Ian M. Eckert
About Ian M. Eckert
Ian M. Eckert, age 37, is Chief Financial Officer of Natural Gas Services Group (NGS). He was appointed CFO effective December 30, 2024 and entered into an Employment Agreement dated November 1, 2024 with an Effective Date no later than January 6, 2025 . Eckert holds a B.S. in Finance from Indiana University and an MBA from Carnegie Mellon University, with a background spanning public company accounting, FP&A, strategy, operational improvement, and acquisition integration . Company performance into his tenure: FY2024 total revenue was $156.742 million with Adjusted EBITDA of $69.526 million; NGS’ cumulative TSR based on a $100 investment from January 1, 2021 was $282.70 as of December 31, 2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alamo Group Inc. (NYSE: ALG) | Chief Accounting Officer; Vice President; Corporate Controller | Jun 2023–Dec 2024 | Led public company accounting and controls; contributed to strategy and operational improvement . |
| AMETEK Inc. (NYSE: AME) – Electron Microscopy Technologies | Vice President, Finance | 2020–2023 | Finance leadership for technology business; supported integration and performance management . |
| Howmet Aerospace Inc. (formerly Alcoa Inc.) | Controllership, FP&A, Strategy roles | Pre-2020 | Progressive responsibility in controllership/FP&A and strategy . |
| Lafarge | Early career | N/A | Began professional career . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| None disclosed | — | — | Company biography does not indicate external public company directorships or committee roles . |
Fixed Compensation
| Item | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $2,274 (paid for late-December start) | $415,000 annual base salary |
| Target Bonus (% of Base) | N/A (joined year-end) | 75% of base salary |
| Sign-on Bonus ($) | $50,000 (paid after Effective Date) | — |
| Discretionary/Make-Whole Bonus ($) | $200,000 (to compensate for foregone 2024 bonus at prior employer; included in SCT bonus total) |
Performance Compensation
Short-Term Incentive Plan (STIP) – 2025 (applies to all NEOs including CFO)
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Stretch | Stretch+ | Payout Schedule |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA | 85% | $72,753,000 | $76,582,000 | $80,794,000 | $81,560,000 | 75%/100%/125%/135% of metric portion |
| Safety (TRIR) | 5% | See Note 1 | See Note 1 | See Note 1 | N/A | Cliff; payout at/below milestone |
| Preventable Vehicle Incidents (PVI) | 5% | See Note 1 | See Note 1 | See Note 1 | N/A | Cliff; payout at/below milestone |
| Environmental | 5% | N/A | See Note 2 | N/A | N/A | Deliver ERP-linked reporting plan |
Notes: TRIR/PVI milestones set vs GCA 5-year averages (Target at 90% of GCA; Threshold/Stretch levels ±1 incident); maximum payout for Safety metrics at Stretch . Financial metric awards prorate between levels; Safety/Sustainability are cliff-based .
Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) – Grants at hire (Dec 30, 2024)
| Award Type | Grant Date | Shares (Threshold/Target/Max) | Grant Date Fair Value ($) | Performance Metric | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | 12/30/2024 | 3,798 / 7,595 / 15,190 | 279,724 | Relative TSR vs peer group; Target at 62.5th percentile; Threshold at 31.25th percentile; Max at top rank; 0–200% payout; absolute TSR caps apply | Cliff vest based on performance period ending 12/31/2027, subject to continued employment |
| RSUs | 12/30/2024 | 7,595 | 207,495 | Time-based | Vest one-third annually on anniversaries of grant date: 2,532 (2025), 2,532 (2026), 2,531 (2027), subject to continued employment |
Peer group and relative TSR ranking framework used in 2024 program; for Eckert’s PSU grant, a 2025 peer group applies due to timing . Company-level LTIP design favors pay-for-performance through TSR-based PSUs and retention via time-based RSUs .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | As of Date | Amount/Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (# of shares) | Apr 25, 2025 | 0 | Listed at 0 shares; percent of class: “*” (less than 1%) |
| Shares Outstanding | Apr 11, 2025 | 12,513,850 | Reference for plan proposal sizing (used for 2019 Plan share increase context) |
| Unvested RSUs (#) | Dec 31, 2024 | 7,595 | Market value $203,546 at $26.80 per share |
| Unearned PSUs (Target #) | Dec 31, 2024 | 7,595 | Market/payout value shown at target $203,546 |
| Options (Exercisable/Unexercisable) | Dec 31, 2024 | — / — | No options held |
| Ownership Guidelines | 2025 policy | NEOs at 2.5x base salary; CEO at 5x; Directors at 4x retainer | |
| Compliance Status | Dec 31, 2024 | Below threshold | Policy counts time-vested RSUs; RSU value $203,546 vs requirement of ~$1,037,500 (2.5×$415,000); historical policy provides a five-year period to attain compliance |
