Sign in

You're signed outSign in or to get full access.

John Haudrich

Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer at O-I Glass, Inc. /DE/O-I Glass, Inc. /DE/
Executive

About John Haudrich

John A. Haudrich (57) is O‑I Glass’s Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer since April 2019, after serving as SVP Chief Strategy & Integration, Acting CFO, Corporate Controller, and VP Investor Relations (2009–2019) . During his tenure, O‑I’s long-term performance has been mixed: EBIT was $579M (2020), $680M (2021), $753M (2022), $943M (2023), and $643M (2024), while net income was $249M, $149M, $584M, $(103)M, and $(106)M, respectively; cumulative TSR vs a $100 base was 100.18 (2020), 101.26 (2021), 139.47 (2022), 137.84 (2023), and 91.20 (2024) .

Pay-versus-Performance (FY 2020–2024)

Metric20202021202220232024
EBIT ($MM)579 680 753 943 643
Net Income ($MM)249 149 584 (103) (106)
Cumulative TSR (Base $100)100.18 101.26 139.47 137.84 91.20

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
O‑I Glass, Inc.SVP & CFO2019–PresentFinance leadership across Fit to Win cost program, capital allocation, and turnaround execution
O‑I Glass, Inc.SVP Chief Strategy & Integration2015–2019Led enterprise strategy and integration initiatives
O‑I Glass, Inc.VP & Acting CFO2015Interim finance leadership
O‑I Glass, Inc.VP Finance & Corporate Controller2011–2015Corporate reporting, controls, and FP&A oversight
O‑I Glass, Inc.VP Investor Relations2009–2011Capital markets engagement and disclosure

Fixed Compensation

Component202220232024
Actual Salary Paid ($)703,000 730,000 759,110
Base Salary In-Effect ($ as of 12/31/2024)766,480
Target Bonus % of Salary80%
Target Bonus ($)607,288
Actual STI Paid ($)1,062,936 733,016 0 (enterprise payout 0%)

Notes: 2024 STI payout was 0% given EBIT of $643M (threshold $760M) and FCF of $(84)M (threshold $105M) .

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive (STI) – 2024 Design and Results

MetricWeightThresholdTargetMaximumActualPayout as % of Target
EBIT ($MM)80% 760 950 1,050 643 0.0%
FCF ($MM)20% 105 150 195 (84) 0.0%
Total100%0.0%

Design features: individual +/-20% modifier (not used as enterprise payout was zero) .

Long-Term Incentive (LTI) – Structure and Cycle Outcomes

  • Mix: 60% PSUs (EPS & ROIC), 40% time-based RSUs; r‑TSR 3‑yr modifier (±20%) vs S&P 1500 Materials .
  • PSUs measure annual EPS and ROIC over three years; r‑TSR adjusts the banked result at cycle end .

2022–2024 PSU Cycle (enterprise outcome):

YearMeasureThresholdTargetMaximumActualWeighted Payoutr‑TSR ModifierFinal Payout
2022EPS ($) 1.461.952.342.3094.9% 0.94 165.3%
2022ROIC (%) 5.817.759.308.7181.0% 0.94
2023EPS ($) 1.862.482.983.09100.0% 0.94 177.7%
2023ROIC (%) 6.809.0610.8710.4789.0% 0.94
2024EPS ($) 2.573.434.120.810.0% 0.94 0.0%
2024ROIC (%) 8.0010.6712.804.860.0% 0.94
Overall121.6% pre‑r‑TSR 0.94 114.3%

Haudrich 2024 equity grants:

  • PSUs (3/7/2024): Target 67,536; grant-date fair value $1,222,402 .
  • RSUs (3/7/2024): 45,024; grant-date fair value $760,005 .
  • RSU vesting: three equal annual installments from the vesting commencement date (March 7) .

