Kenneth Dillon
About Kenneth Dillon
Kenneth Dillon is Senior Vice President of Occidental (OXY) and President of International Oil & Gas Operations, overseeing operations across the Middle East, North Africa, South America, the Gulf of Mexico/Gulf of America, Major Projects and Supply Chain; he joined Occidental more than 35 years ago and was appointed Senior Vice President in 2016 . OXY’s performance-aligned incentive design for executives centers on CROCE (Cash Return on Capital Employed) and TSR PSUs, plus RSUs and, in certain years, stock options; ACI (annual cash incentive) incorporates company metrics including sustainability, which is weighted at 30% of the company performance portion . Recent execution highlights under Dillon include Al Hosn expansion ahead of schedule with record HSE, Algeria Plan of Development approval, Oman record production, Gulf subsea pump commissioning, STRATOS milestones, a CO2 EOR pilot in Oman North, and AI efficiency initiatives .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Occidental Oil and Gas Corporation (subsidiary of OXY) | Senior Vice President; President, International Oil & Gas Operations | 2016–present | Led Al Hosn expansion ahead of schedule, record Abu Dhabi output/HSE, Algeria Plan of Development approval, Oman record production, Gulf of Mexico subsea pump commissioning, STRATOS milestones; established Gulf of America waterflood; launched AI efficiency projects; supported OLCV major projects at scale . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary (effective rate) | $675,000 | $710,000 (eff. Feb 21, 2022) | $760,000 (eff. Feb 20, 2023) | $795,000 (eff. Feb 19, 2024) |
| ACI Target ($) | $800,000 | $825,000 | $825,000 | $825,000 |
| ACI Payout (% of target) | 160% | 170% | 150% | 135% |
| Actual ACI Paid ($) (Non-Equity Incentive in SCT) | $1,280,000 | $1,303,500 | $1,237,500 | $1,113,800 |
| Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Earnings ($) | — | $59,048 | $101,562 | $120,068 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $169,936 | $295,601 | $315,989 | $305,123 |
Performance Compensation
ACI (Annual Cash Incentive) Design and Outcomes
| Attribute | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Target ($) | $800,000 | $825,000 | $825,000 | $825,000 |
| Key Metrics | Company/individual metrics (company portion earned at 160%) | Company/individual metrics (company portion 170%) | Company metrics incl. sustainability (30% of company portion); ACI payout 150% | Company metrics incl. sustainability (30% of company portion); ACI payout 135% |
| Payout (% of Target) | 160% | 170% | 150% | 135% |
| Actual Paid ($) | $1,280,000 | $1,303,500 | $1,237,500 | $1,113,800 |
LTI (Long-Term Incentives) Structure and Key Grant Terms
| LTI Element | 2021 | 2022 |
|---|---|---|
| CROCE (PSUs) | Target 29,047 PSUs; payout 25–200% based on CROCE over 3 yrs | Target 20,359 PSUs; payout 25–200% based on CROCE over 3 yrs |
| TSR (PSUs) | Target 20,066 PSUs; payout 25–200% based on relative TSR; capped at target if absolute TSR negative | Target 14,065 PSUs; same TSR mechanics |
| RSUs | 29,047 RSUs; vest ratably 1/3 on Feb 28, 2022/2023/2024; 2-year post-vest holding for net shares | 20,359 RSUs; standard RSU terms per program |
| NQSOs (Options) | 57,978 NQSOs; exercise price $25.39; vest ratably over 3 yrs (Feb 28, 2022/2023/2024) | 37,410 NQSOs; exercise price $42.98; vest per program schedule |
| 2023 LTI Target Value | — | $3,500,000 target value; components CROCE, RSU, TSR |
| 2024 LTI Target Value | — | $3,600,000 target value; performance-based allocation maintained; components CROCE, RSU, TSR |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Metric | 2021 (as of Mar 11, 2022) | 2023 (as of Mar 10, 2023) | 2024 (as of Mar 8, 2024) | 2025 (as of Mar 10, 2025) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Common Stock | 134,131 | 182,344 | 254,599 | 308,592 |
| Options Exercisable within 60 Days | 179,686 | 291,661 | 323,457 | 335,927 |
| Warrants Exercisable within 60 Days | 14,343 | 16,962 | 16,962 | 16,962 |
| Total Beneficially Owned | 328,160 | 490,967 | 595,018 | 661,481 |
| % of Shares Outstanding | Less than 1% | Less than 1% | Less than 1% | Less than 1% |
- Stock ownership guidelines: Senior Vice Presidents must hold stock equal to 3× base salary; officers not meeting guidelines may not sell shares until compliant; unvested PSUs/options do not count; expected compliance within five years and RSU net shares have a two-year holding period .
