Arnaud Aujouannet
Senior Vice President and Chief Sales and Marketing Officer at OI
Executive
About Arnaud Aujouannet
Senior Vice President and Chief Sales & Marketing Officer at O-I since October 2017; joined O-I in 2015 after 22 years at Gillette/Procter & Gamble and leading Swiss Precision Diagnostics/Clearblue (P&G JV). Age 55. Under O-I’s incentive framework, the 2024 short‑term incentive (EBIT 80%, FCF 20%) paid 0% companywide amid tough demand; the 2022‑2024 PSU cycle paid 114.3% adjusted by a relative TSR modifier (TSR −9.9%, 42nd percentile) reflecting stronger 2022–2023 performance and a weak 2024 . O-I reported 2024 net sales of $6,531M and targeted aEBITDA improvement to ≥$1,450M in 2025 and ≥$1,650M over 3 years, with >8% 5‑year CAGR ambition .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| O‑I Glass | VP Sales & Marketing, Europe | 2015–2017 | Led European commercial agenda ahead of promotion to global CSMO |
| O‑I Glass | SVP & Chief Sales & Marketing Officer | Oct 2017–present | Drives global growth/commercial strategy and privileged customer relationships |
| Procter & Gamble | Commercial Associate Director, Oral Care Europe | 2012–2015 | FMCG commercial leadership in Europe |
| Swiss Precision Diagnostics/Clearblue (P&G JV) | Global Sales & Marketing Chief | 2009–2012 | Global category growth/brand building |
| Gillette & Procter & Gamble | Various commercial roles | ~1993–2015 (22 years) | Consumer brands, innovation, go‑to‑market expertise |
External Roles
None disclosed in company filings for Aujouannet .
Fixed Compensation
| Item | 2024 | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary (USD paid) | $610,287 | Converted from CHF per Bloomberg average FX |
| Base salary rate (CHF) | CHF 540,600 as of 12/31/2024 | 2.0% increase effective 4/1/2024 aligned with Swiss merit budget |
| Target bonus % (STI) | 50% of salary | Target amount CHF 268,975 based on 2024 paid salary CHF 537,950 |
| Actual STI paid | $0 (0% payout) | Enterprise EBIT/FCF below threshold |
Performance Compensation
2024 Short‑Term Incentive (Companywide)
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EBIT (USD mm) | 80% | 760 | 950 | 1,050 | 643 | 0.0% |
| FCF (USD mm) | 20% | 105 | 150 | 195 | (84) | 0.0% |
| Total | — | — | — | — | — | 0.0% |
2022–2024 PSU Cycle (Enterprise)
| Period | Metric | Weight | Target | Actual | Banked payout (% of target) | r‑TSR modifier | Final |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | EPS ($) | 50% | 1.95 | 2.30 | 189.7% | — | — |
| 2022 | ROIC (%) | 50% | 7.75% | 8.71% | 161.9% | — | — |
| 2023 | EPS ($) | 50% | 2.48 | 3.09 | 200.0% | — | — |
| 2023 | ROIC (%) | 50% | 9.06% | 10.47% | 177.9% | — | — |
| 2024 | EPS ($) | 50% | 3.43 | 0.81 | 0.0% | — | — |
| 2024 | ROIC (%) | 50% | 10.67% | 4.86% | 0.0% | — | — |
| 3‑yr total | — | — | — | TSR −9.9% (42nd percentile) | Avg banked 121.6% | 0.94 | 114.3% |
2024 Long‑Term Incentive Grant
| Component | Grant date | Units | Grant‑date FMV (USD) | Vesting terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (2024–2026) | 3/7/2024 | Target 15,657; Thresh 3,758; Max 37,577 | $283,392 | EPS/ROIC annually over 3 yrs; r‑TSR modifier; vest after performance period |
| RSUs | 3/7/2024 | 10,438 | $176,193 | Vest 1/3 on each of first three anniversaries of grant date (subject to service) |
| Mix | — | — | 60% PSUs / 40% RSUs at target | Common annual grant date March 7; dividend equivalents only upon vesting |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | 119,148 shares; <1% of outstanding |
| Stock ownership guideline | Senior Business/Function Leader (Switzerland): 1.5× salary; Aujouannet actual 2.6× as of 6/30/2024 (met/exceeded) |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited (anti‑hedging and no pledging/margin) |
| Options outstanding | None; company did not grant options in 2024 (and generally does not rely on options) |
| Unvested RSUs at 12/31/2024 | 10,438 (2024 grant) MV $113,148; 4,829 (2023) MV $52,346; 4,690 (2022) MV $50,840 (at $10.84 close) |
