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Crystal Lail

Vice President and Chief Financial Officer at NorthWestern Energy GroupNorthWestern Energy Group
Executive

About Crystal Lail

Crystal D. Lail is Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of NorthWestern Energy Group, Inc. (since Oct 2, 2023) and of NorthWestern Corporation (since Feb 2021), after serving as VP & Chief Accounting Officer (Apr 2020–Feb 2021) and VP & Controller (Oct 2015–Apr 2020) . Age 46 (as of Feb 7, 2025) . Company performance metrics informing incentive outcomes: 2024 basic EPS rose 13.7% to $3.66 (from $3.22), one-year TSR was 10.5% (9th of 13 peers; peer avg 12.9%), and three-year ROAE was 7.5% (used in LTIP) .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
NorthWestern CorporationVice President & ControllerOct 2015 – Apr 2020Led controllership; foundation for later elevation to principal accounting and finance leadership .
NorthWestern CorporationVice President & Chief Accounting OfficerApr 2020 – Feb 2021Oversaw accounting, readiness for CFO role .
NorthWestern CorporationVice President & Chief Financial OfficerFeb 2021 – presentPrincipal financial officer of NorthWestern Corporation .
NorthWestern Energy Group, Inc.Vice President & Chief Financial OfficerOct 2, 2023 – presentPrincipal financial officer of holding company; finance leadership across group entities .

Fixed Compensation

Multi-year reported compensation for Crystal Lail (Summary Compensation Table):

MetricFY 2022FY 2023FY 2024
Salary ($)402,548 457,716 493,101
Stock Awards ($)498,750 474,375 592,947
Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation ($)217,800 237,425 435,000
Change in Pension Value/Nonqual. Def. Comp. Earnings ($)23,479 6,161
All Other Compensation ($)62,937 64,249 212,926
Total ($)1,182,035 1,257,244 1,740,135

Base salary setting:

NameAnnualized Base ($) 2023Annualized Base ($) 2024Increase (%)
Crystal Lail474,375 500,000 5.4%

Annual cash incentive structure and 2024 outcome:

ItemValue
Base Salary (A)$500,000
Target Opportunity (% of Base, B)75%
Plan Funding (% of Target, C)116%
Individual Performance Multiple (D)1.00
Actual Payout (A × B × C × D)$435,000

Performance Compensation

2024 Annual Incentive metrics (Company-level) and funding:

MetricWeightThresholdTargetMaximumActualTarget % AchievedContribution to Funding
Net Income ($mm)55% 194.0 215.5 237.1 224.1 120.0% 66.0%
Lost Time Incident Rate10% 13 7 9 60.0% 6.0%
Safety Training Completion5% 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 5.0%
SAIDI (ex-MED)10% 138 101 90 95.2 163.3% 16.3%
Gas leaks per 100 miles5% 13.6 9.7 6.5 9.2 120.0% 6.0%
JD Power Electric Rank7.5% 14 8 1 8 100% 7.5%
JD Power Gas Rank7.5% 14 8 1 6 125% 9.4%
Total Plan Funding116%

2024 LTIP grants (target) for Crystal Lail:

ComponentTarget Value ($)Target Units (#)Notes
Performance Share Units (70%)415,038 9,940 3-yr performance (ROAE + EPS growth 50%, relative TSR 50%); payout 0–200%; IG ratings required .
Restricted Share Units (30%)177,908 4,512 Time-based, cliff vest Dec 31, 2026 .
Total LTIP Target592,969 LTIP target set at 125% of base salary .

2019 ERRP vesting outcome (5-year performance metric: net income > 2019 in 3 of 5 years): Not met; 2019 ERRP awards did not vest .

2022–2024 PSU vesting outcome:

NameUnits at GrantVesting %Units upon VestingValue Realized ($)
Crystal Lail7,266 73.8% 5,362 $286,669 (at $53.46/share)

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Ownership, guideline status, and restrictions:

ItemValue
Beneficial ownership (shares)15,936 total (13,503 unrestricted; 2,433 DSUs); <1% of shares outstanding .
Stock ownership guideline4× base salary ($2,000,000 requirement) .
Shares/DSUs value vs guideline$874,090; 44% of guideline achieved (as of Mar 3, 2025 at $54.85) .
Sale restrictionExecutives restricted from selling until guideline achieved; must maintain thereafter .
Hedging/optionsHedging prohibited; no stock options granted or outstanding .

