Robert Myers
About Robert Myers
Robert (Bob) F. Myers is President of Phillips Edison & Company (PECO) since January 1, 2024, after serving as COO since October 2010 and EVP since August 2020. He joined PECO in 2003 and holds a B.S. in Business Administration from Huntington College (1995). Age: 52. In 2024, PECO delivered 10% net income growth and ~4% Core FFO/share growth; annual cash incentive payouts for NEOs were 105% of target on Adjusted FFO/share $2.00 and Same-Center NOI growth of 3.8%. Over the 2022–2024 LTI cycle, PECO achieved 23.2% TSR, 66th percentile vs FTSE Nareit Equity Shopping Centers, earning 165.2% of target on performance-based LTI awards .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| PECO | President | 2024–Present | Oversees operations, development/redevelopment, acquisitions/dispositions, and cost controls tied to annual and long-term incentives . |
| PECO | Chief Operating Officer | 2010–2023 | Led integrated operating platform; responsible for leasing & operations across grocery-anchored centers . |
| PECO | Executive Vice President | 2020–2023 | Senior leadership during IPO/post-IPO period . |
| PECO | SVP Leasing & Operations | 2009–2010 | Drove leasing productivity and operating discipline . |
| PECO | VP Leasing | 2006–2009 | Advanced portfolio leasing metrics and tenant mix . |
| PECO | Regional Leasing Manager | 2005–2006 | Regional portfolio leasing . |
| PECO | Senior Leasing Manager | 2003–2005 | Property-level leasing execution . |
| Equity Investment Group | Property Manager | 1997–1998 | On-site property operations . |
| Equity Investment Group | Director of Operations | 1998–2000 | Scaled operating processes . |
| Equity Investment Group | Director of Lease Renegotiations/Leasing Agent | 2000–2003 | Lease optimization and renegotiations . |
External Roles
None disclosed in PECO’s executive officer biography for Myers .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $489,246 | $507,338 | $525,000 | $550,000 |
| Annual Merit Increase (%) | — | — | — | 5% |
Multi-year compensation (Summary Compensation Table):
| Component ($) | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | $489,246 | $507,338 | $523,223 | $547,115 |
| Stock Awards (ASC 718 grant-date FV) | $2,440,283 | $1,296,538 | $1,130,575 | $1,387,395 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan | $514,500 | $586,040 | $630,000 | $577,500 |
| All Other Compensation | $83,619 | $110,399 | $136,035 | $46,083 |
| Total | $3,748,148 | $2,500,315 | $2,419,833 | $2,558,093 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive Program structure: 50% Adjusted FFO/share, 20% Same-Center NOI growth, 30% individual goals; maximum payout per component 150% (raised to 200% beginning in 2025) .
2024 program metrics and payout:
| Metric | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Weighting | Payout Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted FFO per Share | $1.92 | $1.99 | $2.07 | $2.00 | 50% | 53.2% after weighting |
| Same-Center NOI Growth | 3.5% | 4.0% | 5.0% | 3.8% | 20% | 16.6% after weighting |
| Individual Goals | — | — | — | Above target | 30% | 35.2% after weighting |
| Total Payout vs Target | — | — | — | — | — | 105% |
2023 program results:
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Company performance payout | 79.5% of target |
| Individual performance payout | 40.5% of target |
| Total payout vs target | 120% |
| Myers Target/Actual Bonus | $525,000 / $630,000 |
2022 program metrics and payout:
| Metric | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Weighting | Payout Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted FFO per Share | $1.75 | $1.82 | $1.92 | $1.82 | 50% | 50% of target after weighting |
| Same-Center NOI Growth | 3.0% | 3.5% | 4.5% | 4.5% | 20% | 30% of target after weighting |
| Individual Goals | — | — | — | Above target | 30% | 35% after weighting |
| Total Payout vs Target | — | — | — | — | — | 115% |
| Myers Target/Actual Bonus | $509,600 / $586,040 |
Long-Term Equity Incentive Program (LTI) design:
- 60% performance-based (Class C Units or performance RSUs) on Relative TSR vs FTSE Nareit Equity Shopping Centers (“FNSC”); thresholds 30th/50th/75th percentile; Absolute TSR modifier caps above-target payout if absolute 3-year TSR is negative; vest 50% at performance period end and 50% one year later .
- 40% time-based (Class B Units or RSUs) vesting in four equal annual installments .
- 2022–2024 cycle earned 165.2% of target; half vested Dec 31, 2024, remainder vests Dec 31, 2025 .
