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John Haudrich

Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer at OI
Executive

About John Haudrich

John A. Haudrich (57) is O‑I Glass’s Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer since April 2019, after serving as SVP Chief Strategy & Integration, Acting CFO, Corporate Controller, and VP Investor Relations (2009–2019) . During his tenure, O‑I’s long-term performance has been mixed: EBIT was $579M (2020), $680M (2021), $753M (2022), $943M (2023), and $643M (2024), while net income was $249M, $149M, $584M, $(103)M, and $(106)M, respectively; cumulative TSR vs a $100 base was 100.18 (2020), 101.26 (2021), 139.47 (2022), 137.84 (2023), and 91.20 (2024) .

Pay-versus-Performance (FY 2020–2024)

Metric20202021202220232024
EBIT ($MM)579 680 753 943 643
Net Income ($MM)249 149 584 (103) (106)
Cumulative TSR (Base $100)100.18 101.26 139.47 137.84 91.20

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
O‑I Glass, Inc.SVP & CFO2019–PresentFinance leadership across Fit to Win cost program, capital allocation, and turnaround execution
O‑I Glass, Inc.SVP Chief Strategy & Integration2015–2019Led enterprise strategy and integration initiatives
O‑I Glass, Inc.VP & Acting CFO2015Interim finance leadership
O‑I Glass, Inc.VP Finance & Corporate Controller2011–2015Corporate reporting, controls, and FP&A oversight
O‑I Glass, Inc.VP Investor Relations2009–2011Capital markets engagement and disclosure

Fixed Compensation

Component202220232024
Actual Salary Paid ($)703,000 730,000 759,110
Base Salary In-Effect ($ as of 12/31/2024)766,480
Target Bonus % of Salary80%
Target Bonus ($)607,288
Actual STI Paid ($)1,062,936 733,016 0 (enterprise payout 0%)

Notes: 2024 STI payout was 0% given EBIT of $643M (threshold $760M) and FCF of $(84)M (threshold $105M) .

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive (STI) – 2024 Design and Results

MetricWeightThresholdTargetMaximumActualPayout as % of Target
EBIT ($MM)80% 760 950 1,050 643 0.0%
FCF ($MM)20% 105 150 195 (84) 0.0%
Total100%0.0%

Design features: individual +/-20% modifier (not used as enterprise payout was zero) .

Long-Term Incentive (LTI) – Structure and Cycle Outcomes

  • Mix: 60% PSUs (EPS & ROIC), 40% time-based RSUs; r‑TSR 3‑yr modifier (±20%) vs S&P 1500 Materials .
  • PSUs measure annual EPS and ROIC over three years; r‑TSR adjusts the banked result at cycle end .

2022–2024 PSU Cycle (enterprise outcome):

YearMeasureThresholdTargetMaximumActualWeighted Payoutr‑TSR ModifierFinal Payout
2022EPS ($) 1.461.952.342.3094.9% 0.94 165.3%
2022ROIC (%) 5.817.759.308.7181.0% 0.94
2023EPS ($) 1.862.482.983.09100.0% 0.94 177.7%
2023ROIC (%) 6.809.0610.8710.4789.0% 0.94
2024EPS ($) 2.573.434.120.810.0% 0.94 0.0%
2024ROIC (%) 8.0010.6712.804.860.0% 0.94
Overall121.6% pre‑r‑TSR 0.94 114.3%

Haudrich 2024 equity grants:

  • PSUs (3/7/2024): Target 67,536; grant-date fair value $1,222,402 .
  • RSUs (3/7/2024): 45,024; grant-date fair value $760,005 .
  • RSU vesting: three equal annual installments from the vesting commencement date (March 7) .