2024 vesting realized value (enterprise):

ExecutiveShares Vested in 2024Value Realized ($)
John A. Haudrich216,0363,499,783

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Beneficial ownership: 361,923 shares, less than 1% of outstanding .
  • Outstanding awards at FY 2024:
    • RSUs: 45,024 (2024 grant); 22,330 (2023); 20,425 (2022) .
    • PSUs (assumed payout quantities for disclosure): 16,209 (2024–2026); 12,058 (2023–2025); 105,058 (2022–2024) .
  • Ownership guidelines: Senior Business/Function Leader 2.5x salary; Haudrich at 7.0x salary as of June 30, 2024 (200‑day average price $15.08) .
  • Anti‑hedging and pledging: prohibited by Insider Trading Compliance Policy .
  • Insider activity: On Aug 5, 2025 Haudrich purchased 2,289 OI shares (~$29,878 at ~$13.05), bringing reported holdings to ~459,395; SEC Form 4 filed Aug 7, 2025 .

Employment Terms

  • Severance (Executive Severance Policy): 2x base salary + target bonus (lump sum), plus up to 24 months company‑subsidized health benefits; 2‑year non‑compete and non‑solicit required; release of claims required .
  • Change‑in‑control: double trigger vesting for equity; if awards not assumed, RSUs vest and PSUs vest at target immediately prior to closing; if assumed, vesting continues, with full vesting on qualifying termination within 24 months .
  • Clawback: SEC/NYSE‑compliant policy adopted effective Oct 2, 2023 for recovery of erroneously awarded incentive compensation after an accounting restatement (supersedes 2014 policy for pre‑effective date awards) .
  • Perquisites (2024): life insurance premiums ($4,683), qualified and non‑qualified savings plan contributions ($24,372 and $73,008), other items including financial planning/car service ($18,049); total “All Other Compensation” $120,112 .

Potential payments (illustrative, assuming 12/31/2024 termination):

ScenarioTotal ($)Key Components
Involuntary Not for Cause4,403,113Severance 2,759,328; PSUs 1,603,464; RSUs 951,524; Health & Welfare 35,321; Outplacement 5,000
CIC with Involuntary Termination6,024,234Same structure with CIC terms
Disability4,481,570Disability income 1,040,742; health benefits 216,243; equity per plan
Death5,533,089Life insurance 2,299,440; equity per plan; health benefits

Performance Context (Financials under CFO Tenure)

Metric ($MM)FY 2020FY 2021FY 2022FY 2023FY 2024
Revenues*
EBITDA*

*Values retrieved from S&P Global.

Additional operational commentary: O‑I’s 2024 enterprise STI payout was 0% amid sluggish demand, overcapacity in Europe, and inventory normalization; Fit to Win cost actions are expected to drive improvements, with PSUs reflecting strong 2022–2023 performance but no payout for 2024 and a r‑TSR modifier at 0.94 . In Q1 2025, the company reaffirmed FY 2025 adjusted EPS guidance ($1.20–$1.50) and flagged tariff uncertainties; Fit to Win benefits and inventory reductions were highlighted by management, including the CFO .

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance alignment: 2024 STI paid zero, PSUs for 2022–2024 paid 114.3% after r‑TSR moderation; metrics (EBIT, FCF for STI; EPS, ROIC with r‑TSR for PSUs) are rigorous and aligned to value creation .
  • Retention and selling pressure: Significant RSU/PSU holdings with three‑year vesting cadence and robust ownership (7x salary vs 2.5x guideline) reduce near-term selling pressure; hedging/pledging prohibitions further support alignment .
  • Downside protections and change-in-control economics: Double‑trigger equity vesting and 2x salary+bonus severance create balanced retention incentives but also event‑driven payout risk; CIO scenarios are standard for industrial peers .
  • Execution risk: Mixed TSR and negative net income in 2023–2024 underscore turnaround dependence on Fit to Win and market normalization; management (including CFO) reaffirmed 2025 EPS rebound guidance but noted tariff uncertainty .
Note: Where “*” appears, figures are from S&P Global; all other figures/policies are from O‑I’s definitive proxy statement, 10‑K/10‑Q filings, and SEC Form 4 filings as cited.