Francis Leonard
NovoCureAbout Francis Leonard
Executive Vice President and President, Novocure Oncology since January 4, 2024; previously Chief Development Officer (effective September 1, 2020) and President, CNS Cancers US (effective September 19, 2022). 2024 company performance included net revenues of $605 million (+19% YoY) and Adjusted EBITDA of $0.8 million, with PSU design linking long-term awards to 2026 net revenue, Adjusted EBITDA, and clinical milestones . Company cumulative TSR (pay-versus-performance disclosure) equated to $35 on a $100 initial investment in 2024, underscoring equity sensitivity in compensation outcomes .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Novocure Limited | Chief Development Officer | 2020–2022 | Senior R&D/execution leadership to advance TTFields pipeline |
| Novocure Limited | President, CNS Cancers US | 2022–2024 | U.S. CNS segment leadership aligned with commercialization |
| Novocure Limited | EVP, President Novocure Oncology | 2024–present | Executive oversight across oncology portfolio and growth initiatives |
External Roles
- None disclosed for Francis Leonard in company filings .
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Target Bonus (% of Base) | Actual Bonus ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 525,000 | 60% | 283,500 |
| 2023 | 475,000 | — | 253,650 |
| 2022 | 475,000 | — | 237,500 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan – 2024 Corporate Metrics and Outcomes
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual | Score | Weighted Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| New GBM Patient Starts | 30% | 4,700 | 4,546 patients | 97% | 29% |
| New Lung Patient Starts | 15% | 220 | <25 | — | — |
| Reimbursement Pathway Establishment | 15% | NCCN guidelines established | NCCN request submitted | 50% | 8% |
| Clinical Trial Milestones | 20% | METIS topline by Apr 15; PANOVA DB lock by Nov 15 + above-budget enrollment | METIS topline; PANOVA DB lock | 50% | 10% |
| Flex Torso Array – Final Design | 10% | Final design and COGS in line | Met | 100% | 10% |
| Adjusted EBITDA | 10% | ≥($90M) | $0.8M | 180% | 18% |
| Modifier | — | — | +15% | — | — |
| Cumulative Achievement | — | — | — | — | 90% |
Long-Term Incentives – 2024 Grants and Vesting
| Grant Date | Instrument | Shares/Units | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2/27/2024 | Stock Options (ex. price $16.30) | 156,348 | 1,666,670 | 4 equal annual installments over 4 years |
| 2/27/2024 | RSUs | 102,249 | 1,666,659 | 3 equal annual installments over 3 years |
| 2/27/2024 | PSUs (Threshold/Target/Max) | 25,562 / 102,249 / 204,498 | 1,666,659 (target assumption) | 3-year performance period; vests based on 2026 Net Revenue, 2026 Adj. EBITDA and trial milestones |
PSU Performance Framework (2024 Awards)
| Level | Financial Targets | Clinical Milestones | Payout Mechanics |
|---|---|---|---|
| Threshold | 2026 Net Revenue ≥ $600M; 2026 Adj. EBITDA > ($120M) | TRIDENT final data; LUNAR‑2 ≥60% enrolled; KEYNOTE D‑58 ≥60% enrolled | 50% of target PSUs; must remain employed through vest |
| Target | 2026 Net Revenue ≥ $700M; 2026 Adj. EBITDA > ($60M) | TRIDENT final; LUNAR‑4 final; LUNAR‑2 ≥80%; KEYNOTE D‑58 ≥80% | 100% of target PSUs; linear interpolation applies |
| Outperformance | 2026 Net Revenue ≥ $800M; 2026 Adj. EBITDA positive | TRIDENT final; LUNAR‑4 final; LUNAR‑2 fully enrolled; KEYNOTE D‑58 fully enrolled | Up to 200% of target PSUs; subject to quarterly positive Adj. EBITDA condition |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total Beneficial Ownership | 394,046 shares (219,126 Ordinary Shares + 174,920 options exercisable within 60 days) |
| Ownership % of Outstanding | <1% (asterisk denotes less than 1%) |
| Vested vs Unvested | Unvested time‑based RSUs: 131,624; exercisable options within 60 days: 174,920 |
| Options Exercised (2024) | None |
| Stock Vested (2024) | 17,176 shares; $271,541 value |
| Anti‑Hedging/Pledging | Hedging and pledging prohibited for directors, officers, employees |
| Ownership Guidelines | Executives must achieve Ordinary Share ownership equal to 3× base salary within 5 years; CEO/Executive Chairman 6× |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment Status | At‑will (effective Sept 1, 2020 employment agreement) |
| Severance (pre‑CIC) | 75% of base salary paid over 9 months; COBRA premium reimbursement up to 9 months (subject to eligibility) |
| Change‑of‑Control (double trigger) | 1.5× base salary + target annual bonus paid over 18 months; COBRA premium reimbursement up to 12 months; acceleration of unvested options/other equity (excluding PSUs) |
| Equity Acceleration | Unvested stock options and other equity awards (other than PSUs) fully vest upon Qualifying Termination within 12 months post‑CIC |
| Clawback | Dodd‑Frank compliant incentive compensation recovery; awards subject to recoupment for “Detrimental Activity” within 1 year of vest/exercise |
| Restrictive Covenants | Confidentiality and non‑disparagement; non‑compete 9 months; employee/customer/supplier non‑solicit during employment and for 9 months thereafter |
Multi‑Year Compensation Summary
| Component ($) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | 475,000 | 475,000 | 525,000 |
| Stock Awards | 3,299,814 | 2,866,517 | 3,333,317 |
| Option Awards | 2,102,893 | 1,435,196 | 1,670,829 |
| Non‑Equity Incentive | 237,500 | 253,650 | 283,500 |
| All Other Compensation | 10,599 | 8,874 | 11,284 |
| Total Compensation | 6,125,806 | 5,039,237 | 5,823,930 |
Compensation Structure Context
- Peer Group: Compensation benchmarked to med‑tech/biopharma peers (e.g., 10x Genomics, Align, DexCom, Exact Sciences, Insulet; updates across 2023–2024) .
- Governance: No option repricing; double‑trigger CIC; robust clawback; annual say‑on‑pay (98.2% support in 2024) .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Leonard’s pay mix is equity‑heavy (RSUs/options/PSUs) with long‑dated PSU hurdles tied to 2026 revenue, EBITDA, and pivotal trial execution, creating direct linkage to long‑term value creation .
- Retention Risk: Non‑compete and double‑trigger CIC economics (1.5× salary + target bonus plus equity acceleration excluding PSUs) offer meaningful retention protection; however, equity vesting cadence (notably 2024 grants) and annual RSU/option schedules can introduce periodic selling pressure on vest dates .
- Trading Signals: Anti‑hedging/pledging policy and ownership guidelines mitigate misalignment; lack of 2024 option exercises and modest stock vesting suggest limited near‑term selling pressure, while PSU outcomes will be sensitive to 2026 financials and trial milestones .
- Execution Risk: Annual incentive underperformance in lung starts and mixed clinical/reimbursement progress (offset by EBITDA beat and product design milestones) underscores operational risk balance; overall payout at 90% reflects disciplined pay-for-performance .