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Craig R. Smiddy

Craig R. Smiddy

President and Chief Executive Officer at OLD REPUBLIC INTERNATIONALOLD REPUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
CEO
Executive
Board

About Craig R. Smiddy

Craig R. Smiddy, age 60, has served as Old Republic International Corporation’s President and Chief Executive Officer since 2019 and as a director since 2019; he chairs the Board’s Executive Committee . Under his tenure, total shareholder return rose from an indexed 100 at year-end 2019 to 229.23 at year-end 2024, outpacing the approved peer group’s 182.62 . ORI’s pay-for-performance design links Smiddy’s incentives to underwriting results and long-term book value/operating ROE; in 2024, consolidated net earned premiums and fees grew 13.3% (max payout) and the combined ratio was 93.9% (above-threshold), contributing to his PRP payout of $2.416M .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Old Republic International CorporationPresident & Chief Operating OfficerJun 2018–2019Elevated corporate leadership ahead of CEO election
Old Republic International CorporationPresident & Chief Executive Officer2019–presentLeads enterprise; Board director and Executive Committee Chair
Old Republic General Insurance Group, Inc.Chief Operating Officer → President2013–2018Led general insurance segment operations

External Roles

  • No other public company directorships are disclosed for Smiddy in the proxy .

Fixed Compensation

Multi-year compensation mix (USD):

Metric202220232024
Base Salary$890,000 $926,667 $985,000
Legacy Bonus (pre-PRP)$1,451,018 $0 $0
Stock Awards$1,638,000 $1,933,420 $3,387,359
Option Awards (Grant-date value)$554,400 $652,000 $854,074
Non-Equity Incentive (PRP payout)$2,278,211 $2,416,698
All Other Compensation$6,592 $37,019 $36,024
Total$4,540,010 $5,887,317 $7,679,154

Annual cash incentive framework:

Metric202220232024
PRP Target Bonus % of SalaryN/A 165% 175%
PRP Target ($)N/A $1,529,000 $1,723,750
PRP Actual Payout ($)N/A $2,278,211 $2,416,698

Performance Compensation

2024 PRP annual bonus (paid in 2025; vesting requires employment on payment date) :

ComponentWeightTargetActualPayout ($)Vesting/Timing
Net Earned Premiums & Fees (YoY change, consolidated ex-Title/RFIG run-off)35% 5.0% (objective); 2.0% (threshold); 8.0% (max) 13.3% → 200% of component $1,206,625 Cash, paid following fiscal year; employment required
Combined Ratio (consolidated ex-RFIG run-off)35% 92.5% (objective); 99.0% (threshold); 89.0% (max) 93.9% → 89.2% of component $538,155 Cash, paid following fiscal year; employment required
Discretionary (individual performance)30% 0–200% scale Committee-determined $671,918 Cash, paid following fiscal year; employment required
Total100%$2,416,698

2024 PSU long-term equity (3-year performance period ending 12/31/2026) :

MetricWeightThresholdObjectiveMaximumAward
3-Year Avg Operating ROE50% 6% 11% 18% 86,737 PSUs (target)
3-Year Book Value Annual Compound Total Return per Share (incl. dividends)50% 6% 11% 18% 86,737 PSUs (target)
Vesting/PayoutStock settled within 90 days of certification; 0–200% earned; cash for dividend equivalents

2024 RSU and Option grants (time-based) :

InstrumentGrant DateAmountTermsExercise PriceVesting
RSUs03/06/202428,912 units Stock settled; dividend equivalents paid in cash 3 equal installments starting 03/06/2025
Options03/06/2024186,479 options 10-year term $29.29 3 equal installments starting 03/06/2025

Option exercises and stock vested in 2024:

Item2024 Activity
Options Exercised (shares)14,500
Value Realized on Exercise$187,050
Restricted Shares Vested (shares)50,616
Value Realized on Vesting$1,525,027

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Ownership/Grant ElementDetail
Total Beneficial Ownership979,786 shares (0.39% of class)
Composition of Beneficial OwnershipOptions exercisable within 60 days: 793,297 shares; employee plan shares: 41,461; other shares: 145,028
Options Outstanding (12/31/2024)Exercisable: 616,980; Unexercisable: 421,999
Unvested RSUs/Restricted Stock (12/31/2024)106,986 shares; market value $3,871,823 (at $36.19)
PSU (Target) Outstanding86,737 units; market value $3,139,012 (at $36.19)
Hedging/PledgingProhibited for directors and executive officers
Stock Ownership GuidelinesCEO: 6× base salary; 5 years to comply; directors increased to $400,000 ownership in 2025
Guideline ComplianceAll directors/executives meet or are within the compliance window

