Sign in
Robert Eifler

Robert Eifler

President and Chief Executive Officer at Noble Corp
CEO
Executive
Board

About Robert Eifler

Robert W. Eifler (age 45) has served as Noble Corporation’s President and CEO since May 2020 and as a director since 2020; he holds a B.S. in Systems & Information Engineering (University of Virginia) and an Acton MBA in Entrepreneurship . Under his tenure, Noble completed strategic M&A (Maersk Drilling 2022; Diamond Offshore 2024), returned $300M via repurchases and $276–278M via dividends in 2024, and realized >$150M Maersk synergies and over half of the estimated $100M Diamond synergies to date . Company operating metrics include 97% uptime, strong HSE metrics, and 2024 revenue of $3,046.8M (+18% YoY) alongside a 58% increase in income before tax; relative TSR measured Jan 1, 2022–Dec 31, 2024 ranked at the 44th percentile versus the TSR peer group . 2024 STIP funded at 109% with balanced financial/operational/ESG outcomes (Adjusted FCF, margin, safety, customer satisfaction, talent) .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Noble CorporationPresident & CEO2020–presentLed Maersk and Diamond integrations; capital returns via buybacks/dividends; 97% uptime and HSE strength .
Noble CorporationSVP, Commercial; SVP, Marketing & Contracts; VP & GM – Marketing & Contracts; various operational/marketing roles2017–2020 (SVP/VP); joined 2005Drove commercial strategy and contracting; global marketing leadership (incl. Eastern Hemisphere) .
Hercules Offshore, Inc.Director, International Marketing2013–2015Offshore driller marketing leadership experience .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
No other public company directorships disclosed in the proxy biography .

Fixed Compensation

Metric202220232024
Base salary ($)800,000 883,333 941,667
STIP target (% of base)125% 130%
2024 STIP payout ($)1,346,150

Notes:

  • 2025 base salary set at $1,000,000; 2025 STIP target remains 130% with normalized cash generation (70%), customer satisfaction (15%), and safety index (15%) as funding metrics .

Performance Compensation

2024 Long-term Incentive Program (LTIP) Awards

ComponentGrant dateUnits/ValueVestingNotes
PVRSUs1/26/2024118,860 target units; grant date value $5,711,223 3-year cliff (2024–2026)Performance on ATSR/RTSR (50%), ROIC (40%), ESG (10%) with 0–200% payout; TSR matrix uses $47.85 start VWAP and 7-day end VWAP .
TVRSUs1/26/202450,940 units; grant date value $2,286,187 Ratable over 3 years30% of CEO LTIP; aligns with share price; accrues dividend equivalents paid at vest .

2024 PVRSU performance design (CEO)

MetricWeightThresholdTargetMaxMechanics
Absolute/Relative TSR (vs. TSR peer group/index)50%MatrixMatrixMatrixATSR/RTSR matrix with 0–200% payout; 7-day VWAP windowing .
ROIC40%10.0%14.6%19.0%EBIT−cash taxes over average equity+net debt .
ESG (CO2 intensity – floaters)2.5%115.94 (−6%)113.8 (−8%)111.01 (−10%)Tons CO2e/contracted day .
ESG (CO2 intensity – jackups)2.5%36.91 (−8%)36.50 (−9%)36.10 (−10%)Tons CO2e/contracted day .
ESG (ISO 50001 compliance)5%15 rigs20 rigsAll rigsEnergy mgmt. system deployment .

2022 PVRSU outcome (settled Jan 30, 2025)

MetricWeightTargetActualFactorResult
TSR (ATSR/RTSR)33.33%MatrixRTSR 44th pct; ATSR 8.9%0.950.317
Merger synergies16.67%$125M$173M1.960.327
Capital structure evolution16.67%SubjectiveOutstanding2.000.333
Customer satisfaction16.67%SubjectiveOutstanding2.000.333
ESG (locked in 2022)8.33%SubjectiveLocked0.750.062
ESG workforce diversity (locked)8.33%SubjectiveLocked0.750.062
Total payout multiple1.43x; CEO vested 185,513 PVRSUs .

