
Steven Abramson
About Steven Abramson
Steven V. Abramson, age 73, is President & Chief Executive Officer of Universal Display Corporation (OLED) and has served on the Board since May 1996; he previously served as President & COO from May 1996 to December 2007 and held senior roles at InterDigital and Roy F. Weston before joining OLED . Under his leadership, the company reported 2024 revenue of $648 million and net income of $222 million; a $100 investment in OLED from year-end 2019 was valued at $73.54 by 2024 versus $237.86 for the peer index, illustrating TSR underperformance in that period . Executive compensation is tightly linked to revenue, adjusted operating income, adjusted EBITDA and relative TSR via annual incentives and PSUs, with formal clawbacks and stringent anti-hedging policies .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| InterDigital, Inc. | General Counsel; EVP; GM Technology Licensing Division | 1982–1991 | Led licensing operations and international business development in wireless technology . |
| Roy F. Weston, Inc. | VP, General Counsel, Secretary & Treasurer | 1992–1996 | Managed legal and treasury functions at a global environmental consulting firm . |
| Universal Display Corporation | President & COO | 1996–2007 | Built operations during formative growth stage prior to CEO tenure . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | No external public company directorships disclosed for Abramson in the proxy . |
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year CEO compensation components:
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 842,703 | 878,024 | 917,766 |
| Target Bonus (% of Base) | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | 125% |
| Annual Incentive Paid ($) | 1,857,838 | 1,543,185 | 1,709,173 |
| Stock Awards Grant-Date Fair Value ($) | 7,033,223 | 6,781,096 | 6,420,598 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 45,388 (auto, insurance, 401k) | 53,347 (auto, insurance, 401k) | 40,204 (auto, insurance, 401k) |
| CEO Pay Ratio | — | — | 61:1 (CEO $9,087,751 vs median $148,030) |
Notes:
- 2024 initial base for plan purposes was $937,175, with a 125% target bonus; actual payout ≈146% of target, paid March 2025 .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) design and 2024 outcomes:
| Component | Weight | Target | Threshold | Maximum | Actual 2024 | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Company Revenue | 40% of total (half of financial factors) | $650M | $600M (50% payout) | >$700M (200%) | $648M | Contributed to ≈146% overall payout |
| Adjusted Operating Income | 40% of total (half of financial factors) | $270M | $250M (50% payout) | >$290M (200%) | $283M | Contributed to ≈146% overall payout |
| Team/Individual KPIs | 20% | Scorecard goals (serve customers, operate with discipline, grow, develop people) | — | — | Maximum ratings | Contributed to ≈146% overall payout |
Long-term incentives (granted March 4, 2024):
- RSUs: 11,559 units; vest ratably 1/3 on Mar 4, 2025, 2026, 2027; GDFV ≈$2,000,054 .
- PSUs (target): 23,119 units; 3-year performance Jan 2024–Dec 2026; 50% cumulative adjusted EBITDA, 25% relative TSR vs Nasdaq Electronics Components Index, 25% cumulative gross margin; payout multiplier 0x–3x; vest in 2027 subject to employment .
Prior PSU cycle (granted Feb 16, 2022; performance Jan 2022–Dec 2024):
- Weighting: 50% adjusted EBITDA, 25% cash from operations, 25% relative TSR .
- Results: Adjusted EBITDA 0% of target; Cash from operations 109%; TSR at 72nd percentile, 275% of target; total PSU vesting equal to 96% of target for 2022 grants .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 256,159 shares; less than 1% of outstanding; includes 5,033 shares in a January 2023 Grantor Retained Annuity Trust for Abramson . |
| Unvested RSUs (12/31/2024) | 4,494 (2022 grant), 9,616 (2023), 11,559 (2024); market value $657,023, $1,405,859, $1,689,926 (at $146.20) . |
| Unvested PSUs (12/31/2024) | 26,964 (2022 cycle), 28,851 (2023), 23,119 (2024); market/payout values $3,942,137, $4,218,016, $3,379,998 (at $146.20) . |
| 2024 Stock Vested | 22,513 shares vested; value realized $3,974,315 . |
| Options | None outstanding/exercisable for NEOs . |
| Pledging | No pledging disclosed for Abramson; pledges exist for certain other directors (Hartley, Lacerte) . |
| Ownership Guidelines | Executives must hold 6x base salary for CEO; all NEOs currently in compliance; sales restricted until threshold met; 5-year compliance window for new executives . |
| Anti-Hedging | Company prohibits short-selling and hedging transactions for all employees and directors . |
Employment Terms
| Term | Provision | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Employment Contract | None; no individual employment agreements for NEOs . | Reduces guaranteed protections; compensation set annually. |
| Change-in-Control (CIC) | Double-trigger; 2x base salary + 2x annual bonus; accelerated vesting; continued benefits; outplacement; excise tax gross-up for Abramson and certain NEOs . | Estimated CEO CIC total $56.2M on 12/31/2024 scenario, including $15.29M accelerated equity and $18.90M tax reimbursement; SERP payout $16.08M . |
| SERP | Nonqualified supplemental retirement; CEO class at 50% of base + 3-year average bonus; 10-year payout; immediate vest on CIC; special participant includes spouse life expectancy; present value $16,077,671 as of 12/31/2024 . | |
| Deferred Comp (DCP) | Plan effective 1/1/2024; CEO eligible but not shown as participant for 2024; distributions upon termination or CIC; assets remain general creditor . | |
| Clawback | Three-year recovery for restatement-triggered erroneous awards; supplemental clawbacks in equity agreements . | |
| Non-Compete | 6-month non-compete post-CIC termination; 2-year non-solicit and non-interference; release required . | |
| Perquisites | Auto allowance $500/month; life and disability insurance; 401(k) nonelective contribution $10,350 in 2024 . |
Board Governance
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Board Service, Independence, Roles:
- Director since May 1996; currently President & CEO; not independent due to officer status .