Employment Terms

  • Employment contracts and severance: ORI has no employment agreements or severance/golden parachute arrangements for executives; all employees are at-will .
  • Change-of-control (CIC) treatment: Awards under 2022 Plan accelerate if not assumed, or if assumed and terminated within 36 months post-CIC; PRP vests on termination without cause in connection with CIC; KEPRP balances become immediately vested/payable on CIC .

Potential payments (illustrative, assuming CIC at 12/31/2024, stock at $36.19):

ScenarioPRP (Target)Acceleration of EquityKEPRP BalanceTotal
CIC (no termination)$0 $11,211,116 $3,854,076 $15,065,192
Involuntary/Constructive Termination post-CIC$1,723,750 $11,211,116 $3,854,076 $16,788,942
Death/Disability$1,723,750 $11,211,116 $3,854,076 $16,788,942

Clawback policy and trading rules:

  • Clawback: ORI will promptly seek recovery of erroneously awarded compensation upon an accounting restatement, per NYSE Section 303A.14 and SEC Rule 10D-1; recovery is required regardless of individual knowledge; impracticability exceptions defined by the Compensation Committee .
  • Securities Trading Policy: prohibits short sales, derivatives, margin accounts, pledging; anti-hedging/pledging enforced .

Board Governance

  • Board roles: Smiddy is a Director since 2019 and chairs the Executive Committee; the Board’s Chairman is separate (Spencer LeRoy III); all directors except the CEO are independent; a Lead Independent Director is designated .
  • Committees and membership: Audit, Compensation, and Governance & Nominating consist exclusively of independent directors; Smiddy is not a member of those committees and does not receive director fees; he leads executive sessions via the Executive Committee and shareholder engagement dialogues .
  • Attendance: In 2024, the Board met quarterly; each incumbent director attended at least 75% of Board and committee meetings .

Director compensation framework (non-employee directors; Smiddy excluded):

  • 2025 changes: Annual Board fee increased to $195,000; added $75,000 in annual RSUs (one-year vest); committee chair fees maintained; membership fees removed .
  • Statement: “Directors who are employees…receive no compensation for their services as directors…” .

Compensation Committee Analysis and Peer Group

  • Compensation Committee: comprised of independent directors; retains FW Cook as independent consultant; shifts larger share of executive pay to long-term equity and performance-based award structures .
  • Peer group (approved): American Financial Group, AIG, W.R. Berkley, Chubb, Cincinnati Financial, CNA Financial, Fidelity National Financial, First American Financial, The Hartford, Stewart Information Services, Travelers .

Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • Say-on-Pay approvals: 94% approval in 2024 for 2023 pay; 94.8% approval in 2023 for 2022 pay .
  • Engagement: CEO Smiddy led outreach to largest institutions, informing compensation transparency and the adoption of long-term PSU metrics (book value TRS, operating ROE) .

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance alignment: Smiddy’s 2024 PRP cash bonus was driven by underwriting and premium growth (max payout on growth, above-threshold on combined ratio), consistent with ORI’s focus on underwriting income and net operating income as key pay-versus-performance measures . PSU metrics directly tie equity to multi-year operating ROE and book value TRS .
  • Retention and selling pressure: Significant unvested equity (106,986 RSUs and 86,737 PSUs) and 421,999 unexercisable options suggest continued retention hooks; scheduled vesting begins March 2025 for 2024 RSUs/options, potentially creating periodic settlement-related selling needs; anti-hedging/pledging policy mitigates alignment risks .
  • Governance checks: No employment contracts or golden parachutes; CIC acceleration applies only if awards are not assumed or after qualifying terminations, limiting guaranteed payouts; a robust clawback policy and independent Compensation Committee oversight support investor alignment .
  • Performance track record: TSR outperformed peers over 5 years (229.23 vs. 182.62), reinforcing that long-term incentives are reasonably linked to shareholder value creation; annual PRP targets and outcomes reflect strong 2024 operational execution .