Jason M. Eakle
About Jason M. Eakle
Executive Vice President, Chief Credit Officer of Peoples Bancorp Inc. (PEBO) and Peoples Bank since April 2020; age 42 in the 2025 proxy (age 41 in 2024; age 40 in 2023) . Career progression inside Peoples includes senior commercial underwriting leadership and portfolio management; prior experience at Eramet Marietta, Inc. (metals/mining) . Company performance context over his recent tenure: 2023 one‑year TSR was 26%; 2022 one‑year TSR was −7% . In 2023, net interest income grew 34% to $339.4M, non‑interest income grew 11% to $87.4M, total assets rose 27% to $9.16B, efficiency ratio improved to 58.7%, and net charge‑offs were 15 bps .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Peoples Bancorp Inc. / Peoples Bank | Executive Vice President, Chief Credit Officer | Apr 2020–present | Oversees enterprise credit risk; leadership across corporate credit standards |
| Peoples Bank | Senior Vice President, Senior Commercial Underwriter | Aug 2016–Mar 2020 | Managed commercial credit underwriting function; credit discipline and underwriting quality |
| Peoples Bank | Vice President, Commercial Credit Portfolio Manager | Jan 2015–Aug 2016 | Portfolio risk management in commercial credit |
| Peoples Bank | Various roles in commercial credit | 2009–Jan 2015 | Progressive responsibility within commercial credit |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eramet Marietta, Inc. | Employee (role not specified) | Pre‑2009 | Large multinational mining and metallurgy company; operational experience |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $181,775 | $222,500 | $250,000 |
| Bonus ($) | — | $10,000 (one‑time discretionary related to 2021 integration) | — |
Performance Compensation
| Incentive Component | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Non‑Equity Incentive Plan Compensation ($) | $55,000 | $100,000 | $108,500 |
| Stock Awards ($, grant for prior year performance) | $126,231 | $29,969 | $73,471 |
| Cash Incentive as % of Base Salary | 30.3% | 45.0% | 43.4% |
| Equity‑Based Incentive as % of Base Salary | 69.5% | 33.0% | 36.0% |
| 2022 Annual Cash Incentive Design (Other Executive Officers) | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2022 Adjusted Actual | Payout Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pre‑Tax/Pre‑Provision ROAA | Corporate metric; part of 70% corporate weighting | 1.39% | 1.74% | 2.09% | 1.82% | Above target supported payout |
| Efficiency Ratio | Corporate metric; part of 70% corporate weighting | 61.01% | 59.23% | 57.45% | 58.69% | Better than target (lower is better) |
| Pre‑Tax/Pre‑Provision Diluted EPS | Corporate metric; part of 70% corporate weighting | $3.30 | $4.13 | $4.96 | $4.58 | Above target |
| Net Charge‑Offs / Avg Total Loans | Corporate metric; part of 70% corporate weighting | 0.41% | 0.27% | 0.20% | 0.16% | Better than maximum (lower is better) |
| Individual (Discretionary) Goals | 30% | — | — | — | Met/above threshold (committee discretion) |
| 2022 Equity Awards (RSUs) | Grant Date | Shares | Grant Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting | Conditions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Long‑term incentive grant | Feb 9, 2022 | 2,281 | $73,471 | 3‑year cliff; vests Feb 9, 2025 | Must remain employed; company well‑capitalized and positive net income each year; one‑third forfeited per year if not met |
| Follow‑on grant for 2022 performance | Feb 8, 2023 | 2,970 | Reported under 2023 stock awards; three‑year cliff | Vests Feb 8, 2026 | Same employment and performance conditions; dividends accrued and paid upon vest |
| 2022 Plan‑Based Award Payout Ranges (Jason M. Eakle) | Threshold ($) | Target ($) | Maximum ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Non‑Equity Incentive (cash) | $25,520 | $101,500 | $152,250 |
| Equity Incentive (translated to RSUs at grant) | $18,270 | $72,500 | $108,750 |
Additional notes:
- No stock options or SARs outstanding or exercised; equity is exclusively restricted common shares under the 2006 Plan .
