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Earl F. Childress

Senior Vice President and Chief Commercial Officer at OCEANEERING INTERNATIONALOCEANEERING INTERNATIONAL
Executive

About Earl F. Childress

Senior Vice President and Chief Commercial Officer at Oceaneering International (OII). Joined OII in 2020 after senior roles at Teledyne; currently responsible for global commercial strategy and business development across energy segments . Company performance during his tenure has improved: 2024 revenue $2.7B (+10% YoY), Adjusted EBITDA $347M (+20%), net income $147M (+51%), and 3-year TSR of 142% (2022–2024 performance unit disclosure) . OII reported six consecutive years of growth and repurchased 825,427 shares ($20M) in 2024, with year-end share price rising to $26.08 from $21.28 in 2023 .
Note: Age and education not disclosed in available filings.

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Oceaneering International (OII)SVP, Business Development; later SVP & Chief Commercial Officer2020–PresentLeads worldwide business development for energy-related segments; appointed to succeed outgoing SVP in 2020 .
Teledyne TechnologiesGroup VP/GM, Teledyne Seismic & Teledyne RD Instruments2016–2020P&L leadership across marine instrumentation businesses .
Teledyne TechnologiesGroup EVP, Sales & Marketing, Marine Instrumentation2015–2016Drove commercial strategy across marine instrumentation .
Multiple oceanographic instrumentation manufacturersSales & management rolesPre-2002Built domain expertise and customer relationships in marine/oceanographic markets .

External Roles

  • Not disclosed in available filings.

Fixed Compensation

Metric20232024
Base Salary ($)378,525 389,881 (+3%)
Target Bonus (% of Base)65% 70% (increased effective Jan 1, 2024)
Actual Annual Cash Bonus ($)262,772 236,619

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive Plan – Design and Payouts

YearMetricWeightTargetActual/AttainmentPayout vs Target
2024Adjusted EBITDA60%$355M plan 98% of target (Committee-adjusted to $348M) 95%
2024Free Cash Flow25%$130M plan 74% of target ($96M) 58%
2024Safety10%Goal-based 108% 108%
2024Environmental5%Goal-based 90% 90%
2023Adjusted EBITDA60%$285M plan 101% of target ($289M) 108%
2023Free Cash Flow25%$100M plan 109% of target ($109M) 112%
2023Safety10%Goal-based 96% 96%
2023Environmental5%Goal-based 90% 90%

Long-Term Incentives – Structure and Results

  • Vehicle mix: 50% service-based RSUs (3-year cliff vest); 50% performance units (PUs) paid in cash after 3-year performance period .
  • 2024–2026 Performance Units (granted Feb 23, 2024):
    • Metrics: Cumulative Adjusted EBITDA (70%) and Relative TSR vs peer group (30%) .
    • Goal grid: Cumulative Adj. EBITDA threshold $852M / target $1,065M / max $1,598M; Relative TSR 30th / 50th / >90th percentile; payout 0–200% of target, TSR capped at target if absolute TSR negative .
  • 2022–2024 Performance Units (paid Feb 2025):
    • Results: Cumulative Adj. EBITDA $867M; Relative TSR 67th percentile; Overall payout 137% of target .
    • Childress’s non-equity incentive line includes this PSU cash payout .

Childress-Specific 2024 and 2023 LTI Targets

YearTarget LTI (% of Salary)Target RSU $RSU SharesTarget PU $
2024130% (up from 125%) $253,423 12,184 $253,422
2023125% $236,578 11,462 $236,578

Vesting: RSUs settle in shares at 3rd anniversary; PUs settle in cash after the 3-year period (with special vesting on death/disability/CoC as described below) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

DateShares OwnedRSUs Unvested/CreditedTotal “Beneficial + RSUs”Notes
Mar 17, 202528,452 34,338 62,790 Each director/executive ≤0.7% of outstanding .
Mar 20, 202436,054 36,373 72,427 Each director/executive ≤0.6% of outstanding .

Additional alignment policies:

  • Stock ownership guidelines: 5x CEO salary; 3x for President/COO/Corporate SVPs; 2x for other SVPs; 5x director retainer. Vested and unvested RSUs count; 5-year compliance window .
  • Hedging/pledging prohibited for directors and officers .
  • No stock options outstanding for NEOs; company has not used annual stock options since 2006 .

