Robert Buckley
About Robert Buckley
Robert J. Buckley is Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of Novanta Inc., serving as an executive officer since March 31, 2011; he is 51 and holds a B.A. in Finance from Manhattanville College and an MBA from UCLA . Before Novanta, he held multiple senior finance roles at PerkinElmer, including CFO of its Environmental Health business (2008–2011) and CFO of Asian operations (2005–2008), with prior management positions at Honeywell and Georgeson . Company performance context for 2024: revenue $949.2M (+7.7% y/y), Adjusted EBITDA $209.8M (up $13.6M y/y), and TSR −9% (after +24% in 2023), underpinning pay-for-performance outcomes (SMIP payout at 48.6% of target) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| PerkinElmer, Inc. | VP & CFO, Environmental Health business | Sep 2008–Feb 2011 | Senior finance leadership for a global segment |
| PerkinElmer, Inc. | CFO, Asian operations | Sep 2005–Sep 2008 | Regional finance leadership across Asia |
| PerkinElmer, Inc. | Various financial management roles | Apr 2001–Aug 2005 | Increasing responsibility in corporate finance |
| Honeywell International, Inc. | Management positions | Not disclosed | Not disclosed |
| Georgeson & Company, Inc. | Management positions | Not disclosed | Not disclosed |
External Roles
No public company directorships or external roles disclosed for Buckley .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $528,675 | $552,466 |
| Metric | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Target Bonus (% of base) | 90% |
| Target Bonus ($) | $497,219 |
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Actual Bonus Paid ($, SMIP) | $301,666 | $241,762 |
| Equity Grant Value | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Awards ($) | $1,263,328 | $1,823,573 | $2,252,478 |
| Option Awards ($) | $460,879 | $675,003 | $840,062 |
Performance Compensation
| SMIP Metric (2024) | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual 2024 | Payout Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA ($M) | 70% | 201 | 224 | 246 | 209.8 | Below target; contributes to blended payout |
| Organic Revenue Growth (%) | 30% | 1.0 | 2.0 | 3.0 | −1.6 | Below threshold; reduces blended payout |
| Total SMIP Payout (as % of target) | — | — | — | Cap 200% | — | 48.6% actual overall payout |
| 2024 Long-Term Equity | Metric | Threshold (#) | Target (#) | Maximum (#) | Vesting | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Stock Units | Cumulative Revenue | 3,112 | 6,223 | 16,180 | Cliff on Jan 1, 2027 | rTSR multiplier 1.0x–1.3x vs Russell 2000; overall payout 0–260% |
| Performance Stock Units | Cumulative Adjusted EBITDA | 3,112 | 6,223 | 16,180 | Cliff on Jan 1, 2027 | Same rTSR multiplier and payout range |
| Stock Options | Service-based | — | 13,469 | — | 1/3 annually over 3 years | Exercise price $157.48/share |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Beneficial Ownership (as of Apr 15, 2025) | Amount |
|---|---|
| Total Beneficial Shares | 161,493 |
| % of Shares Outstanding | <1% |
| Direct Ownership (incl. options exercisable within 60 days) | 125,274 (includes 34,240 options) |
| Indirect Ownership (trusts) | 36,219 |
| Options Summary (Selected Grants) | Exercisable (#) | Unexercisable (#) | Exercise Price ($/sh) | Expiration |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3/30/2016 grant | 12,803 | — | 14.13 | 3/30/2026 |
| 2/24/2022 grant | 6,439 | 3,221 | 135.86 | 2/24/2029 |
| 2/24/2023 grant | 3,644 | 7,289 | 156.72 | 2/24/2030 |
| 2/21/2024 grant | — | 13,469 | 157.48 | 2/21/2031 |
- Stock ownership guidelines: CFO threshold = 2.5x base salary; NEOs were in compliance as of Dec 31, 2024 .
- Anti-hedging and anti-pledging: Company prohibits hedging and pledging by officers; clawback policy compliant with Rule 10D-1 and Nasdaq .
Employment Terms
| Term | Provision |
|---|---|
| Agreement & Term | Amended and Restated CFO Employment Agreement (Apr 21, 2017), evergreen 1-year auto-renewals |
| Base/Bonus Minimums | Base salary ≥ $407,724; annual bonus target ≥ 75% of base; annual equity grant target ≈ 150% of base (or higher at Committee discretion) |
| Severance (no CIC) | 150% of base + target bonus paid over 18 months; pro-rata annual bonus; up to 18 months health coverage; pro-rata vesting of service-based awards; performance awards remain eligible based on actual performance |
| Severance (within 12 months post-CIC) | 200% of base + target bonus paid lump sum; pro-rata annual bonus; 24 months health coverage; all unvested equity vests, performance awards deemed at target (or higher if expressly provided) |
| Death/Disability | Pro-rata annual bonus; full vesting of service-based awards; performance awards remain eligible based on actual performance |
| Restrictive Covenants | Non-compete & non-solicit for 18 months post-termination; indefinite confidentiality; severance/vesting contingent on compliance and release |
| Tax | No 280G gross-up; excise tax cutback to maximize after-tax amounts |
| Change-in-Control Equity Mechanics | RSUs/Options vest if not assumed; if assumed, double-trigger vesting upon termination without Cause or for Good Reason within 12 months post-CIC; PSUs vest on double-trigger per agreements |
Performance & Track Record
| Company Performance | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($M) | 881.7 | 949.2 |
| Consolidated Net Income ($M) | 72.9 | 64.1 |
| Adjusted EBITDA ($M) | 196.2 | 209.8 |
| Operating Cash Flow ($M) | 120.1 | 158.5 |
| Novanta TSR (annual) | +24% | −9% |
- Pay-versus-performance disclosures identify Adjusted EBITDA, Adjusted EPS, Organic Revenue Growth, and Relative TSR as most important performance linkages; shareholder say‑on‑pay support was ~98% in 2024 .