- Restricted share dividends accrue during the restriction period and are paid upon vesting; Eakle received $12,895 in accrued dividends within “All Other Compensation” for 2022 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Beneficial Ownership (as of Feb 27, 2023) | Shares | % of Class | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Common shares presently held | 15,324 | <1% | Includes 108 ESPP shares |
| Additional share interests | — | — | — |
| Unvested Restricted Common Shares (as of Mar 10, 2023) | Grant Date | Shares | Scheduled Vest Date | Conditions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Promotion grant | Oct 1, 2020 | 5,000 | Oct 1, 2023 (3‑year cliff) | Continued employment to vest |
| Annual incentive grant | Feb 9, 2021 | 952 | Feb 9, 2024 (3‑year cliff) | Employment + standard conditions |
| Annual incentive grant | Feb 9, 2022 | 2,281 | Feb 9, 2025 (3‑year cliff) | Employment; capitalized and positive net income each year; one‑third forfeiture if not met |
| Annual incentive grant | Feb 8, 2023 | 2,970 | Feb 8, 2026 (3‑year cliff) | Same performance and employment conditions |
Alignment policies:
- Executive stock‑holding requirement: hold at least 50% of restricted common shares (net of tax withholding) after vesting .
- Hedging and pledging of Peoples common shares are prohibited; trades require pre‑clearance .
- Executive incentive compensation clawback policy in place .
Employment Terms
| Term | Disclosure |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | Peoples has not entered into employment agreements with NEOs (applicable to years Eakle was an NEO) |
| Change‑in‑Control (CIC) agreements | Double‑trigger required (CIC + qualifying termination or good reason); RSUs accelerate only if successor fails to assume/replace or if post‑CIC qualifying termination occurs |
| CIC severance basis | Compensation basis for severance calculation defined as calendar‑year annualized base salary plus average annual cash incentives paid over prior three years (post‑2016 standard for NEOs other than legacy CEO) |
| CIC multiples (current framework) | For current NEOs: 2.00× base annual compensation for most NEOs; 2.99× for CEO; continued medical/dental/life for 12–36 months; non‑compete 12 months (15 months for CEO); no excise tax gross‑ups |
| Non‑compete / non‑disclosure | Included in CIC terms and post‑termination obligations (see above) |
| Deferred compensation | Eligible but did not participate in NQDC Plan during 2022 |
| Perquisites and other | 2022 “All Other Compensation” components included 401(k) match $18,300, $1,250 wellness incentive, $12,895 restricted‑share dividends (paid upon vest) |
Performance & Track Record (Company Context)
| Metric | 2022 Actual | 2023 Actual |
|---|---|---|
| Earnings per diluted common share | $3.60 | $3.44 (impacted −$0.40 acquisition and −$0.06 pension settlement) |
| Net interest income ($M) | $253.4 | $339.4 |
| Total non‑interest income ($M) | $78.8 | $87.4 |
| Total assets ($B) | $7.21 | $9.16 |
| Net charge‑offs (% of avg loans) | 0.16% | 0.15% |
| Efficiency ratio | 59.6% | 58.7% |
| One‑year TSR | −7% (2022) | 26% (2023) |
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance alignment: Annual incentives tied to credit‑quality and efficiency metrics (ROAA, efficiency ratio, pre‑tax/pre‑provision EPS, net charge‑offs) with clear threshold/target/max and an absolute minimum “circuit breaker,” aligning the Chief Credit Officer’s remit with compensation levers .
- Equity structure and vesting: No options; compensation is RSU‑heavy with three‑year cliff vesting and annual company health conditions (well‑capitalized and positive net income) that can reduce vesting by one‑third per year—this both retains talent and moderates near‑term selling pressure, but creates identifiable vesting‑date supply events (e.g., 2/9/2025: 2,281 shares; 2/8/2026: 2,970 shares) .
- Governance protections: Double‑trigger CIC, no excise tax gross‑ups, clawback, and prohibitions on hedging/pledging reduce misalignment and legal/regulatory risk; absence of employment contracts limits guaranteed pay and reduces retention “lock‑in” risk .
- Ownership signal: Beneficial ownership is <1% and includes ESPP participation; company’s 50% post‑vesting hold requirement improves ongoing alignment but absolute ownership is modest—monitor RSU vesting windows for potential liquidity events .