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John Kibarian

John Kibarian

Chief Executive Officer at PDF SOLUTIONSPDF SOLUTIONS
CEO
Executive
Board

About John Kibarian

John K. Kibarian, Ph.D., is co‑founder, President (since 1991) and CEO (since 2000) of PDF Solutions; he is 61 and has served as a director since 1992 . 2024 operating performance included revenue of $179.5M (+$13.6M YoY) and adjusted EBITDA of $38.8M (used for incentive calculations) . Over 2020–2024, the Company’s “value of $100 invested” (TSR) stood at $160 for 2024 versus $151 for the peer index; GAAP net income was $4.1M in 2024 .

2024 Performance SnapshotValue
Revenue ($)$179.5M
YoY Revenue Change ($)+$13.6M
Adjusted EBITDA ($)$38.8M (for incentives)
“$100 Invested” TSR (Company/Peer)$160 / $151
GAAP Net Income ($)$4.1M

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
PDF SolutionsPresident1991–PresentCo‑founder; long‑tenured operating leader shaping strategy and execution
PDF SolutionsChief Executive Officer2000–PresentLed transition to data/analytics for semis; long‑term growth focus

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Electronic System Design (ESD) AllianceGoverning Council Member2019–PresentIndustry engagement and ecosystem influence

Fixed Compensation

Metric202220232024
Base Salary ($)426,667 447,500 450,000
Discretionary Bonus ($)220,000 39,577 42,699
Stock Awards ($)
Non‑Equity Incentive Plan ($)90,423 82,698
All Other Compensation ($)7,953 18,419 14,286
Total ($)654,620 595,919 589,683

Note: As a founder, Dr. Kibarian has not received an equity grant since 2003 by his request to conserve shares for broader employee awards .

Performance Compensation

PDF Solutions’ annual cash incentive program pays 50% based on PPCP metrics and 50% at CHCM Committee discretion .

  • 2024 PPCP metrics and outcome
    • Metrics: Positive YoY revenue growth, positive adjusted EBITDA, and minimum performance rating threshold .
    • Results: Achieved (revenue +$13.6M; adjusted EBITDA $38.8M); corporate factor 61.3% .
  • 2024 individual discretionary component: Committee assessed CEO’s strategic leadership and limited payout at his request to preserve pool funds .
2024 CEO Target/PayoutValue
Target Bonus (% of Salary)60%
Target Bonus ($)$270,000
PPCP Payout ($)$82,698
Discretionary Payout ($)$42,699
Total Payout ($)$125,397
Payout as % of Target46.4%
2024 Incentive FrameworkWeightTarget/ThresholdActual
PPCP: YoY Revenue Growth50% of bonus Positive YoY growth +$13.6M; Achieved
PPCP: Adjusted EBITDA50% of bonus (PPCP portion shared) Positive adjusted EBITDA $38.8M; Achieved
PPCP Corporate FactorApplies to PPCP61.3%
Discretionary Component50% of bonus Committee assessment $42,699 (capped at CEO request)

Program design guardrails:

  • Clawback: Policy adopted Feb 2023; updated Nov 2023 to meet Nasdaq; Apr 2024 expanded to all equity (time‑ and performance‑based) .
  • No perquisites or tax gross‑ups; CEO equity foregone since 2003 at his request .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial Ownership (Shares)2,562,474
Ownership (%) of 39,138,992 shares outstanding6.55%
Held Directly (sole voting/dispositive)39,718
Held via The John Kibarian and Gloria Chen Trust (shared power)2,522,756
Unvested RSUs0 (none outstanding)
Options (exercisable/unexercisable)0 / 0
Stock vested in 2024None for CEO
ESPP participationCEO not eligible; 0 purchased
Stock Ownership GuidelineCEO: 6x base salary; must hold 100% of net shares for 12 months after vest/exercise
Guideline ComplianceAll Section 16 officers meet or are within allowed timeframe
Hedging/PledgingHedging/short sales prohibited; pledging/margin discouraged by policy

Implications:

  • Strong alignment via 6.55% ownership; minimal forced selling pressure (no unvested awards vesting) .
  • Governance policies restrict hedging and discourage pledging, reducing alignment risk .

Employment Terms

ProvisionDisclosure
Employment AgreementNot disclosed for CEO; Company indicates no severance agreements for current NEOs other than CFO
SeveranceNone specific to CEO disclosed (CFO terms detailed separately)
Change‑in‑Control (CIC)Equity plan provides acceleration if awards are not assumed or upon qualifying termination within 24 months post‑CIC; CEO currently has no unvested awards to accelerate
Non‑compete/Non‑solicitNot disclosed
ClawbackIn effect and expanded to all equity; plan awards subject to Compensation Recovery Policy
OtherNo perquisites; no tax gross‑ups

Board Governance (Director Service and Dual‑Role Considerations)

  • Director since 1992; Class III nominee in 2025; non‑independent; no committee assignments .
  • Board structure separates CEO and Chair; Chair position vacant with a robust Lead Independent Director role (Joseph R. Bronson) overseeing agendas, executive sessions, and CEO evaluation .
  • Board independence: 6 of 8 directors are independent; all committee members are independent; 98% average Board/committee meeting attendance in 2024 (six Board meetings; fifteen committee meetings) .
  • Committees: Audit; Compensation & Human Capital Management (CHCM); Nominating & Corporate Governance (NCG) — CEO is not on committees .

Dual‑role implications: While CEO also serves as a director, independence concerns are mitigated by a Lead Independent Director with defined authority, fully independent committees, and regular executive sessions of independent directors .

Director/Committee Practices, Peer Group, and Say‑on‑Pay

  • CHCM Committee is fully independent; did not retain a compensation consultant in 2024; uses a technology peer group for benchmarking (peer list defined in CD&A) .
  • Annual say‑on‑pay held; CHCM considers investor feedback in program design .

Related Party Transactions and Red Flags

  • The company reports no related party transactions requiring disclosure for 2024 .
  • Stock plan governance: no repricing without stockholder approval; no discounted options; no single‑trigger CIC acceleration; no evergreen; no tax gross‑ups; dividends not paid on unvested awards .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Founder‑CEO with 6.55% ownership and no ongoing equity grants produces strong owner alignment and minimal near‑term selling pressure from vesting; hedging banned and pledging discouraged .
  • Incentive quality: Cash incentives tie to profitable growth (YoY revenue and positive adjusted EBITDA) plus a discretionary component; 2024 payout at 46.4% of target reflects moderate achievement and disciplined cash bonus governance (CEO voluntarily reduced discretionary payout) .
  • Retention/CIC risk: With no severance package and no unvested equity, CEO exit costs are limited; however, high founder ownership suggests strong retention and continuity incentives .
  • Governance: Separation of CEO and Board leadership via Lead Independent Director with strong committee independence and high attendance supports oversight quality .