Aaron D. Wade
About Aaron D. Wade
Aaron D. Wade, age 54, is Executive Vice President and Chief Investment Officer at Onity Group Inc. (ONIT), serving in this role since December 2022 after joining Onity in April 2022 as EVP, Capital Markets; he holds a Bachelor’s degree in Business Economics from UCLA . In 2024, Onity delivered $33.4 million GAAP net income (highest since 2013), 20% adjusted pre-tax ROE, improved book value per share to $56, and grew servicing UPB to $302 billion, reflecting strong execution in areas Wade oversees (capital markets, MSR hedging, asset management) and prudent growth . Relative TSR performance for the 2024 LTIP (Period 1) was at the 75.4th percentile vs. the peer group, supporting pay-for-performance alignment in equity awards .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Blackstone portfolio companies (residential real estate debt) | Managing Director | Oct 2018–Apr 2022 | Led business development, due diligence, transaction management and servicer oversight for the residential debt business . |
| OneWest Bank | EVP, Mortgage & SBA Lending and Capital Markets | 2009–2018 | Led lending and capital markets functions across cycles, building execution expertise . |
| IndyMac Bank | Capital Markets leader | — | Managed capital markets function, strengthening risk and pricing capabilities . |
| LaSalle Bank | Capital Markets leader | — | Managed capital markets function, broadening financial institution experience . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Salary ($) | $432,945 |
| Annual Incentive (AIP) paid ($) | $829,000 |
| Stock Awards ($) | $573,848 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $10,350 (401k match) |
| Total Compensation ($) | $1,846,143 |
Additional 2024 AIP structure and year-end target:
- AIP non‑equity plan target used for 2024: $414,522; threshold $207,261; max $829,044 .
- As of 12/31/2024, Wade’s salary was increased to $480,000 and his AIP target set at 95% ($456,000); interim increases on 4/1/2024 to $430,000 and on 9/22/2024 to $480,000 .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – 2024
| Component | Result |
|---|---|
| Corporate Scorecard funding | 143% (reflects profitability, prudent growth, productivity, engagement/inclusion) |
| Service Excellence modifier | 107% (weighted NPS and quality metrics) |
| Net Income modifier (Wade) | +30% |
| Individual performance multiplier (Wade) | 110% |
| Final award % of target (Wade) | 200% |
Scorecard highlights and outcomes:
- Full-Year GAAP Net Income: outcome $33.4M, 150% achievement; weight 25% .
- Adjusted pre-tax ROE: outcome 20%, 150% achievement; weight 25% .
- Servicing and originations efficiency ratios achieved maximum; weighted contributions to funding .
- Growth metrics: recapture rate and MSR additions achieved maximum; total UPB ended near threshold .
Wade’s 2024 achievements tied to payout:
- Directed MSR hedge activities materially exceeding plan, contributing to above-target net income .
- Led debt refinancing/restructuring on attractive terms, strengthening balance sheet flexibility .
- Delivered capital margin returns supporting originations profitability and liquidity generation .
- Managed strategic relationships (Oaktree, MAV, Rithm) to support transactions and portfolio retention .
Long-Term Incentive Program (LTIP) – structure and grants
- LTIP is 50% time-vested RSUs (3-year ratable vest) and 50% PRSUs (3-year cliff) based on relative TSR across four performance periods (three annual and one 3-year, 55% weight) .
- 2024 Wade grants on 3/29/2024: PRSUs target 6,171 units (grant-date fair value $207,160), RSUs 6,171 units ($166,679), and special RSUs 7,405 units ($200,009) with 18‑month vest for retention .
- 2024 relative TSR (Period 1) reached the 75.4th percentile; weighted achievement 134.9% under the multi-period framework (illustrative for remaining periods) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (shares) | 11,476 shares as of April 10, 2025; less than 1% of class . |
| Unvested RSUs at 12/31/2024 | 3,418 (2022 grant), 3,506 (2023 grant), 6,171 (2024 grant), plus special RSUs 7,405 (vest at ~18 months) . |
| Unvested PRSUs at 12/31/2024 | 9,220 (2022 grant), 2,629 (2023 grant), 12,342 (2024 grant) . |
| Market value of Wade’s unvested units (12/31/2024 at $30.71) | RSUs $227,408 (special) + $189,511 (2024) + $107,669 (2023) + $104,967 (2022); PRSUs $379,023 (2024) + $80,737 (2023) + $283,146 (2022) . |
| Hedging/pledging | Company prohibits short sales, hedging, margin accounts, and pledging; no shares pledged by named executive officers . |
| Post‑vest holding | One-year mandatory hold on shares acquired via vesting (awards granted on/after 3/31/2022) . |
Vesting schedules for 2024 grants:
- RSUs granted 3/29/2024 vest in equal thirds on the first, second, and third anniversaries of grant (i.e., 3/29/2025, 3/29/2026, 3/29/2027) .
- PRSUs granted 3/29/2024 cliff-vest on third anniversary, subject to relative TSR performance across defined periods .
- Special RSUs (retention) granted 3/29/2024 vest on 9/29/2025 .
Stock ownership guidelines:
- No fixed executive stock ownership requirement; alignment achieved via equity awards and mandatory 1‑year post‑vest holding; director guideline (5x cash retainer) does not apply to Wade as an executive .
Employment Terms
- Employment status: At‑will; Company does not use fixed‑term executive employment agreements .
- Severance Plan (U.S. Basic): lump sum equal to 18x monthly base salary and eligibility for subsidized COBRA up to 18 months, upon qualifying involuntary termination .
