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Stuart Mackinnon

Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer at NCR Atleos
Executive

About Stuart Mackinnon

Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of NCR Atleos (NATL) since October 16, 2023, and a named executive officer (NEO) alongside the CEO, CFO, and General Counsel . Base salary is $500,000 with a 100% target annual bonus; his compensation emphasizes pay-for-performance via short‑term incentives (STI) and long‑term performance RSUs tied to relative TSR . Company performance context: Adjusted EBITDA was $781 million in 2024, net income $92 million, and cumulative TSR rose to 159 (value of initial fixed $100 from the 10/17/2023 listing date to year‑end 2024) . Hedging and pledging of company stock is prohibited, and incentive compensation is subject to a clawback policy aligned with NYSE rules .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
NCR Atleos CorporationEVP & COO2023–presentOperational leadership post-spin; compensation anchored to STI metrics (Adjusted EBITDA, Free Cash Flow, Revenue) and rTSR-based PSUs to align pay with shareholder outcomes

External Roles

  • No external directorships or outside public company roles disclosed for Mackinnon in the proxy/10‑K materials.

Fixed Compensation

Metric20232024
Base Salary ($)$500,000 $500,000
Target Bonus (% of Base)100% 100%
Actual STI Bonus Paid ($)$660,000 (132% of target under NCR AIP) $645,000 (129% of target under Atleos STI)

Performance Compensation

2024 Short‑Term Incentive (STI) Plan – Corporate Metrics and Payout

Performance MeasureWeightThreshold (50%)Target (100%)Maximum (200%)Actual FY2024Attainment Before AdjustmentsFinal Payout
Adjusted EBITDA ($M)35% $725 $780 $835 $781 101% 98% (FX, non-core, pension adjustments)
Free Cash Flow ($M)35% $150 $200 $250 $242 184% 152% (tax adjustments)
Revenue ($B)30% $4.15 $4.30 $4.45 $4.32 112% 138% (FX and non-core revenue adjustments)
Total100% 133% 129% (Committee negative discretion)

2024 Long‑Term Incentive (LTI) Awards (Granted 2/16/2024)

InstrumentGrant DateTarget Value ($)Share CountVestingPerformance
Time‑based RSUs2/16/2024 $600,000 30,992 RSUs 1/3 annually starting 2025; 12‑month post‑vesting hold
Performance RSUs (PSUs)2/16/2024 $900,000 Target 46,487 (range 23,244–92,974) Cliff vest in 2027 after 3‑year period (2024–2026); 12‑month post‑vesting hold rTSR vs S&P SmallCap 600: 75th=200%, 50th=100%, 25th=50%, <25th=0%

Prior LTI Outcomes

  • 2022 PBRSUs (LTI Recurring Revenue/EBITDA) earned at 108.8% average (2022–2023) and vest on 2/25/2025 .
  • 2022 PBTSRs (combined Atleos+Voyix rTSR vs S&P MidCap 400 Value) paid 0% at vesting on 2/25/2025, indicating relative underperformance for that cohort .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Stock ownership guideline: 3× salary for NEOs; Mackinnon meets the guideline as of 12/31/2024 .
  • Hedging and pledging are prohibited by Insider Trading Policy; blackout windows and pre‑clearance apply to executives .
  • Outstanding equity at 12/31/2024 (market values use NATL $33.92; Voyix $13.84) :
    • Time‑based RSUs: 30,992 units; market value $1,051,249 .
    • Unearned PSUs (2024 grant): 92,974 units; market value $3,153,678 (representative amount per SEC rules) .
    • Legacy PBRSUs (e.g., 12/21/2022): 96,319 units; market value $1,977,743 .
    • Legacy PBRSUs (2/25/2022): 38,321 units; market value $786,864 .
    • Options (Cardtronics/NCR legacy): 3,672 @ $21.34 exp. 3/30/2027; 1,345 @ $32.62 exp. 3/13/2026; 2,690 @ $22.52 exp. 3/13/2026 (fully vested) .
  • 2024 vested shares and value realized: 2,745 RSUs; $47,388 (includes 1,830 Voyix shares) . Post‑vesting 12‑month hold mitigates immediate selling pressure .