2024 STIP scorecard and payout (CEO)

ComponentMetricWeight2024 TargetActual 2024FactorComponent payout
FinancialAdjusted Free Cash Flow ($mm)30%289–324293.01.000.30
FinancialContract Drilling Margin30%37.8–38.0%36.04%0.820.25
CustomerCustomer QPR15%6.36.3751.190.18
SafetyConsequence Severity Index15%675.0590.01.430.21
TalentFirst Choice for Employees10%SubjectiveCommittee 1.5x1.500.15
Award factor1.09; CEO payout $1,346,150 .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemAmountNotes
Beneficial ownership (3/10/2025)1,236,365 shares CEO/director.
Shares outstanding (record date 3/10/2025)158,772,968 For % ownership calc.
Ownership as % of shares outstanding~0.8% (calc. from above) Calculated for context.
Unvested TVRSUs (12/31/2024)121,519 Vest ratably over 3 years.
Unvested PVRSUs (target) (12/31/2024)212,797 Shown at target; max 425,594 .
2024 stock vested (shares; value realized)1,672,674; $69,913,472 Realized value uses average high/low on vest date .
Ownership guideline (CEO)6× base salary; all officers/directors compliant CEO 2024 requirement shown at $4.8M; value $37.45M at 12/31/24 .
Hedging/pledgingProhibited for directors/executives Trading via pre-cleared 10b5-1 plans permitted .

Upcoming vesting cadence (TVRSUs in CEO’s name as of 12/31/2024):

GrantVest datesShares per tranche
2/3/2022 TVRSU2/3/202528,829
2/3/2023 TVRSU2/3/2025; 2/3/202620,875 each
1/26/2024 TVRSU1/26/2025; 1/26/2026; 1/26/202716,980 each

Governance/compliance:

  • Related-party transactions: none requiring disclosure in 2024 .
  • Share ownership policy excludes unvested performance shares; unvested TVRSUs count toward compliance .

Employment Terms

Plan framework and severance economics:

  • Employment agreements (including Eifler’s) terminated Feb 5, 2024; Noble adopted an Executive Severance Plan and an Executive Change-in-Control Severance Plan in Aug 2023 .
  • Base severance (no CIC): cash equal to (base salary + target bonus) × 2.0 for CEO; pro‑rata bonus; 12 months COBRA; up to $50k outplacement; full vest of time‑vest; performance awards continue pro‑rata based on actual performance; separation agreement required .
  • CIC severance (double-trigger within 24 months): cash equal to (base salary + target bonus) × 3.0 for CEO; pro‑rata bonus; 18 months COBRA; up to $50k outplacement; full vest of time‑vest; performance awards vest at target .
  • Non‑competition: Eifler’s prior service contract (expired Feb 2024) included a 12‑month non‑compete; current severance governed by plan terms above .
  • Clawback: adopted Oct 2023 for current/former executive officers (restatement‑based recovery of cash/equity incentive comp) .

Illustrative potential payments at 12/31/2024 (CEO):

ScenarioCash severancePro‑rata bonusCOBRAOutplacementEquity acceleration
Termination w/o Cause$4,370,000 $1,346,150 $18,394 $50,000 $7,117,907 (closing px $31.40)
Good Reason resignation$4,370,000 $1,346,150 $18,394 $50,000 $7,117,907
CIC + Qualifying termination$6,555,000 $1,346,150 $27,591 $50,000 $10,497,522
Death/Disability$1,346,150 $1,200,000 (life ins.) $7,117,907

Trigger definitions (Cause/Good Reason/CIC) summarized per plan; all severance requires release and compliance .

Perquisites/benefits:

  • 401(k) match $20,700 in 2024; dividend equivalent rights paid on vesting; company paid UK taxes related to business travel ($673,732) and Medicare tax gross‑up ($15,832) for CEO .
  • No executive SERP; minimal perquisites otherwise; 2024 CEO All Other Compensation totaled $1,751,277 .

Compensation Structure Analysis

Multi‑year compensation mix and trends (CEO):

Component202220232024
Salary ($)800,000 883,333 941,667
Stock awards ($)5,913,496 6,725,180 7,997,410
STIP ($)686,400 1,653,750 1,346,150
All other comp ($)36,152 385,120 1,751,277
Total ($)7,436,048 9,647,383 12,036,504

Observations:

  • High “at‑risk” pay: in 2024, 90% of CEO target TDC was variable (STIP + equity), dominated by PVRSUs (70% of LTIP) .
  • 2024 STIP factor at 1.09 reflects mixed financials (margin below target) offset by safety, customer satisfaction, and talent outcomes .
  • 2022 PVRSUs settled at 143% primarily on integration and capital structure outcomes; TSR delivered mid‑quartile relative performance over the cycle .
  • Governance changes include adoption of a clawback in 2023 and continued prohibition on hedging/pledging .
  • Shareholder support remains high: >90% “say‑on‑pay” support in 2024 US advisory vote; UK Directors’ Remuneration Report 91.03% approval in 2024 AGM .