2024 vesting realized value (enterprise):

ExecutiveShares Vested in 2024Value Realized ($)
John A. Haudrich216,0363,499,783

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Beneficial ownership: 361,923 shares, less than 1% of outstanding .
  • Outstanding awards at FY 2024:
    • RSUs: 45,024 (2024 grant); 22,330 (2023); 20,425 (2022) .
    • PSUs (assumed payout quantities for disclosure): 16,209 (2024–2026); 12,058 (2023–2025); 105,058 (2022–2024) .
  • Ownership guidelines: Senior Business/Function Leader 2.5x salary; Haudrich at 7.0x salary as of June 30, 2024 (200‑day average price $15.08) .
  • Anti‑hedging and pledging: prohibited by Insider Trading Compliance Policy .
  • Insider activity: On Aug 5, 2025 Haudrich purchased 2,289 OI shares (~$29,878 at ~$13.05), bringing reported holdings to ~459,395; SEC Form 4 filed Aug 7, 2025 .

Employment Terms

  • Severance (Executive Severance Policy): 2x base salary + target bonus (lump sum), plus up to 24 months company‑subsidized health benefits; 2‑year non‑compete and non‑solicit required; release of claims required .
  • Change‑in‑control: double trigger vesting for equity; if awards not assumed, RSUs vest and PSUs vest at target immediately prior to closing; if assumed, vesting continues, with full vesting on qualifying termination within 24 months .
  • Clawback: SEC/NYSE‑compliant policy adopted effective Oct 2, 2023 for recovery of erroneously awarded incentive compensation after an accounting restatement (supersedes 2014 policy for pre‑effective date awards) .
  • Perquisites (2024): life insurance premiums ($4,683), qualified and non‑qualified savings plan contributions ($24,372 and $73,008), other items including financial planning/car service ($18,049); total “All Other Compensation” $120,112 .

Potential payments (illustrative, assuming 12/31/2024 termination):

ScenarioTotal ($)Key Components
Involuntary Not for Cause4,403,113Severance 2,759,328; PSUs 1,603,464; RSUs 951,524; Health & Welfare 35,321; Outplacement 5,000
CIC with Involuntary Termination6,024,234Same structure with CIC terms
Disability4,481,570Disability income 1,040,742; health benefits 216,243; equity per plan
Death5,533,089Life insurance 2,299,440; equity per plan; health benefits

Performance Context (Financials under CFO Tenure)

Metric ($MM)FY 2020FY 2021FY 2022FY 2023FY 2024
Revenues*
EBITDA*

*Values retrieved from S&P Global.

Additional operational commentary: O‑I’s 2024 enterprise STI payout was 0% amid sluggish demand, overcapacity in Europe, and inventory normalization; Fit to Win cost actions are expected to drive improvements, with PSUs reflecting strong 2022–2023 performance but no payout for 2024 and a r‑TSR modifier at 0.94 . In Q1 2025, the company reaffirmed FY 2025 adjusted EPS guidance ($1.20–$1.50) and flagged tariff uncertainties; Fit to Win benefits and inventory reductions were highlighted by management, including the CFO .

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance alignment: 2024 STI paid zero, PSUs for 2022–2024 paid 114.3% after r‑TSR moderation; metrics (EBIT, FCF for STI; EPS, ROIC with r‑TSR for PSUs) are rigorous and aligned to value creation .
  • Retention and selling pressure: Significant RSU/PSU holdings with three‑year vesting cadence and robust ownership (7x salary vs 2.5x guideline) reduce near-term selling pressure; hedging/pledging prohibitions further support alignment .
  • Downside protections and change-in-control economics: Double‑trigger equity vesting and 2x salary+bonus severance create balanced retention incentives but also event‑driven payout risk; CIO scenarios are standard for industrial peers .
  • Execution risk: Mixed TSR and negative net income in 2023–2024 underscore turnaround dependence on Fit to Win and market normalization; management (including CFO) reaffirmed 2025 EPS rebound guidance but noted tariff uncertainty .
Note: Where “*” appears, figures are from S&P Global; all other figures/policies are from O‑I’s definitive proxy statement, 10‑K/10‑Q filings, and SEC Form 4 filings as cited.

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Best AI for Equity Research

Performance on expert-authored financial analysis tasks

Fintool-v490%
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GPT 546.9%
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Qwen 3 Max32.7%