Richard J. Bradfield
About Richard J. Bradfield
Richard J. Bradfield is Executive Vice President and Chief Growth Officer (since October 2024) and President, PHH Asset Services LLC; he joined Onity Group in March 2024 as EVP, Strategic Initiatives. He is 55 years old and holds a B.S. in Finance from Drexel University and an MBA from Temple University, with prior senior leadership posts in mortgage origination, capital markets, and treasury across PHH, Home Point Financial, and Arc Home LLC. Onity’s executive compensation architecture ties annual incentives to Net Income, ROE, Growth, Productivity, and Engagement, and long-term incentives to relative TSR versus a mortgage finance peer set, aligning Bradfield’s incentives to profitability and shareholder value creation amidst company initiatives to improve book value, service excellence, and automation productivity.
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Arc Home LLC | Chief Executive Officer | 5 | Led a mortgage platform; CEO experience directly relevant to Onity’s growth agenda. |
| Home Point Financial | Chief Financial Officer | Not disclosed | Financial leadership across capital structure and performance management. |
| PHH Corp. | SVP, Originations; earlier SVP, Capital Markets & Treasurer | 25 | End-to-end mortgage originations and capital markets execution; deep treasury and market risk expertise. |
External Roles
- No public-company directorships or committee roles disclosed for Bradfield.
Fixed Compensation
- Bradfield is an executive officer but not a Named Executive Officer (NEO); his individual base salary and AIP target are not disclosed in the proxy. The company’s 2024 NEO cash pay structure provides context for executive cash compensation benchmarking.
| NEO | Annual Salary ($) | AIP Target ($ and % of Salary) | Total Target Cash ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Glen A. Messina (CEO) | 1,000,000 | 1,500,000 (150%) | 2,500,000 |
| Sean B. O’Neil (CFO) | 550,000 | 550,000 (100%) | 1,100,000 |
| Scott W. Anderson | 500,000 | 500,000 (100%) | 1,000,000 |
| Aaron D. Wade | 480,000 | 456,000 (95%) | 936,000 |
| Dennis Zeleny | 500,000 | 500,000 (100%) | 1,000,000 |
Performance Compensation
- Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) architecture and weights (apply to senior leadership, including NEOs; individual targets for Bradfield not disclosed):
| Metric | Weight | Design Notes |
|---|---|---|
| GAAP Net Income | 25% | Company-level net income drives baseline funding; subject to additional Net Income Modifier for senior leadership. |
| Adjusted Pre-tax ROE (ex-notables) | 25% | ROE focus to reinforce capital efficiency. |
| Growth (UPB, MSR, subservicing, recapture, cash yields) | 25% | Volume and economics across servicing/originations and recapture. |
| Productivity (expenses absolute or % of revenue) | 15% | Cost discipline and operating leverage. |
| Engagement & Inclusion | 10% | Employee engagement survey and D&I roadmap execution. |
- Long-Term Incentive Program (LTIP): RSUs vest ratably over three years; PRSUs cliff vest at three years based on TSR versus a defined peer group.
| Instrument | Vesting | Performance Metric | Settlement |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 1/3 per year over 3 years | Time-based (retention) | Shares of common stock |
| PRSUs | Cliff at 3 years | Relative TSR vs peer group (multi-period weighting) | Shares of common stock (if earned) |
- PRSU performance curve and measurement structure:
| TSR Percentile vs Peer Group | Earned PRSUs (% of Target) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 25th (Threshold) | 50% | Below threshold earns 0%. |
| 50th (Target) | 100% | Interpolated between levels. |
| 100th (Max) | 200% | Subject to continued service to vest. |
| Performance Period | Window | Weight |
|---|---|---|
| Period 1 | Mar 29, 2024 – Mar 29, 2025 | 15% |
| Period 2 | Mar 29, 2025 – Mar 29, 2026 | 15% |
| Period 3 | Mar 29, 2026 – Mar 29, 2027 | 15% |
| Period 4 | Mar 29, 2024 – Mar 29, 2027 | 55% |
- Recent PRSU performance outcomes for company-wide grants (illustrative of pay-for-performance regime): 2024 LTIP interim weighted achievement 134.9%; 2022 LTIP final weighted achievement 94.3%.
