Laura Moon
About Laura Moon
Laura P. Moon is Executive Vice President, Chief Accounting Officer and Treasurer of Piedmont Office Realty Trust (PDM). She has served as Chief Accounting Officer since 2007 and assumed the Treasurer role in 2023; she is a CPA and began her career at Deloitte & Touche LLP in 1991 . As of March 4, 2024, she was 54 and one of the company’s executive officers . Company performance context for incentive alignment in 2024: Core FFO per share was $1.49 (vs. $1.74 in 2023), Same Store NOI (cash) rose ~2.6% vs. ~0.75% target, leasing totaled 2.4M SF with strong rent growth, net debt to Core EBITDA averaged 6.8x, and TSR was ~31% for 2024 (top quartile vs. peers) . STIC payout pool was ~118% of target, with LTIC performance shares for the 2022–2024 cycle paying at 80% of target on relative TSR .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Piedmont’s former advisor | Vice President & Chief Accounting Officer | Not disclosed | Led general ledger accounting, financial and tax reporting, and internal audit for 19 public registrants and private real estate partnerships |
| Deloitte & Touche LLP | Audit professional (CPA) | 1991 (start) | Foundational audit/controls experience for public company reporting |
External Roles
- No external public company board service or outside roles disclosed in her executive biography .
Fixed Compensation
- Short-Term Cash Incentive Compensation (STIC) targets by role (EVPs generally at 100% of base salary target; threshold 50%, maximum 150%). The EVPs listed (Investments, COO) carry 50%/100%/150% thresholds; EVP—Northeast had 35%/70%/105%. CFO also 50%/100%/150% .
- Base salary decisions for NEOs were benchmarked and adjusted in February 2024 (1–3% increases for NEOs other than the CEO); while Moon is an executive officer rather than an NEO, EVP roles are managed under the same compensation framework .
Performance Compensation
STIC – 2024 Corporate Performance Goals and Outcomes
| Metric | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Core FFO/share vs. budget | $1.42 | $1.48 | $1.55 | $1.49 | STIC pool sensitivity and one adjustment for higher interest expense due to an unbudgeted bond |
| Net Debt to Core EBITDA (x) | 7.5 | 6.8 | 6.1 | 6.8 | Credit ratio focus; 1% variance impacts targeted award per weighting |
| Same Store NOI (cash) | (1.25%) | 0.75% | 2.75% | 2.6% | Supplemental operating performance measure |
| New SF Leasing (000s) | 675 | 900 | 1,125 | 1,014 | Demand/absorption driver |
| Renewal SF Leasing (000s) | 563 | 750 | 938 | 1,379 | Retention driver |
| Strategic Priorities (incl. ESG) | Qualitative | Qualitative | Qualitative | Target | ESG and strategic achievements assessed qualitatively |
- Weighting: 85% of STIC opportunity tied to quantitative metrics; qualitative strategic priorities assessed at target for 2024 .
- Aggregate payout: ~118% of target STIC pool for 2024; individual awards may vary by personal performance .
LTIC – Structure and 2024 Highlights
| Component | Metric/Weighting | Payout Range | Cycle | Vesting/Hold | 2024 Outcome/Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Share Program | Relative TSR vs. defined office REIT peer group; 100% weighting | 0–200% of target | 3-year overlapping cycles | Earned shares after performance period; equity awards subject to minimum one-year vesting and one-year post-vest holding | 2022–2024 period: payout at 80% of target; absolute TSR was −41% but ranked 40th percentile vs. peers |
| Deferred Stock Units (time-based) | Time-based only | N/A | Annual grants | Vests over 4 years; one-year post-vest holding | Company grants DSUs; no options historically issued to employees |
- Equity award design: Company has not issued stock options to NEOs historically; equity delivered via performance shares and DSUs; minimum one-year vesting and one-year holding post-vesting reinforce long-term alignment .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy/Item | Requirement/Status |
|---|---|
| Stock ownership guidelines (Other EVPs) | Lesser of 2x base salary or 30,000 shares |
| Holding requirement | One-year holding period after vesting for equity received under the 2007 Omnibus Incentive Plan |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited; none of exec officers or directors have pledged shares |
| Beneficial ownership | Security ownership table is disclosed for directors and NEOs; Moon is an executive officer but not an NEO, so her individual beneficial ownership is not disclosed in the proxy’s ownership table |
Employment Terms
| Term | Details |
|---|---|
| Executive Severance Plan coverage | Adopted in 2024; executive officers (including EVPs) participate via a signed participation agreement; legacy employment agreements terminated |
| Severance (non-CIC) | CEO: 2x; other executive officers: 1x of base salary + target bonus; plus pro-rated target bonus for year of termination, COBRA-equivalent benefits (12 months × multiplier × 170%), accrued compensation; time-based equity vests; performance-based equity treated per LTIC rules |
| Severance (CIC double trigger) | If terminated other than for Cause or resigns for Good Reason within 3 months prior to or 24 months after a CIC: CEO 3x; other executive officers 2x; designated EVPs 1x; same ancillary benefits; all time-based equity vests |
| Change-in-control equity mechanics | Performance-based equity converts at CIC to time-based equal to target × greater of actual achievement or target; remains time-based unless qualifying termination, then vests consistent with time-based awards |
| Restrictive covenants | 1-year non-compete post-termination for executive officers participating in the plan |
| Clawback | Dodd-Frank, SEC Rule 10D‑1, and NYSE-compliant clawback for excess incentive-based compensation upon accounting restatement over a 3-year recovery period |
| Tax gross-ups | None for executives under the plan |
| Perquisites | Company states it does not award perquisites or supplemental executive benefits to NEOs; policy framework applies broadly |
Investment Implications
- Alignment and pay-for-performance: Moon’s incentives are driven by company-wide quantitative metrics (Core FFO/share, leverage, NOI, leasing) for STIC and multi-year relative TSR for LTIC, with minimum vesting and mandated holding periods; absence of options reduces repricing risk and promotes long-term equity alignment .
- Retention and change-of-control economics: Double-trigger CIC severance (2x for executive officers) and vesting mechanics on time-based awards support retention while avoiding single-trigger windfalls; clawback and no gross-ups are governance positives .
- Insider selling pressure: One-year post-vest holding requirement and prohibition on hedging/pledging reduce near-term selling pressure and align behavior with shareholders; no pledged shares among executives mitigates collateral-driven selling risk .
- Execution track record context: 2024 delivered strong leasing and rent growth with top quartile TSR despite Core FFO/share down YoY due to refinancing costs; STIC pool paid ~118% and LTIC payout for the 2022–2024 cycle was 80%, indicating calibrated payouts tied to quantifiable outcomes and peer-relative performance .