Employment Terms

  • Change-of-control protection: Childress participates in the CoC Plan (adopted 2018). On a termination without cause or for good reason in connection with a change of control (double-trigger), lump sum equals 2x (highest base salary + target annual bonus) plus one year of post-employment health benefits (COBRA premium); “net better of” provision for excise tax mitigation .
  • Equity treatment on termination/CoC:
    • Death or disability: unvested RSUs vest; PUs vest at target value .
    • Change of control: PUs deemed earned at target but generally remain subject to continued service to original vest date; upon qualifying termination, for CoC Plan participants (like Childress) PUs vest at target ($100/unit) .
  • Illustrative potential payments (as of Dec 31, 2024): Involuntary termination w/o CoC: $194,941 cash severance + $1,688 COBRA subsidy; Death/Disability: RSUs $948,608; PUs $754,600; SERP vested $396,682 + unvested $128,524; CoC+Termination: cash $1,345,854; COBRA $13,407; RSUs $948,608; PUs $754,600; SERP vested $396,682 + unvested $128,524 .

Additional Compensation & Benefits Details

  • SERP (nonqualified deferred compensation): Company credits equal to 20% of base salary for Childress; 2024 company contribution $77,976; 2024 aggregate balance $525,206; hypothetical 2024 earnings $42,194 .
  • Perquisites (2024): Excess liability insurance, supplemental medical plan, use of sporting event tickets, club membership; 2024 perqs total $31,960 .

Say-on-Pay, Program Governance, and Peer Group

  • Say-on-pay support: ~94% (2024 vote referenced for 2025 compensation decisions); ~93% the prior year .
  • Compensation Consultant: Meridian Compensation Partners (independent; retained since 2015) .
  • 2024 Peer Group: ChampionX, Chart Industries, Dril-Quip, Expro, Flowserve, Helix Energy Solutions, Helmerich & Payne, Noble, NOW (DNOW), Oil States International, Transocean, Weatherford .

Performance & Track Record

  • 2024 Outcomes: Revenue $2.7B (+10% YoY), operating income $246M (+36%), net income $147M (+51%), Adjusted EBITDA $347M (+20%); 6th consecutive year of growth .
  • Capital returns and equity: Repurchased 825,427 shares ($20M); share price rose from $21.28 (Dec 29, 2023) to $26.08 (Dec 31, 2024) .
  • Long-term: 3-year TSR of 142% (used in pay vs performance/PSU disclosures) .
  • Segment highlights include manufactured products backlog $604M YE 2024 providing visibility .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • At-risk mix: For non-CEO NEOs, 66–79% of total direct compensation at risk (target) in 2024; long-term incentives ~50% performance-based (PUs) and ~50% RSUs .
  • Shift/increases: Childress LTI target raised from 125% to 130% of salary in 2024 based on benchmarking; AIP target increased from 65% to 70% of salary in 2024 .
  • Clawback: SEC/NYSE-compliant policy approved Aug 2023; 3-year lookback on restatements .
  • Risk controls: Caps on payouts; TSR component capped at target if absolute TSR negative; hedging/pledging prohibited .

Equity Grant and Vesting Schedule (Selected)

Unvested RSUs as of Dec 31, 20242022 Grant (delivers 2/25/2025)2023 Grant (delivers 2/24/2026)2024 Grant (delivers 2/23/2027)Total
Earl F. Childress12,727 11,462 12,184 36,373

Vesting: RSUs vest fully on the third anniversary of grant; withholding applies for taxes; PUs vest based on 3-year performance and are cash-settled .

Compliance & Related Matters

  • Section 16 compliance: 2023 filings generally timely; one Form 4 for another officer (McDonald) reported late (no issue noted for Childress) .
  • Related party transactions: No disclosed related-party transactions involving Childress in 2023 .

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance alignment is strong: company-level metrics (Adj. EBITDA, FCF, safety, ESG) drive annual bonuses; long-term PSUs tied to cumulative Adj. EBITDA (70%) and relative TSR (30%); TSR capped in down markets—mitigates windfalls .
  • Retention risk moderated by multi-year RSU/PU vesting and competitive LTI target (130% of salary); CoC protection is double-trigger at 2x, which is market-standard and limits single-trigger concerns .
  • Alignment safeguards: robust stock ownership guidelines; prohibition on hedging/pledging reduces misalignment/forced selling risk; no options outstanding reduces incentives for repricing behavior .
  • Performance momentum (EBITDA growth, higher profitability, backlog) plus 3-year TSR of 142% underpin incentive payouts; continued delivery on FCF targets is critical given 2024 FCF under plan (74% of target) which reduced cash bonus payout—signals discipline in payout calibration .