Key grant details:
| Year | Grant Type | Units (#) | Grant-Date FV ($) | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Performance (Class C) | Target 20,276; Max 40,552 | $892,955 | Earn on 1/1/2024–12/31/2026 TSR; 50% vest 12/31/2026, balance 1-year later . |
| 2024 | Time-based (Class B) | 13,517 | $451,197 | 25% annually over four years starting 3/1/2025 . |
| 2024 | Accrued distributions (Class C) | 1,218 | $43,243 | Vested and granted per award agreement . |
| 2023 | Performance (Class C) | Target 17,118 | — | Earn on 1/1/2023–12/31/2025 TSR; 50% vest 1/1/2026, balance 1/1/2027 . |
| 2023 | Time-based (Class B) | 8,310 | — | 25% annually from 3/1/2024 . |
| 2022 | Performance (Class C) | Earned but unvested 14,486 | — | 50% vested 12/31/2024; remaining 50% vest 12/31/2025 . |
| 2022 | Time-based (Class B) | 5,622 | — | 25% annually from 3/1/2023 . |
| 2021 | Time-based (Class B) | 3,428 | — | Vested 1/1/2025 . |
Stock vested (value realized):
| Year | Units Vested (#) | Value Realized ($) |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 62,362 | $2,221,743 |
| 2022 | 67,024 | $2,228,065 |
Notes:
- PECO does not grant options; no NEO options outstanding or exercised in 2022/2024 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (as of 3/7/2025) | 29,013 common; rights to common (OP/vested LTIPs within 60 days): 267,885; total 296,898; <1% of class . |
| OP Units & Earned Class C Units (footnote) | 266,788 OP Units; 1,097 earned Class C Units vesting within 60 days . |
| Outstanding Equity at 12/31/2024 | Time-based unvested: 13,517 (2024), 8,310 (2023), 5,622 (2022), 3,428 (2021). Performance-based: target 20,276 (2024), target 17,118 (2023), earned unvested 14,486 (2022) . |
| Ownership Guidelines (SOP) | Non-CEO NEOs: 3x base salary . |
| SOP Compliance | Compliant as of March 19, 2025; requirement $1,740,000 . Compliant as of March 21, 2024; requirement $1,650,000 . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for all officers/directors per Insider Trading Policy . |
Employment Terms
| Term | Provision |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | Company policy: no employment contracts with executive officers . |
| Severance (no CIC) | 1.5x (salary + average bonus over 3 yrs), 18 months COBRA; unvested time-based awards vest that would vest within 18 months; pro-rata earn-out on performance awards . |
| Severance (with CIC + termination within 2 yrs) | 2.0x (salary + average bonus) and 24 months COBRA; time-based and earned-but-unvested performance awards fully vest . |
| Non-Compete/Non-Solicit | Required for 18 months post-termination (24 months for CEO); confidentiality applies during and after employment . |
| Quantified Payments (as of 12/31/2024) | Termination not for cause/good reason: Severance $1,721,770; Health $37,282; Time-based equity acceleration $799,696; Performance-based equity acceleration $1,903,979; Total $4,462,727 . Death/Disability: Severance $577,500; Time-based equity $799,696; Performance-based equity $1,903,979; Total $3,281,175 . CIC+termination: Severance $2,295,693; Health $49,709; Time-based equity $1,156,652; Performance-based equity $3,344,167; Total $6,846,221 . |
| Clawback | Dodd-Frank-compliant recovery policy adopted; recovery required upon accounting restatement irrespective of misconduct; broader clawback for misconduct up to 36 months . |
| Tax Gross-Ups | None provided to executive officers . |
| Related Arrangements | Tax protection agreement (2021 TPA) with Edison, Murphy, Myers through 2031 subject to OP unit holding thresholds; notice/structuring considerations thereafter; no obligation to counterparty acceptance . |
Performance Compensation – Detailed Metrics Table
| Year | Metric | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Weighting | Total Cash Payout vs Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Adjusted FFO/share | $1.92 | $1.99 | $2.07 | $2.00 | 50% | 105% |
| 2024 | Same-Center NOI Growth | 3.5% | 4.0% | 5.0% | 3.8% | 20% | 105% |
| 2024 | Individual Goals | — | — | — | Above target | 30% | 105% |
| 2023 | Company Payout | — | — | — | 79.5% | — | 120% |
| 2023 | Individual Payout | — | — | — | 40.5% | — | 120% |
| 2022 | Adjusted FFO/share | $1.75 | $1.82 | $1.92 | $1.82 | 50% | 115% |
| 2022 | Same-Center NOI Growth | 3.0% | 3.5% | 4.5% | 4.5% | 20% | 115% |
| 2022 | Individual Goals | — | — | — | Above target | 30% | 115% |
Compensation Peer Group and Governance Signals
- 2024 peer group includes Acadia, Brixmor, Federal Realty, InvenTrust, Kimco, Kite Realty, Macerich, Regency, Retail Opportunity Investments, Tanger, Urban Edge; benchmarking supported by Nareit survey; consultant Ferguson Partners (FPC) deemed independent .
- 2024 Say-on-Pay approval: 97.5% .
- Policy prohibitions: hedging/pledging; no “single-trigger” CIC severance; no repricing/buyouts; no employment contracts .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Annual bonuses tied to Adjusted FFO/share and Same-Center NOI; LTI awards 60% driven by Relative TSR with an absolute TSR cap—this embeds direct sensitivity to shareholder returns and sector-relative performance .
- Vesting calendar and potential supply: Large releases around Dec 31, 2025 (remaining 50% of 2022 LTI) and time-based tranches annually from Mar 1, 2025 (2024 Class B Units). Additional performance cycles end Dec 31, 2025 and Dec 31, 2026 with staggered one-year vesting tails—monitor insider trading windows for potential selling pressure .
- Ownership alignment: Myers holds 266,788 OP Units and earned Class C Units; complies with 3x salary SOP; hedging/pledging prohibited—reduces misalignment risk .
- Retention and change-of-control economics: Severance of 1.5x salary+bonus (no CIC) and 2.0x (CIC) plus equity acceleration are competitive but not excessive; non-compete/non-solicit covenants at 18 months reinforce retention without guaranteed pay increases .
- Governance and shareholder support: Robust clawback policies, high say-on-pay approval (97.5%), and independent compensation oversight lower governance risk .