- 2024 SMIP design focused on Organic Revenue Growth and Adjusted EBITDA; equity PSUs measure 3‑year cumulative Revenue and Adjusted EBITDA with an rTSR multiplier vs the Russell 2000 (1.0x–1.3x) .
Compensation Committee Analysis & Peer Group
- Committee composition: Carpenter (Chair), Solomon, Wilson; independent; retained Aon plc as independent advisor for 2024 design and benchmarking .
- Peer group used for 2024 compensation benchmarking included Aspen Technology, Cognex, CONMED, IPG Photonics, Masimo, Merit Medical, MKS Instruments, National Instruments, Omnicell, Penumbra, QuidelOrtho, Repligen, Teradyne, Mercury Systems, Globus Medical, Integra LifeSciences .
Equity Ownership & Governance Policies
- Beneficial ownership by major holders as of Apr 15, 2025: BlackRock 12.7%, Vanguard 11.5%, T. Rowe Price 5.3% .
- Board governance and compensation best practices include: independent Compensation Committee and advisor, stock ownership guidelines, clawback, anti-hedging/pledging, double-trigger CIC, no option repricing, no excise tax gross-ups .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Anti-hedging/anti-pledging policies in place, no excise tax gross-ups, and prohibition on option repricing mitigate governance risk .
- Section 16(a) compliance reported; no director/officer indebtedness outside ordinary course; D&O insurance maintained ($70M + $30M A‑side) .
- No related party transactions involving executives disclosed; approval procedures defined .
Performance Compensation – Detailed Table (Buckley)
| Component | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SMIP Cash | Adjusted EBITDA ($M) | 70% | 224 | 209.8 | Contributes to 48.6% blended payout | Paid Mar 2025 |
| SMIP Cash | Organic Revenue Growth (%) | 30% | 2.0 | −1.6 | Contributes to 48.6% blended payout | Paid Mar 2025 |
| PSUs (2024 grant) | 3‑yr Cumulative Revenue | 50% | 6,223 tgt shares | Not disclosed (in-period) | 0–260% of target via rTSR multiplier | Cliff Jan 1, 2027 |
| PSUs (2024 grant) | 3‑yr Cumulative Adjusted EBITDA | 50% | 6,223 tgt shares | Not disclosed (in-period) | 0–260% of target via rTSR multiplier | Cliff Jan 1, 2027 |
| Options (2024 grant) | Service-based | — | 13,469 options @ $157.48 | — | — | 1/3 annually over 3 years |
Employment Contracts & Change-of-Control Economics
| Provision | CFO (Buckley) |
|---|---|
| Severance (no CIC) | 150% of base + target bonus over 18 months; pro‑rata bonus; 18 months health; pro‑rata vesting of service awards; performance awards remain eligible |
| Severance (≤12 months post‑CIC) | 200% of base + target bonus lump sum; pro‑rata bonus; 24 months health; full vesting; PSUs deemed at target (or higher if specified) |
| Covenants | 18‑month non‑compete/non‑solicit; release required; confidentiality indefinite |
| Tax | 280G cutback (no gross‑ups) |
| Equity awards treatment (plan) | RSUs/Options vest if not assumed at CIC; if assumed, double-trigger; PSUs vest on double-trigger per agreements |
Equity Ownership – Vested vs Unvested Snapshot (Dec 31, 2024)
| Award Type | Status | Quantity | Key Terms |
|---|---|---|---|
| Options (2016) | Exercisable | 12,803 | $14.13; exp 3/30/2026 |
| Options (2022) | 6,439 exercisable / 3,221 unexercisable | — | $135.86; exp 2/24/2029 |
| Options (2023) | 3,644 exercisable / 7,289 unexercisable | — | $156.72; exp 2/24/2030 |
| Options (2024) | Unexercisable | 13,469 | $157.48; exp 2/21/2031 |
| PSUs (2021 OCF) | Performance/vesting schedule | 10,851 | Performance achieved; scheduled vesting in tranches 2025–2026 |
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 say‑on‑pay approval ~98%; Company continues annual say‑on‑pay and engages investors on compensation matters .
Compensation Peer Group (Benchmarking)
- Peer group used in Aon’s Nov 2023 report for 2024 design includes AspenTech, Azenta, Cognex, CONMED, Globus Medical, Integra LifeSciences, IPG Photonics, Masimo, Merit Medical, MKS Instruments, National Instruments, Omnicell, Penumbra, QuidelOrtho, Repligen, Teradyne, Mercury Systems .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High equity mix (PSUs and options) with 3‑year Revenue/Adjusted EBITDA targets and rTSR link supports long‑term value creation; stringent anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging and ownership guidelines reinforce alignment (CFO guideline 2.5x salary; NEOs compliant) .
- Retention & CIC: Evergreen contract with robust double‑trigger protections and pro‑rata/accelerated vesting reduces retention risk in normal course but provides meaningful CIC economics (200% base+bonus lump sum; equity vesting at target) .
- Near‑term incentives: 2024 SMIP payout at 48.6% reflects below‑target EBITDA and negative organic growth; if macro or end‑market conditions remain soft, near‑term cash payouts may stay muted, increasing reliance on equity performance (2024–2026) .
- Trading signals: Pending Form 4 analysis would clarify vesting‑related sales cadence, but anti‑hedging/pledging policy reduces selling pressure risk factors; beneficial ownership of 161,493 shares (<1%) suggests meaningful but not controlling stake .