Benchmarking/peer groups:

  • 2024 Compensation Benchmark Peer Group includes Baker Hughes, Halliburton, Valaris, Transocean, NOV, Nabors, Weatherford, TechnipFMC, ChampionX, Bristow, Patterson‑UTI, Oceaneering; Diamond Offshore removed post‑acquisition .
  • TSR Peer Group (for PVRSUs) includes Valaris, Transocean, Seadrill, and the PHLX Oil Service Sector Index; Diamond excluded post‑acquisition .

Board Governance (dual‑role implications)

  • Eifler is a management director (non‑independent) and has served on the Board since 2020 . The Chair is independent (Charles Sledge), and the roles of Chair and CEO are separated with regular executive sessions of independent directors; all Board committees are fully independent .
  • Committee roles: Eifler is not a member of audit, compensation, nominating & governance, or safety & sustainability committees; committee chairs are Hemmingsen (Safety & Sustainability), Hirshberg (Compensation), Jennings (Audit), Pickard (N&G; through 2024) .
  • Independence and oversight: Board affirms NYSE independence for non‑management directors; independent Chair presides over executive sessions .
  • Bankruptcy disclosure: Noble’s predecessor filed in 2020; Eifler served as director/executive officer at petition time (disclosed under “legal proceedings”) .

Equity Ownership & Director Service

  • Beneficial ownership: Eifler beneficially owned 1,236,365 shares as of March 10, 2025 .
  • Director service: Director since 2020; age 45; core skills in governance, international business, operations, sales/marketing, engineering; extensive OFS experience .
  • Director compensation: Applies to non‑employee directors only; 2024 program includes cash/deferred RSUs; not applicable to CEO .

Performance & Track Record

  • Strategic M&A/integration: Realized >$150M Maersk synergies (vs. $125M target) and over half of ~$100M Diamond synergies by YE 2024; built leading 7th‑gen drillship fleet .
  • Capital returns: $300M share repurchases and ~$276–278M dividends in 2024 .
  • Operating and customer outcomes: 97% uptime; customer satisfaction averaged 6.37/7 in 2024 .
  • Financials: 2024 revenue $3,046,787k (+18% YoY) and income before income tax up 58% .
  • TSR: Relative TSR 44th percentile over 2022–2024 period; ATSR/RTSR used in PVRSU design .

Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2024 outreach contacted holders ≈70% of outstanding shares; met ≈49%; over 90% of votes cast supported executive compensation .
  • 2023 UK Directors’ Remuneration Report approved with 91.03% votes in favor; Remuneration Policy approved in 2023 with 98.96% support .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • CIC economics: 3.0× base+target bonus double‑trigger severance for CEO could increase acquisition transaction costs; performance awards vest at target upon CIC termination .
  • Clawback and no-pledging: Clawback adopted 2023; hedging/pledging prohibited—mitigates misalignment risk .
  • Tax items: Company paid certain UK taxes tied to business travel and a Medicare tax gross‑up for CEO in 2024—watch for ongoing perquisite optics .
  • Bankruptcy history: Predecessor’s 2020 filing disclosed; Eifler was serving as director/executive officer at the time .

Compensation Committee & Advisors

  • Compensation Committee (independent) sets goals and approves CEO pay; uses Meridian Compensation Partners as independent consultant; no conflicts reported; 2024 fees $178,815 .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: High at‑risk mix (PVRSU‑heavy) ties CEO outcomes to TSR and ROIC with ESG add‑ons; strong ownership guidelines and no‑pledging reinforce alignment .
  • Retention/supply risk: Meaningful unvested equity and TVRSU vesting cadence support retention but create periodic vest‑related liquidity windows; trading only via policy‑compliant channels (10b5‑1) .
  • Performance momentum: 2024 delivered double‑digit revenue and profit growth and integration milestones, but relative TSR mid‑quartile suggests upside depends on sustained margin expansion and cash generation; 2025 STIP tilts further to normalized cash generation (70%) .
  • Governance: Independent Chair/fully independent committees mitigate CEO/director dual‑role concerns; strong say‑on‑pay support reduces near‑term governance overhangs .