- Anti-hedging: Executives are prohibited from hedging or engaging in derivative transactions designed to offset Occidental equity exposure .
- Ownership trend: Dillon’s reported total beneficial ownership increased from ~328K (2021) to ~661K (2025) shares-equivalents .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| Golden Parachute policy | No grants exceeding 2.99× salary + ACI without shareholder approval . |
| Change-in-Control (CIC) Severance Plan | Double-trigger equity vesting; cash severance of 2.00× (CEO 2.99×) base salary + target bonus; pro-rata bonus; 2 years welfare benefits; outplacement up to 9 months . |
| Clawback | Compensation Committee may claw back ACI and LTI awards for misconduct; policy aligned with SEC Rule 10D-1/NYSE Listing Standard 303A.14 . |
| Retirement eligibility | As of Dec 31, 2023, Dillon qualifies for “Eligible Retirement” under OXY’s Retirement Policy; retirement treatment affects vesting (e.g., full vesting for RSUs; performance awards vest subject to actual performance) . |
| Non-CIC involuntary termination (illustrative amounts as of Dec 30, 2022) | Cash severance $2,302,500; pro-rata bonus $825,000; plus specified treatment of outstanding equity and limited benefits/outplacement . |
Performance Compensation – Detailed Metrics Table
| Metric | Weighting | Target (Illustrative) | Actual/Payout | Vesting/Settlement |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ACI (cash) | Company metrics include sustainability (30% of company portion) | $800k (2021), $825k (2022–2024) | 160% (2021), 170% (2022), 150% (2023), 135% (2024) | Annual cash payout based on Committee assessment/program metrics |
| CROCE (PSUs) | Performance-based LTI | 29,047 target PSUs (2021); 20,359 (2022) | 25–200% of target based on CROCE over 3 years | Pays in shares at performance certification; CIC and retirement treatments per plan |
| TSR (PSUs) | Performance-based LTI | 20,066 target PSUs (2021); 14,065 (2022) | 25–200% of target based on relative TSR; capped at target if absolute TSR negative | Pays in shares at performance certification; CIC and retirement treatments per plan |
| RSUs | Time-based LTI | 29,047 (2021); 20,359 (2022) | N/A (time-based) | Vest 1/3 annually (Feb 28 for 2021 grants) with 2-year holding on net shares |
| NQSOs | Time-based LTI | 57,978 (2021); 37,410 (2022) | N/A (time-based) | 2021 strike $25.39; 2022 strike $42.98; vest ratably over 3 years |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment remains strong: high proportion of equity with performance PSUs (CROCE, TSR) and double-trigger vesting; ACI includes sustainability metrics (30% of company portion) and has trended down from 170% (2022) to 135% (2024), indicating tighter calibration to outcomes .
- Ownership/skin-in-the-game: Dillon’s beneficial ownership has steadily increased (328K→661K) while OXY enforces 3× salary stock ownership for SVPs and prohibits hedging; RSU holding period further restricts immediate monetization, dampening near-term selling pressure .
- Vesting/sale windows: Historically, RSU tranches vest around late February (e.g., Feb 28 for 2021 grants) and annual equity grants have occurred around March 1, which can concentrate insider activity windows; however, holding requirements and anti-hedging reduce near-term liquidity incentives .
- Retention risk vs optionality: Eligibility for retirement-related vesting as of 2023 increases optionality for tenured leaders (including Dillon) while preserving performance conditions on PSUs; CIC protections are standard (2.00× base+target bonus for executives, plus pro-rata bonus and benefits) with shareholder-friendly golden parachute cap at 2.99× .
Net view: Compensation structure and governance indicate high alignment and controlled risk-taking; increasing beneficial ownership plus performance-weighted LTI design support sustained execution incentives, with limited evidence of pledging or aggressive severance economics beyond market-standard CIC terms .