- CEO and Board Chair roles are separated; Board Chair is Sidney D. Rosenblatt; Lead Independent Director is Elizabeth H. Gemmill with active oversight and shareholder engagement .
- Board and committees met regularly in 2024; all members attended ≥75% of meetings in aggregate .
- CEO received no compensation for Board service in 2024 .
-
Committee Structure and Oversight:
- Independent committees include Audit, Human Capital (compensation), Nominating & Corporate Governance, Environmental & Social Responsibility, and Investment .
- Human Capital Committee is fully independent, uses Korn Ferry as advisor, and administers equity, AIP, SERP, DCP .
Director Compensation
- For 2024, independent directors received cash retainers and equity; CEO (Abramson), as an officer-director, did not receive separate Board compensation .
Performance & Track Record
| Year | Revenue ($M) | Net Income ($M) | Company $100 Investment Value | Peer $100 Investment Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 429 | 133 | 111.93 | 124.37 |
| 2021 | 554 | 184 | 80.71 | 152.97 |
| 2022 | 617 | 210 | 53.38 | 134.97 |
| 2023 | 576 | 203 | 95.35 | 162.17 |
| 2024 | 648 | 222 | 73.54 | 237.86 |
Highlights:
- 2024 AIP targets were set above 2023 results; company exceeded thresholds on revenue and adjusted operating income and achieved maximum KPI ratings, yielding ~146% of target payout for NEOs .
- 2022 PSU cycle vested at 96% of target driven by strong TSR vs index (72nd percentile) and cash from operations, despite EBITDA shortfall .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Increased emphasis on objective financials in AIP (80% financial, 20% KPI) with targets above prior-year performance; no guaranteed bonuses; capped and thresholded payouts .
- Shift to RSUs and PSUs; options and SARs generally not granted; RSUs vest ratably, PSUs tied to 3-year adjusted EBITDA, TSR, and gross margin with 0x–3x multipliers; no repricing allowed without shareholder approval .
- Robust clawback policy aligned with Nasdaq rules; strict anti-hedging/short-selling policies; stock ownership guidelines enforced with sell restrictions until compliance .
- CIC agreements include double-trigger protection; notable excise tax gross-ups remain for CEO and certain NEOs; 280G/4999 implications disclosed .
Related Party Transactions and Red Flags
- No related-party transactions disclosed for Abramson; company discloses employment of David Rosenblatt (CFO’s family) and audits such items via the Audit Committee .
- Risk indicators: excise tax gross-up provisions in CIC (shareholder-unfriendly), significant SERP present value, and large potential CIC payouts; hedging prohibited; pledging not disclosed for Abramson .
Equity Ownership & Alignment Table (Detail)
| Category | Shares/Value |
|---|---|
| Shares Beneficially Owned | 256,159; <1% of common stock . |
| RSUs Unvested (12/31/2024) | 4,494 ($657,023); 9,616 ($1,405,859); 11,559 ($1,689,926) at $146.20 . |
| PSUs Unvested (12/31/2024) | 26,964 ($3,942,137); 28,851 ($4,218,016); 23,119 ($3,379,998) at $146.20 . |
| 2024 Vesting Value | $3,974,315 on 22,513 shares . |
| Ownership Guidelines | CEO must hold ≥6x base salary; in compliance . |
Employment & Contracts Summary
| Topic | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| No Employment Contract | CEO compensation set by Human Capital Committee; no auto-renewal contracts . |
| CIC Economics | 2x salary + bonus; accelerated vesting; benefits continuation; outplacement; excise tax gross-up (CEO); estimated total $56.2M in 12/31/2024 scenario . |
| SERP | 50% of salary+avg bonus; special participant status; PV $16.08M; immediate vest on CIC . |
| Clawbacks | 3-year recovery for restatements; equity agreements include clawbacks . |
| Non-Compete/Non-Solicit | 6-month non-compete; 2-year non-solicit/interference post-CIC termination . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Hedging/short-selling prohibited; no pledge disclosed for CEO . |
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- Annual advisory vote (“say on pay”) conducted; Board recommends approval; shareholder outreach meetings with holders representing >35% of shares as of year-end 2024, led by Lead Independent Director, to refine compensation structure .
Compensation Committee Analysis
- Committee: Independent; chair Lawrence Lacerte; consulted Korn Ferry in 2024; administers AIP, equity plans, SERP, DCP; no interlocks or insider participation issues disclosed .
Investment Implications
- Near-term selling pressure risk: RSUs vest 1/3 each on Mar 4, 2025/2026/2027; PSUs from 2024 grant vest after FY2026, creating periodic liquidity events; anti-hedging rules constrain risk management, but ownership guidelines restrict sales until thresholds are met .
- Alignment vs entrenchment: Strong pay-for-performance (AIP and PSUs) with objective financial metrics and relative TSR; however, large CIC payouts and excise tax gross-ups (and substantial SERP PV) present governance and payout risk if control changes .
- Performance linkage: 2024 targets were set above 2023 results and partially met/exceeded; 2022 PSU cycle rewarded strong TSR and cash generation despite EBITDA shortfall, signaling balanced metrics but potential sensitivity to margin/EBITDA headwinds .
- Ownership: CEO beneficially holds 256k shares (<1%); significant unvested equity and compliance with stringent ownership guidelines underpin alignment; absence of pledging is positive .