Unvested/Unearned awards outstanding (12/31/2024):

Award TypeGrant DateUnvested/Unearned Units (#)Market/Payout Value ($)
2024 LTIP RSU2/14/20244,512 241,212
2024 LTIP PSU (assumes target)2/14/20249,940 531,392
2023 LTIP RSU2/17/20232,774 148,298
2023 LTIP PSU (assumes target)2/17/20235,945 317,820
2020 ERRP RSU12/14/20211,260 67,360
2021 ERRP (performance-based)12/13/20222,166 115,794
2022 ERRP RSU12/13/20222,631 140,653

Note: Company disclosed that based on performance through Dec 31, 2024, 2023 and 2024 PSUs were tracking below target (SEC requires target disclosure in tables) .

Employment Terms

Key Employee Severance Plan (amended Apr 25, 2024) :

ScenarioCash SeveranceInterrupted Annual BonusCOBRA PremiumsOutplacementTotal Potential Cash
Change in Control (within 24 months; termination w/o cause or for good reason)2.5× base + 2.5× target bonus = $2,187,500 $343,750 $37,875 $20,000 $2,589,125
No Change in Control (involuntary w/o cause)1.5× base = $750,000 $343,750 $37,875 $20,000 $1,151,625

Change-in-control equity treatment: If awards not assumed/substituted, vest at target immediately prior to change; if assumed/substituted, vest at target upon involuntary termination within 24 months post-change; Lail’s potential accelerated stock value at target: $1,562,529 (at $53.46) .

Clawback policy: Adopted Oct 2023; recovers “Incentive-based Compensation” after an accounting restatement; computed based on restated amounts (Nasdaq Rule 5608 / SEC Rule 10D-1) .

Non-qualified deferred compensation (2024):

ItemValue
Executive contributions$0
Company discretionary supplemental retirement contribution$142,313 (30% of base salary; 5-year cliff to Dec 31, 2028; payout deferred until separation) .
Aggregate balance (12/31/2024)$278,676
Aggregate 2024 earnings$12,457

Pension benefits (cash balance plan):

PlanCredited Service (yrs)Present Value of Accumulated Benefit ($)Cash Balance (if terminated 12/31/2024) ($)
NorthWestern Energy SD/NE Pension Plan21.93 135,543 197,445

Employment agreements: Company discloses no employment agreements for executives (reviewed periodically) .

Performance Compensation (detail)

LTIP metrics for PSU (framework applicable to Lail’s awards):

  • 50% weight: three-year average ROAE and simple average EPS growth matrix; 50% weight: relative TSR vs peer group; maintaining investment grade credit ratings required; TSR negative caps TSR component at 100% .
  • 2022–2024 performance result: Financial goals contributed 31.3% (ROAE 7.51%, avg EPS growth 0.9%); TSR ranked 7th of 13 contributing 42.5%; total vesting 73.8% .

Say-on-Pay & Peer Practices

  • 2024 say-on-pay approval: 98.9% of votes cast approved NEO pay .
  • Pay practices highlight: target pay around peer median; significant at-risk pay; no stock options; no option repricing; no tax gross-ups; hedging prohibited .
  • 2024 pay mix: at-risk pay ~60% for NEO average; CEO ~80% .

Performance & Track Record

  • 2024 EPS up 13.7% to $3.66; one-year TSR 10.5% (peer avg 12.9%); dividend $2.60 (4.9% yield end-2024); reliability and customer satisfaction exceeded targets; safety slightly below lost-time target .
  • Strategic execution: filed rate reviews in MT/NE/SD (SD settled), completed Yellowstone County Generating Station, announced incremental Colstrip interests (zero-dollar purchase price), progressed wildfire mitigation, and announced two large-load data center opportunities .

Equity Ownership Guidelines & Compliance

ExecutiveRequired MultipleRequirement ($)Shares & DSUs Owned (#)Value ($)% of Guideline (3/3/2025)
Crystal Lail (CFO)4× base salary 2,000,000 15,936 874,090 44%

Investment Implications

  • Alignment and retention: Lail’s compensation is heavily performance- and equity-based (2024 target bonus 75% of base; LTIP 125% of base split 70/30 PSU/RSU) with robust clawback; supplemental retirement contributions (30% of base) vest over 5 years, supporting retention .
  • Selling pressure: Lail is below her 4× ownership guideline (44% achieved), and executives are restricted from selling until meeting the guideline—limiting near-term insider selling; near-term RSU vesting dates (Dec 31, 2025 and Dec 31, 2026) and PSU below-target tracking may further temper share supply from vesting .
  • Change-of-control economics: Combined cash severance ($2.59M) plus potential equity acceleration ($1.56M) create moderate COC leverage; double-trigger design on assumed awards aligns with shareholder-friendly practice .
  • Pay-for-performance: Annual incentive overfunded at 116% on improved net income, reliability, and customer satisfaction; 3-year PSU payouts at 73.8% reflect balanced outcomes vs ROAE/EPS and TSR matrices—suggesting measured incentive realization tied to fundamentals and relative returns .