| Grant Year | Weighted Achievement (%) |
|---|---|
| 2024 (interim) | 134.9 |
| 2022 (final) | 94.3 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Bradfield beneficial ownership | Included within 27,037 shares held collectively by current executive officers who are not NEOs (group includes Bradfield, Evans, Grunenwald, Peach, Samarias); individual allocation not disclosed. |
| All current directors + executive officers (16 persons) | 711,752 shares, 8.8% of class (8,008,515 shares outstanding as of April 10, 2025). |
| Pledging / hedging | Company policy prohibits pledging, short sales, margin accounts, and hedging; proxy states no shares have been pledged by named executives or directors. |
| Ownership guidelines | No formal stock ownership requirements for executives; directors generally expected to own ≥5x base annual cash retainer within 5 years. |
| Post-vest holding | One-year holding period on shares acquired from executive awards granted on/after March 31, 2022. |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment agreements | At-will; the company does not maintain fixed-term employment agreements for executive officers; separation treatment is via offer letters and plan documents. |
| Clawback policy | Adopted Nov 10, 2023; compliant with SEC/Dodd-Frank and listing rules; additive to any plan-level recoupment rights. |
| Severance Plan (non-CIC) | For eligible executives, lump sum equal to 18× monthly base salary and subsidized COBRA up to 18 months; individual eligibility for Bradfield not disclosed. |
| Change-in-Control Severance Plan | Double-trigger: if terminated or resign for good reason within 12 months post-CIC, lump sum equal to 24× monthly base salary plus prorated AIP for service in the year of termination, and subsidized COBRA up to 24 months. |
| Equity treatment on separation | RSUs/PRSUs pro-rata vesting for death/disability; for 2023/2024 PRSUs, incomplete measurement periods at termination are measured as of termination and future periods deemed target; double-trigger CIC provides vesting at target upon qualifying termination. |
| Restrictive covenants | Executives subject to confidentiality/IP and non-disclosure; non-compete/non-solicit may be embedded in separation or award agreements; specifics for Bradfield not disclosed. |
Performance & Governance Context
- Company execution highlights supporting pay-for-performance design: improved refinance recapture (1.6x industry), consumer direct originations up 2.5x YoY, Fannie Mae STAR and HUD Tier 1 servicer rankings, and >50,000 manual hours saved monthly via AI-enabled automation; book value per share improved to $56 in 2024 despite debt restructuring to lower annual interest expense by ~$14M.
- Say-on-Pay support: 86.5% approval in 2024; ongoing annual advisory votes.
- LTIP peer group used for relative TSR PRSUs includes mortgage finance and REIT comparators: Annaly, PennyMac, Better, Radian, Cherry Hill, Redwood, Finance of America, Rithm, Guild, Rocket, loanDepot, Two Harbors, MGIC, UWM, Mr. Cooper.
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Bradfield’s role and tenure place him squarely under Onity’s incentive framework where half of LTIP is performance-based PRSUs tied to relative TSR with meaningful three-year weighting, driving direct linkage of realized equity to shareholder outcomes.
- Selling pressure and retention: A one-year post-vest holding requirement and prohibitions on pledging/hedging reduce forced selling and short-term speculation; however, absence of formal executive ownership requirements limits guaranteed “skin in the game,” and Bradfield’s individual holdings are not broken out.
- Pay-for-performance rigor: AIP weights emphasize profitability (Net Income, ROE) with Growth and Productivity, plus an additional Net Income modifier for senior leadership—supportive of disciplined execution in Bradfield’s growth mandate.
- Change-of-control economics: Double-trigger CIC and pro-rata equity rules balance retention with shareholder protection and limit windfall payouts without separation; Bradfield’s specific eligibility under severance plans is not disclosed, a modest uncertainty for retention analysis.
- Governance and shareholder support: Strong recent Say-on-Pay approval and formal clawback policy enhance governance quality, lowering compensation-related headline risk.