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Steven Abramson

Steven Abramson

President and Chief Executive Officer at UNIVERSAL DISPLAY CORP \PA\UNIVERSAL DISPLAY CORP \PA\
CEO
Executive
Board

About Steven Abramson

Steven V. Abramson, age 73, is President & Chief Executive Officer of Universal Display Corporation (OLED) and has served on the Board since May 1996; he previously served as President & COO from May 1996 to December 2007 and held senior roles at InterDigital and Roy F. Weston before joining OLED . Under his leadership, the company reported 2024 revenue of $648 million and net income of $222 million; a $100 investment in OLED from year-end 2019 was valued at $73.54 by 2024 versus $237.86 for the peer index, illustrating TSR underperformance in that period . Executive compensation is tightly linked to revenue, adjusted operating income, adjusted EBITDA and relative TSR via annual incentives and PSUs, with formal clawbacks and stringent anti-hedging policies .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
InterDigital, Inc.General Counsel; EVP; GM Technology Licensing Division1982–1991Led licensing operations and international business development in wireless technology .
Roy F. Weston, Inc.VP, General Counsel, Secretary & Treasurer1992–1996Managed legal and treasury functions at a global environmental consulting firm .
Universal Display CorporationPresident & COO1996–2007Built operations during formative growth stage prior to CEO tenure .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
No external public company directorships disclosed for Abramson in the proxy .

Fixed Compensation

Multi-year CEO compensation components:

MetricFY 2022FY 2023FY 2024
Base Salary ($)842,703 878,024 917,766
Target Bonus (% of Base)Not disclosedNot disclosed125%
Annual Incentive Paid ($)1,857,838 1,543,185 1,709,173
Stock Awards Grant-Date Fair Value ($)7,033,223 6,781,096 6,420,598
All Other Compensation ($)45,388 (auto, insurance, 401k) 53,347 (auto, insurance, 401k) 40,204 (auto, insurance, 401k)
CEO Pay Ratio61:1 (CEO $9,087,751 vs median $148,030)

Notes:

  • 2024 initial base for plan purposes was $937,175, with a 125% target bonus; actual payout ≈146% of target, paid March 2025 .

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) design and 2024 outcomes:

ComponentWeightTargetThresholdMaximumActual 2024Payout
Company Revenue40% of total (half of financial factors) $650M $600M (50% payout) >$700M (200%) $648M Contributed to ≈146% overall payout
Adjusted Operating Income40% of total (half of financial factors) $270M $250M (50% payout) >$290M (200%) $283M Contributed to ≈146% overall payout
Team/Individual KPIs20% Scorecard goals (serve customers, operate with discipline, grow, develop people) Maximum ratings Contributed to ≈146% overall payout

Long-term incentives (granted March 4, 2024):

  • RSUs: 11,559 units; vest ratably 1/3 on Mar 4, 2025, 2026, 2027; GDFV ≈$2,000,054 .
  • PSUs (target): 23,119 units; 3-year performance Jan 2024–Dec 2026; 50% cumulative adjusted EBITDA, 25% relative TSR vs Nasdaq Electronics Components Index, 25% cumulative gross margin; payout multiplier 0x–3x; vest in 2027 subject to employment .

Prior PSU cycle (granted Feb 16, 2022; performance Jan 2022–Dec 2024):

  • Weighting: 50% adjusted EBITDA, 25% cash from operations, 25% relative TSR .
  • Results: Adjusted EBITDA 0% of target; Cash from operations 109%; TSR at 72nd percentile, 275% of target; total PSU vesting equal to 96% of target for 2022 grants .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial Ownership256,159 shares; less than 1% of outstanding; includes 5,033 shares in a January 2023 Grantor Retained Annuity Trust for Abramson .
Unvested RSUs (12/31/2024)4,494 (2022 grant), 9,616 (2023), 11,559 (2024); market value $657,023, $1,405,859, $1,689,926 (at $146.20) .
Unvested PSUs (12/31/2024)26,964 (2022 cycle), 28,851 (2023), 23,119 (2024); market/payout values $3,942,137, $4,218,016, $3,379,998 (at $146.20) .
2024 Stock Vested22,513 shares vested; value realized $3,974,315 .
OptionsNone outstanding/exercisable for NEOs .
PledgingNo pledging disclosed for Abramson; pledges exist for certain other directors (Hartley, Lacerte) .
Ownership GuidelinesExecutives must hold 6x base salary for CEO; all NEOs currently in compliance; sales restricted until threshold met; 5-year compliance window for new executives .
Anti-HedgingCompany prohibits short-selling and hedging transactions for all employees and directors .

Employment Terms

TermProvisionNotes
Employment ContractNone; no individual employment agreements for NEOs .Reduces guaranteed protections; compensation set annually.
Change-in-Control (CIC)Double-trigger; 2x base salary + 2x annual bonus; accelerated vesting; continued benefits; outplacement; excise tax gross-up for Abramson and certain NEOs .Estimated CEO CIC total $56.2M on 12/31/2024 scenario, including $15.29M accelerated equity and $18.90M tax reimbursement; SERP payout $16.08M .
SERPNonqualified supplemental retirement; CEO class at 50% of base + 3-year average bonus; 10-year payout; immediate vest on CIC; special participant includes spouse life expectancy; present value $16,077,671 as of 12/31/2024 .
Deferred Comp (DCP)Plan effective 1/1/2024; CEO eligible but not shown as participant for 2024; distributions upon termination or CIC; assets remain general creditor .
ClawbackThree-year recovery for restatement-triggered erroneous awards; supplemental clawbacks in equity agreements .
Non-Compete6-month non-compete post-CIC termination; 2-year non-solicit and non-interference; release required .
PerquisitesAuto allowance $500/month; life and disability insurance; 401(k) nonelective contribution $10,350 in 2024 .