- Change‑in‑Control Severance (U.S. CIC Plan): if terminated without cause or resigns for good reason within 12 months post‑CoC, lump sum equal to 24x monthly base salary plus prorated annual target incentive, and subsidized COBRA up to 24 months; double‑trigger; equity awards vest at target on qualifying CoC termination .
- Equity award treatment: RSUs pro‑rated vesting upon death/disability/termination without cause; PRSUs pro‑rated and measured as of termination for open periods; double‑trigger acceleration post‑CoC .
- Clawback: Company adopted an incentive compensation clawback policy on November 10, 2023, compliant with SEC and exchange rules .
- Restrictive covenants: Executed IP and non‑disclosure agreements; certain equity awards condition post‑retirement vesting/exercise on compliance; the Company has used non‑competes for select executives in specific awards (not expressly described for Wade) .
Performance Compensation (Detailed metrics table)
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual | Payout leverage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GAAP Net Income ($M) | 25% | $1.7 | $33.4 | 150% |
| Adjusted pre-tax ROE (%) | 25% | 11.6% | 20% | 150% |
| Servicing efficiency ratio | 8% | 30.8% | 28.9% | 150% |
| Originations efficiency ratio | 2% | 69.3% | 57.4% | 150% |
| Corporate functions adj. opex ($M) | 5% | $130 | $134 | 67% |
| Recapture rate (gross) | 6.5% | 5.6 | 8.0 | 150% |
| Originations cash yield (Δ vs. CoC) | 6.5% | 0.27% | 0.68% | 150% |
| MSR growth ($B UPB) | 4% | $24.5 | $40.6 | 150% |
| Subservicing additions ($B UPB) | 4% | $68.7 | $44.9 | —% |
| Servicing YE total UPB ($B) | 4% | $315.5 | $301.7 | 61% |
| Engagement (survey Δ) | 5% | ±8 | +1.0 | 100% |
| Inclusion (road map objectives met) | 5% | 90% | 100% | 150% |
| Corporate Scorecard funding | — | 100% | 134% | 134% |
| Service Excellence modifier | — | 100% | 107% | 107% |
Compensation Peer Group (benchmarking risk)
The Compensation Committee used a peer group across consumer finance, regional banks, and mortgage finance to inform 2024 decisions; names include Associated Banc‑Corp, Mr. Cooper Group, Axos Financial, PennyMac Financial Services, BankUnited, Radian Group, Finance of America, South State, Guild Holdings, UWM Holdings, LendingTree, Walker & Dunlop, loanDepot, Webster Financial, MGIC Investment, and WSFS Financial .
Equity Grants (2024 detail)
| Grant type | Grant date | Units (#) | Grant-date fair value ($) | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PRSUs (relative TSR) | 3/29/2024 | 6,171 | $207,160 | Cliff vest at 3 years; TSR vs peer group across 4 periods . |
| RSUs (time-vested) | 3/29/2024 | 6,171 | $166,679 | Equal tranches at 1, 2, 3 years . |
| Special RSUs (retention) | 3/29/2024 | 7,405 | $200,009 | Vest after ~18 months (9/29/2025) . |
| 2025 LTIP target (value) | 3/15/2025 | — | $375,000 | Increased target recognizing contributions; plus $75,000 cash retention award (1-year vest) . |
Equity Ownership & Upcoming Vesting Milestones (supply/pressure signals)
- 2022 RSUs final tranche vests on the third anniversary of grant (grants made 4/5/2022 for Wade) .
- 2023 RSUs vest on 4/3/2025 and 4/3/2026 (second and third tranches) .
- 2024 RSUs vest on 3/29/2025, 3/29/2026, and 3/29/2027 .
- 2024 PRSUs cliff vest 3/29/2027 subject to TSR outcomes; 2023 PRSUs cliff vest 4/3/2026; 2022 PRSUs cliff vest 3/31/2025 (multi‑period TSR with measurement rules) .
- Mandatory one‑year holding post‑vest reduces near‑term selling pressure from vested shares; hedging/pledging prohibited, and no pledged shares disclosed for executives .
Governance, Clawbacks, and Shareholder Feedback (alignment)
- Clawback policy adopted Nov 10, 2023, compliant with SEC/exchange rules .
- No tax gross‑ups; no option repricing/backdating/reloading; LTIP awards require double trigger for change‑in‑control vesting .
- 2024 Say‑on‑Pay support: 86.5% of votes in favor; 2025 meeting: shareholders again approved NEO compensation on an advisory basis .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: 200% AIP payout reflects outsized contributions (hedging, capital markets, strategic transactions), under a scorecard centered on profitability and ROE—sustained performance will be needed to repeat such outcomes .
- Equity exposure and TSR incentives: Significant unvested PRSUs and RSUs with one‑year post‑vest hold and relative TSR measurement tie realized pay to shareholder outcomes; 2024 TSR percentile performance was strong (75.4th), but future periods remain open .
- Selling pressure risk appears moderated: mandatory holding, anti‑pledging/hedging policy, and absence of disclosed pledging lower short‑term supply risk; however, multiple near‑term vesting dates (2025–2027) could still add float over time .
- Retention and CoC economics: Severance plan (18‑month salary) and CIC plan (24‑month salary + prorated AIP; double‑trigger equity acceleration) provide competitive protection, reducing flight risk, but increase potential change‑in‑control costs; clawback coverage mitigates downside governance risk .
- Benchmarking discipline: Use of broad financial/mortgage peers for cash/equity targets and relative TSR peer set for PRSUs mitigates pay inflation risks and supports shareholder alignment; continued shareholder support (Say‑on‑Pay) suggests program credibility .