Steven Campbell
About Steven Campbell
Steven F. Campbell (age 53) is President (since Dec 2022) and Chief Operating Officer (since Jun 2020) of Annaly Capital Management (NLY). He previously led Credit Strategy, Credit Operations & Enterprise Risk, Business Operations, and Annaly’s Commercial Real Estate Group; he holds a B.B.A. from Notre Dame and an M.B.A. from Chicago Booth . In 2024, Annaly delivered 11.9% Tangible Economic Return, top-quartile Relative TER versus peers, and operating expense of 1.44% of equity, underpinning incentive outcomes for executives .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Annaly Capital Management | President | Dec 2022–present | Co-leads strategy, capital markets, investor relations, operations, risk; oversight of MSR operations |
| Annaly Capital Management | Chief Operating Officer | Jun 2020–present | Firmwide operations and technology oversight; enterprise risk management |
| Annaly Capital Management | Head of Business Operations | 2019–Jun 2020 | Built operating infrastructure across investment/support groups |
| Annaly Capital Management | Head of Credit Operations & Enterprise Risk | 2018–2019 | Strengthened controls and risk governance for credit |
| Annaly Capital Management | COO, Annaly Commercial Real Estate Group | 2016–2018 | Operated commercial platform within Annaly |
| Annaly Capital Management | Head of Credit Strategy | 2015–2018 | Guided credit portfolio strategy |
| Fortress Investment Group | Managing Director, Credit Funds (various roles) | ~6 years prior to 2015 | Credit investing leadership experience |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| University of Notre Dame, Fitzgerald Institute of Real Estate | Advisory Board Member | Current | Industry-academic engagement, real estate insights |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $750,000 | $750,000 | $750,000 |
| Actual Bonus Paid ($) | $1,828,750 | $2,739,800 | $3,078,650 |
| Total Summary Compensation ($) | $4,393,443 | $5,333,704 | $6,582,250 |
| 2024 Target Incentive Mix | Cash ($) | RSUs ($) | PSUs ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Target amounts | $2,625,000 | $1,312,500 | $1,312,500 | $5,250,000 |
Performance Compensation
| 2024 Corporate Scorecard Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout Multiplier |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Relative Tangible Economic Return | 50% | 5th percentile | 55th percentile | 100th percentile | 83% vs agency peers; 100% vs hybrid peers | 129% |
| Operating Efficiency (OpEx/Avg Equity) | 30% | 1.60% | 1.45% | 1.30% | 1.47% | 92% |
| Market Risk (Total Assets Available for Financing / Equity) | 10% | 40% | 45% | 50% | 56% | 150% |
| Operational Risk (12 KRIs annually) | 10% | 10/12 achieved | 12/12 achieved | N/A | 12/12 achieved | 100% |
| Weighted Corporate Multiplier | — | — | — | — | — | 117% |
| 2024 Individual Multiplier Inputs | Outcome |
|---|---|
| Key achievements (capital markets, budgeting, IR/Investor Day, Dallas buildout, strategic initiatives incl. MSR ops recognition; firmwide OpEx 1.44% vs mREIT peer avg 6.55%) | 110% individual multiplier |
| Corporate multiplier (weighted 75%) + Individual (25%) | Blended multiplier 115.25% |
| Absolute Tangible Economic Return modifier (12% ⇒ +2%) | Final multiplier 117.25% |
| 2024 Incentive Outcome | Target Total ($) | Final Multiplier | Total Incentive ($) | Cash ($) | RSUs ($) | PSUs ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual cash + equity | $5,250,000 | 117.25% | $6,157,300 | $3,078,650 | $1,539,325 | $1,539,325 |
| RSUs granted (Feb 1, 2025; for 2024 perf.) | Value ($) | Number (#) | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|
| Steven F. Campbell | $1,539,325 | 75,420 | 3 equal annual installments starting Feb 1, 2026, subject to service |
| PSUs granted (Feb 1, 2025; for 2024 perf.) | Target Value ($) | Target Number (#) | Performance Metrics (50/50) | Performance Period | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Steven F. Campbell | $1,539,325 | 75,420 | Relative Tangible Economic Return; Average EAD ROE | Jan 1, 2025–Dec 31, 2027 | TSR governor caps Relative TER portion at 100% if 3-year TSR negative |
| PSU Award Payout (granted 2022; performance 2022–2024) | Metric | Weight | Result | Payout vs Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Relative Tangible Economic Return | 50% | 58th percentile; TSR −10.79% | 100% (capped due to negative TSR) | |
| Average EAD ROE | 50% | 14.44% | 150% | |
| Blended PSU payout | — | — | — | 125% |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (Mar 17, 2025) | 99,090 shares; <1% of class |
| Shares Outstanding (Record Date) | 597,555,127 |
| Ownership as % of Outstanding | ~0.017% (99,090 / 597,555,127) |
| Unvested RSUs (12/31/2024) | 77,351; $1,415,523 market value at $18.30 |
| Unearned PSUs (12/31/2024) | 116,028; $2,123,312 market/payout value at $18.30 (assumes max based on performance through 2024) |
| Stock Vested in 2024 | 88,165 shares; $1,725,395 realized value |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | 3x base salary for executive officers; retention of after-tax shares until guideline met |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited under Insider Trading Policy and compensation governance |
| Clawbacks | Dual policies: no-fault restatement recoupment (3 fiscal years) and misconduct/detrimental conduct recovery; covers cash and all equity |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Executive Severance Plan | If involuntary termination without “cause”: 1.25x base salary + 1.25x target cash bonus; lump sum; prorated cash bonus after Mar 31 based on prior year bonus; severance recoverable for detrimental conduct within 3 years |
| Change-in-Control Cash | No enhanced cash severance; no single-trigger cash severance |
| RSU Treatment | Death/disability: immediate vest; Qualifying Termination: continued scheduled vesting (subject to release/covenants); CIC termination: immediate full vesting |
| PSU Treatment | Death: immediate vesting at target, prorated; Disability: continued scheduled vesting based on actual performance, prorated; Qualifying Termination: continued scheduled vesting based on actual performance; CIC termination: immediate full vesting at greater of target or actual |
| Quantified Potential Payments (as of 12/31/2024) | Termination without cause: $13,008,409 total; Termination within two years of CIC: $13,008,409; Death: $4,561,037; Disability: $5,711,009 |
| Perquisites / Tax Gross-ups | Limited perqs (<$10,000); no tax gross-ups on change-in-control/perqs (except non-cash relocation) |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is strong: 2024 corporate scorecard achieved 117% with top-quartile Relative TER and disciplined OpEx; individual multiplier 110%; final multiplier 117.25% drove balanced cash/equity awards .
- Equity-heavy incentives and three-year PSU performance cycles create ongoing alignment, with governance safeguards (clawbacks, hedging/pledging prohibitions, ownership guidelines) limiting misalignment risks .
- Near-term supply considerations: RSUs vest annually and PSUs cliff-vest post-2027 performance period; with 77,351 RSUs and 116,028 PSUs unvested at 12/31/2024, watch for tax-withholding-related Form 4 sales around vesting dates that could introduce modest selling pressure .
- Retention risk appears moderate: severance multiples are standard (1.25x salary/bonus), long-term equity weighting is increasing (PSUs 60% of equity from 2025), and no CIC cash enhancements or single-trigger vesting; however, 2024 Say-on-Pay support of ~63% prompted program changes and may keep compensation scrutiny high .