| Unearned PSUs at 12/31/2024 | 3,758 (2024–2026) MV $40,733; 2,608 (2023–2025) MV $28,269; 24,125 (2022–2024) MV $261,518 (at $10.84 close; quantity assumes payout rates) |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| Severance policy | If terminated without cause, lump sum equal to 2× base salary + 2× target bonus; company‑subsidized health benefits up to 24 months; standard outplacement; Section 4999 cut‑back or full (better after‑tax); restrictive covenants (2‑year non‑compete/non‑solicit), confidentiality, non‑disparagement; requires release |
| Equity vesting on change‑in‑control | Double‑trigger required for equity vesting (change in control plus qualifying termination) |
| Clawback policy | Adopted per SEC/NYSE; recovery of erroneously awarded incentive‑based compensation on restatements (effective 10/2/2023) |
| Deferred comp | Not a participant in U.S. SPASP/EDSP (Switzerland‑based); eligible for Swiss Pension Plan |
| Pension benefits | Swiss Pension Plan present value $1,950,554 at 12/31/2024; actuarial assumptions disclosed |
| Perquisites (2024) | Financial planning/tax reimbursement $13,181; car allowance $51,731 (converted to USD) |
| Termination economics (illustrative) | Involuntary (not for cause): severance $1,839,881; RSUs $216,334; PSUs $516,309; retirement plans $1,950,554. Change‑in‑control with involuntary termination: RSUs $216,334; PSUs $516,309; severance $1,839,881; retirement plans $1,950,554 |
Performance Compensation Plan Design (Detail)
| Program | Metric | Weight | Target setting | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| STI | EBIT | 80% | Budget‑based; FX‑adjusted; excludes non‑recurring items | Individual +/-20% adjustment possible; capped at 200% |
| STI | FCF | 20% | Budget‑based; FX‑adjusted; pension overfunding excluded if not budgeted | Stand‑alone payout per metric; caps apply |
| LTI PSUs | EPS | 50% | 1st year budget; yrs 2–3 set as prior year actual plus fixed growth rates; audited results; r‑TSR modifier ±20% vs S&P 1500 Materials | |
| LTI PSUs | ROIC | 50% | Similar annual target approach with bp improvement; pension AOCI held constant | |
| LTI RSUs | Time‑based | 40% of LTI value | Vest one‑third each year over 3 years |
Equity Grant History (Plan totals to 3/19/2025)
| Executive | Cumulative PSUs (#) | Cumulative RSUs (#) |
|---|---|---|
| Arnaud Aujouannet | 116,200 | 78,895 |
Say‑on‑Pay & Peer Benchmarking
- Say‑on‑Pay support: 97% approval in 2023 and 2024, signaling investor endorsement of pay‑for‑performance design .
- Peer group: Packaging/industrial cohort targeting market median; PSU r‑TSR compares vs S&P 1500 Materials; balanced cash/equity, fixed/variable mix; majority of LTI performance‑based .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and payout sensitivity: 2024 STI paid 0% on EBIT/FCF miss, evidencing downside sensitivity and pay discipline; PSU 2022–2024 payout 114.3% benefitted from strong 2022–2023 EPS/ROIC despite 2024’s shortfall (r‑TSR dampened results), indicating multi‑year balance in incentives .
- Ownership and selling pressure: Aujouannet exceeds 1.5× salary ownership guideline (2.6×), holds <1% of shares, with anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging policy and no stock options—reduces forced‑selling/pledging risk; unvested RSUs/PSUs represent meaningful future delivery tied to performance and service .
- Retention risk and change‑in‑control economics: Severance at 2× salary+bonus with double‑trigger equity protection offers competitive retention and orderly transition terms; Swiss pension is a significant value component, particularly under disability/death scenarios .
- Execution focus: As CSMO, Aujouannet’s growth agenda emphasizes premiumization, targeted category/geography offense/defense, and leveraging “privileged” customer relationships—aligned with O‑I’s Horizon 2 profitable growth while Horizon 1 cost actions restore competitiveness; delivery of aEBITDA targets is key to future PSU outcomes and potential equity value accretion .