| Hedging/Pledging | Policy | Prohibited | Hedging or pledging Company securities is prohibited for officers/directors; none of officers’ shares were pledged as of April 25, 2025 |
| Clawback | Policy | Adopted | Clawback under Section 10D/NYSE listing standards for certain restatements |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Title/Reporting | CFO, reporting to CEO |
| Agreement Term | Initial one-year term from Effective Date with automatic one-year renewals unless 60 days’ prior non-renewal notice |
| Effective Date | No later than January 6, 2025 |
| Base Salary | $415,000; reviewed annually |
| Bonuses | $50,000 sign-on; $200,000 cash bonus for calendar 2024; 2025 target bonus 75% of base |
| Equity Eligibility | RSU award valued at 50% of base and PSU award valued at 50% of base for remainder of 2024 and for 2025; RSUs vest in three equal annual installments; PSUs vest on TSR metrics set by Compensation Committee |
| Severance | If terminated without Cause, non-renewal by Company, or Good Reason resignation: Accrued amounts plus severance equal to 12–18 months of base salary paid over 12–18 months, and COBRA continuation coverage up to 12 months |
| For Cause/Without Good Reason/Death/Disability | Accrued amounts only; no severance |
| Non-Compete/Non-Solicit | Non-compete duration of 12 months (if Good Reason resignation or Company terminates without Cause/non-renewal); 24 months (if resignation without Good Reason or termination for Cause). Non-solicit applies during employment and for the same post-termination periods |
| Clawback | Incentive compensation subject to applicable clawback regulations |
| Change-in-Control Treatment (Plan-Level) | Double-trigger acceleration: if terminated without Cause or for Good Reason within 18 months post-CIC, all awards fully vest; performance awards deemed achieved at 100% of target; Committee may cash out awards |
| Tax Gross-Ups | Not provided; Company does not offer tax gross-ups for executive severance/CIC |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited under Insider Trading Policy |
Performance & Track Record (Company-Level Metrics)
| Metric ($USD thousands unless noted) | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total Revenue | 84,825 | 121,167 | 156,742 |
| Adjusted EBITDA | 29,165 | 45,779 | 69,526 |
| Rental Revenue | 74,465 | 106,159 | 144,236 |
| Ending Stock Price (Dec 31) ($/share) | $10.47 | $11.46 | $26.80 |
| TSR Based on $100 Investment | $110.44 | $120.89 | $282.70 |
Rental revenue and horsepower utilization expansion underpin revenue and margin growth; rental adjusted gross margin rose to 60.5% in 2024 (from 54.0% in 2023) driven by high-horsepower fleet additions and pricing .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: CFO’s incentives are heavily tied to Adjusted EBITDA (85% STIP weight) and relative TSR via PSUs with 0–200% payout, anchoring compensation to shareholder value creation and operating performance .
- Vesting and selling pressure: RSUs vest roughly 2,532 shares annually on each anniversary of the 12/30/2024 grant through 2027; PSUs cliff-vest at 12/31/2027 subject to TSR outcomes. Expect potential liquidity events around late-December each year; Insider Trading Policy pre-clearance and blackout windows apply, and hedging/pledging is prohibited, which can moderate near-term selling behavior .
- Ownership alignment and guideline shortfall: As of 12/31/2024, Eckert held 7,595 RSUs (market value $203,546) and no common shares, below the 2.5× salary ownership guideline; prior policy provides up to five years to attain compliance, suggesting accumulation over time, especially as RSUs vest .
- Retention and change-of-control economics: Severance of 12–18 months base salary plus COBRA and enforceable non-compete/non-solicit (12–24 months) mitigate retention risk; double-trigger CIC acceleration at plan-level protects earned equity if terminated post-transaction—both reduce execution risk and align leadership stability through cycles .
- Governance and risk flags: No tax gross-ups; clawback policy adopted per SEC/NYSE; pledging/hedging prohibited; no repricing of equity awards—these practices reduce governance risk and enhance investor confidence in compensation design .
Overall, Eckert’s package balances retention (time-vested RSUs, severance) with performance-linked compensation (TSR PSUs, EBITDA-weighted STIP). The current ownership guideline shortfall and scheduled RSU vesting cadence are the primary watchpoints for potential trading flows; policy constraints and pre-clearance processes should limit opportunistic selling unrelated to vesting windows .