .
- Incentive alignment context: The CHRC’s 2024 pay program emphasized earnings quality and cash generation (Adjusted EBITDA and Free Cash Flow at 70% weighting) with Revenue at 30%, yielding a 129% funded STI outcome for the year—supportive of balanced growth/returns emphasis .
- Governance guardrails: Robust stock ownership guidelines, a clawback policy, prohibited hedging/pledging, and double-trigger CIC vesting reduce misalignment and excessive risk-taking; 2024 Say-on-Pay support was 97.8%, indicating strong shareholder endorsement of the program .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Company-wide incentives emphasize cash generation and disciplined growth; rTSR-based PSUs tie realized value to peer-relative performance, and 12-month post-vest holding on RSUs lengthens horizons—positive alignment signals for finance leaders including Mr. Duvall .
- Retention and selling pressure: For executives receiving 2024 awards, annual-vesting RSUs (1/3 per year starting 2025) and PSU cliff-vesting in 2027 temper near-term selling pressure; prohibited hedging/pledging and hold requirements further limit supply, though Mr. Duvall’s specific awards are not disclosed .
- Skin-in-the-game: Individual beneficial ownership for Mr. Duvall is not separately disclosed; he is included within a small “Other Executives” group holding 20,694 shares in aggregate as of March 7, 2025 (≈0.028% of outstanding), making it difficult to quantify his personal exposure; stock ownership guidelines (3x for non-CEO NEOs) and hold-until-compliance policies mitigate this opacity .
- Contract economics: Executive Severance and CIC frameworks are standardized and shareholder-friendly (no excise tax gross-ups; double-trigger vesting), and the successor CAO’s offer letter suggests typical CAO-level incentive opportunity and severance coverage—indicative of competitive but disciplined pay practices for Mr. Duvall’s role cohort .
Overall, Mr. Duvall’s finance-controllership pedigree, continuity across the separation, and the company’s strong governance/incentive architecture support execution quality; lack of individual grant/ownership disclosure limits precision on his personal incentive convexity, but program features suggest alignment with value creation and controlled retention risk in the near term .