Uri Weinberg
NovoCureAbout Uri Weinberg
Chief Innovation Officer at Novocure (NVCR) since August 1, 2024; designated a Named Executive Officer (NEO) in the 2025 proxy . 2024 corporate performance underpinning incentive outcomes: net revenues $605.2M (+19% YoY), Adjusted EBITDA $0.8M (above target), while cumulative TSR over 2019–2024 reflected market pressure ($35 value of $100 invested) and net loss of $(169)M . Executive pay practices include robust clawback, anti-hedging/anti-pledging, no CIC tax gross-ups, and double-trigger equity vesting, aligning pay with long-term shareholder interests .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Novocure | Chief Innovation Officer | Aug 2024–present | Oversees innovation across clinical pipeline; 2024 milestones included METIS and PANOVA-3 Phase 3 successes and multiple trial enrollments/launches |
External Roles
No external board or public-company roles disclosed for Dr. Weinberg in company filings. (No disclosure)
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 Detail | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $471,483 (USD) | Increased to 450,000 CHF effective Aug 1, 2024; previously paid in NIS; FX treatment per footnote |
| Target Bonus % | 50% of base salary | Company-wide plan with weighted corporate goals |
| Actual Bonus Paid | $226,473 (USD) | Payout at 90% of target based on corporate achievement |
Performance Compensation
| Metric | Weight | Target (100%) | Actual | Payout Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| New GBM Patient Starts | 30% | 4,700 patients | 4,546 patients; 97% score | 29% weighted |
| New Lung Patient Starts | 15% | 220 patients | <25; 0% score | 0% weighted |
| Reimbursement Pathway (NCCN) | 15% | Guidelines established | Request submitted; 50% score | 8% weighted |
| Clinical Trial Milestones | 20% | METIS topline + PANOVA DB lock + ≥3 trials above-budget | METIS topline + PANOVA DB lock; 50% score | 10% weighted |
| Flex Torso Array Final Design | 10% | Final design + COGS on budget | Achieved; 100% score | 10% weighted |
| Adjusted EBITDA | 10% | ≥($90M) | $0.8M; 180% score | 18% weighted |
| Committee Modifier | — | — | +15% modifier | Corporate payout 90% of target |
RSUs, Options, PSUs – 2024 Grants and Vesting
| Award Type | Grant Date | Quantity | Key Terms |
|---|---|---|---|
| Options | Feb 27, 2024 | 125,078 | Exercise price $16.30; vest 25% annually over 4 years; expire 2/26/2034 |
| RSUs | Feb 27, 2024 | 81,799 | Vest in 3 equal annual tranches |
| PSUs (Threshold/Target/Max) | Feb 27, 2024 | 20,449 / 81,799 / 163,598 | 3-year measurement; vest contingent on 2026 Net Revenue, 2026 Adjusted EBITDA, and specified clinical milestones |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership Detail | Amount |
|---|---|
| Ordinary Shares Owned (Apr 4, 2025) | 221,218 |
| Options Exercisable within 60 days | 123,219 |
| Total Beneficial Ownership | 344,437 shares (≈0.31% of 111,485,134 outstanding) |
| Unvested RSUs (Dec 31, 2024) | 81,799; MV $2,437,610 @ $29.80 |
| Unearned PSUs (Target, Dec 31, 2024) | 81,799; MV $2,437,610 @ $29.80 (performance-contingent) |
| Policy Alignment | Executive stock ownership guideline: 3× base salary within five years; unvested PSUs/options excluded; refrain from sales until compliant |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for directors, officers, employees |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | Effective Aug 1, 2024; at-will; CIO |
| Severance (No CIC) | 75% of base salary over 9 months upon termination without cause / good reason |
| Severance (Within 12 months post-CIC) | Base salary + target annual bonus over 12 months; double-trigger full vesting for options/other equity (PSUs excluded) |
| Non-Compete / Non-Solicit | Applies during employment and for 9 months post-employment |
| Clawback | Dodd-Frank/NASDAQ-compliant recoupment policy; awards recoverable for detrimental activity |
| Quantified Potential Payments (as of 12/31/2024) | No-CIC cash severance: $383,501; Post-CIC cash+bonus: $818,136; Post-CIC equity acceleration (FV): $4,556,803 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Pay-for-performance: 2024 bonuses at 90% of target reflected mixed operational performance and above-target Adjusted EBITDA, with Committee modifier for strategic achievements .
- Long-term alignment: PSUs conditioned on 2026 Net Revenue ($600M/$700M/$800M thresholds), 2026 Adjusted EBITDA (>-120M/>-60M/>0), and clinical milestones (TRIDENT data; LUNAR-4 data/enrollment; LUNAR-2 and KEYNOTE D58 enrollment) .
- Governance safeguards: No option repricing; no CIC tax gross-ups; double-trigger vesting; robust ownership and clawback policies; 2024 say-on-pay approval 98.2% signaling investor support .
Investment Implications
- Retention and execution: Multi-year vesting of 2024 RSUs/options and performance-conditioned PSUs create strong retention and focus on 2026 financial/clinical milestones .
- M&A economics: Double-trigger equity acceleration for options/RSUs (PSUs excluded) raises transaction costs but maintains performance integrity; quantified post-CIC benefits provide clarity ($818k cash+bonus; $4.56M equity acceleration, as of 12/31/2024 marks) .
- Alignment and risk: Anti-hedging/pledging and ownership guidelines strengthen alignment; clawback mitigates misconduct risk; no related-party transactions disclosed; no option repricing/red flags noted .
- Performance drivers: Bonus and PSU frameworks tie compensation directly to TTFields adoption, reimbursement progress, pipeline milestones, and profitability—key levers for NVCR valuation and trading signals around clinical/regulatory events .