Employment Terms

  • Offer letter (9/1/2021): Bonus not less than 100% target; Executive Severance 1.0× salary+target bonus; CIC Severance originally Tier III (1.0×), upgraded to Tier II (2.0×) by CHRC in March 2024; sign‑on PBRSUs vest 9/9/2024; non‑compete and non‑solicit generally 12 months post‑termination; continued vesting for certain awards on qualifying separation .
  • Change in Control Severance Plan: Double‑trigger; Tier II = 200% salary+target bonus, pro‑rata bonus, 2 years benefits, 1 year outplacement; no excise tax gross‑up; “better‑of” cutback applies .
  • Executive Severance Plan (non‑CIC, amended March 2024): 1.0× salary+target bonus, prorated bonus, up to 18 months COBRA, 12 months life insurance, outplacement; requires restrictive covenant and release .

Quantified Separation Benefits (as of 12/31/2024)

ScenarioCash Severance ($)Pro‑rata Bonus ($)Equity Awards ($)Welfare Benefits ($)Outplacement ($)Total ($)
CIC (double‑trigger)2,000,000 645,000 6,043,052 61,206 10,000 8,759,258
Involuntary (non‑CIC)1,000,000 500,000 3,204,591 45,449 10,000 4,760,040
Death/Disability645,000 6,969,535 7,614,535

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Strong pay‑for‑performance design: 2024 STI linked to Adjusted EBITDA, Free Cash Flow, and Revenue with calibrated thresholds and Committee discretion; payout reduced to 129% of target despite metric over‑achievement .
  • LTI mix emphasizes performance: 60% PSUs using rTSR vs S&P SmallCap 600; 40% RSUs with holding requirements to ensure alignment and discourage short‑termism .
  • Governance safeguards: No hedging/pledging; no option repricing; robust clawback; stock ownership guidelines (3× salary) met by Mackinnon as of 12/31/2024 .
  • Peer group refinement: 2025 compensation peer group updated to better match industry, size, and cost structures (adds CIEN, CNXC, LNW, PBI, PLXS, SANM, SCSC; removes BFH, JKHY, PSFE) .

Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2025 say‑on‑pay approval: 62,411,072 For; 841,431 Against; 96,950 Abstained (broker non‑votes 5,193,508) .
  • 2024 say‑on‑pay support: 97.8% of shares voted in favor, indicating strong investor endorsement of the program .

Performance & Track Record

  • Company outcomes during Mackinnon’s tenure context: 2024 Adjusted EBITDA $781M, net income $92M, and cumulative TSR increased to 159 (from initial $100 on 10/17/2023 to year‑end 2024), evidencing improved financial performance and shareholder value creation .
  • Prior rTSR cohort underperformance: 2022 PBTSRs paid 0% at vesting (2/25/2025), highlighting relative stock performance risk embedded in legacy awards .

Equity Ownership & Alignment (Additional Detail)

ItemDetail
Ownership Guideline3× salary; met as of 12/31/2024
Holding Requirements12‑month post‑vesting hold on RSUs and PSUs
Hedging/PledgingProhibited for executives and directors
Trading ControlsPre‑clearance required; quarterly and supplemental blackout periods enforced

Employment Terms (Restrictive Covenants)

  • Non‑compete and non‑solicit for ~12 months post‑termination; confidentiality and non‑disparagement obligations apply; certain awards continue vesting subject to compliance .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment and discipline: The mix of STI metrics (cash generation focus via Free Cash Flow) and rTSR‑based PSUs, combined with post‑vesting holding, stock ownership requirements, and prohibition on hedging/pledging, indicates high alignment and mitigates short‑term selling pressure, reducing adverse trading signals from vesting events .
  • Retention risk moderate: Tier II CIC benefits and quantified severance provide retention incentives; continued vesting provisions for certain awards upon qualifying separation further reduce flight risk during execution cycles .
  • Performance sensitivity: Legacy rTSR underperformance (2022 PBTSRs at 0%) underscores sensitivity to relative stock outcomes; the current PSU framework amplifies this exposure—watch rTSR trajectory versus S&P SmallCap 600 through 2026 for payout risk or upside .
  • Shareholder support robust: High say‑on‑pay approval (97.8% in 2024; strong majority in 2025) suggests investor confidence in pay‑for‑performance design; sustained delivery on EBITDA/FCF metrics should maintain support .