Board Governance

  • Board Service, Independence, Roles:

    • Director since May 1996; currently President & CEO; not independent due to officer status .
    • CEO and Board Chair roles are separated; Board Chair is Sidney D. Rosenblatt; Lead Independent Director is Elizabeth H. Gemmill with active oversight and shareholder engagement .
    • Board and committees met regularly in 2024; all members attended ≥75% of meetings in aggregate .
    • CEO received no compensation for Board service in 2024 .
  • Committee Structure and Oversight:

    • Independent committees include Audit, Human Capital (compensation), Nominating & Corporate Governance, Environmental & Social Responsibility, and Investment .
    • Human Capital Committee is fully independent, uses Korn Ferry as advisor, and administers equity, AIP, SERP, DCP .

Director Compensation

  • For 2024, independent directors received cash retainers and equity; CEO (Abramson), as an officer-director, did not receive separate Board compensation .

Performance & Track Record

YearRevenue ($M)Net Income ($M)Company $100 Investment ValuePeer $100 Investment Value
2020429 133 111.93 124.37
2021554 184 80.71 152.97
2022617 210 53.38 134.97
2023576 203 95.35 162.17
2024648 222 73.54 237.86

Highlights:

  • 2024 AIP targets were set above 2023 results; company exceeded thresholds on revenue and adjusted operating income and achieved maximum KPI ratings, yielding ~146% of target payout for NEOs .
  • 2022 PSU cycle vested at 96% of target driven by strong TSR vs index (72nd percentile) and cash from operations, despite EBITDA shortfall .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Increased emphasis on objective financials in AIP (80% financial, 20% KPI) with targets above prior-year performance; no guaranteed bonuses; capped and thresholded payouts .
  • Shift to RSUs and PSUs; options and SARs generally not granted; RSUs vest ratably, PSUs tied to 3-year adjusted EBITDA, TSR, and gross margin with 0x–3x multipliers; no repricing allowed without shareholder approval .
  • Robust clawback policy aligned with Nasdaq rules; strict anti-hedging/short-selling policies; stock ownership guidelines enforced with sell restrictions until compliance .
  • CIC agreements include double-trigger protection; notable excise tax gross-ups remain for CEO and certain NEOs; 280G/4999 implications disclosed .

Related Party Transactions and Red Flags

  • No related-party transactions disclosed for Abramson; company discloses employment of David Rosenblatt (CFO’s family) and audits such items via the Audit Committee .
  • Risk indicators: excise tax gross-up provisions in CIC (shareholder-unfriendly), significant SERP present value, and large potential CIC payouts; hedging prohibited; pledging not disclosed for Abramson .

Equity Ownership & Alignment Table (Detail)

CategoryShares/Value
Shares Beneficially Owned256,159; <1% of common stock .
RSUs Unvested (12/31/2024)4,494 ($657,023); 9,616 ($1,405,859); 11,559 ($1,689,926) at $146.20 .
PSUs Unvested (12/31/2024)26,964 ($3,942,137); 28,851 ($4,218,016); 23,119 ($3,379,998) at $146.20 .
2024 Vesting Value$3,974,315 on 22,513 shares .
Ownership GuidelinesCEO must hold ≥6x base salary; in compliance .

Employment & Contracts Summary

TopicKey Terms
No Employment ContractCEO compensation set by Human Capital Committee; no auto-renewal contracts .
CIC Economics2x salary + bonus; accelerated vesting; benefits continuation; outplacement; excise tax gross-up (CEO); estimated total $56.2M in 12/31/2024 scenario .
SERP50% of salary+avg bonus; special participant status; PV $16.08M; immediate vest on CIC .
Clawbacks3-year recovery for restatements; equity agreements include clawbacks .
Non-Compete/Non-Solicit6-month non-compete; 2-year non-solicit/interference post-CIC termination .
Hedging/PledgingHedging/short-selling prohibited; no pledge disclosed for CEO .

Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • Annual advisory vote (“say on pay”) conducted; Board recommends approval; shareholder outreach meetings with holders representing >35% of shares as of year-end 2024, led by Lead Independent Director, to refine compensation structure .

Compensation Committee Analysis

  • Committee: Independent; chair Lawrence Lacerte; consulted Korn Ferry in 2024; administers AIP, equity plans, SERP, DCP; no interlocks or insider participation issues disclosed .

Investment Implications

  • Near-term selling pressure risk: RSUs vest 1/3 each on Mar 4, 2025/2026/2027; PSUs from 2024 grant vest after FY2026, creating periodic liquidity events; anti-hedging rules constrain risk management, but ownership guidelines restrict sales until thresholds are met .
  • Alignment vs entrenchment: Strong pay-for-performance (AIP and PSUs) with objective financial metrics and relative TSR; however, large CIC payouts and excise tax gross-ups (and substantial SERP PV) present governance and payout risk if control changes .
  • Performance linkage: 2024 targets were set above 2023 results and partially met/exceeded; 2022 PSU cycle rewarded strong TSR and cash generation despite EBITDA shortfall, signaling balanced metrics but potential sensitivity to margin/EBITDA headwinds .
  • Ownership: CEO beneficially holds 256k shares (<1%); significant unvested equity and compliance with stringent ownership guidelines underpin alignment; absence of pledging is positive .