Daniel Cregg
PUBLIC SERVICE ENTERPRISE GROUPAbout Daniel Cregg
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Public Service Enterprise Group (PSEG) since October 8, 2015; previously VP–Finance at PSE&G (2013) and VP–Finance at PSEG Power (2006). He joined PSEG in 1991 after five years at Deloitte & Touche; MBA (Wharton) and BS Accounting (Lehigh) . Company performance context: Operating Revenues were $11,237M (2023) and $10,290M (2024); non-GAAP Operating Earnings were $1,742M (2023) and $1,839M (2024); the year-end share price rose from $61.15 (2023) to $84.49 (2024) . LTIP outcomes highlight execution: the 2022 PSU cycle paid at 163% driven by top-quartile TSR and ROIC, with strong ESG attainment .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| PSE&G (PSEG subsidiary) | VP – Finance | 2013–2015 | Led utility finance; supported regulated investment programs and reliability initiatives |
| PSEG Power | VP – Finance | 2006–2013 | Drove development/strategic planning, financings, investor communications for generation portfolio |
| PSEG Corporate | Director – Corporate Development | Prior to 2006 | Corporate development, tax planning/structuring for Energy Holdings and affiliates |
| Deloitte & Touche | Consultant | ~1986–1991 | Energy-focused consulting; foundation in capital markets/accounting |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Edison Electric Institute | Chair, Finance Executive Advisory Board | n/d | Industry finance leadership |
| Community FoodBank of New Jersey | Board of Directors | n/d | Community service governance |
| NJBIZ | CFO of the Year (Public Companies) | 2018 | Recognition for finance leadership |
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year compensation summary:
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | 735,700 | 780,500 | 825,000 |
| Stock Awards ($) | 1,850,015 | 3,950,148 | 2,400,086 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan Comp (MICP) ($) | 647,500 | 680,600 | 1,009,800 |
| Change in Pension Value ($) | – | 410,000 | – |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 33,592 | 31,835 | 42,938 |
| Total ($) | 3,266,807 | 5,853,083 | 4,277,824 |
Target bonus and target LTI:
| Component | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Target Bonus (% of Salary) | 80% | 90% |
| Target PSUs ($) | 1,365,038 | 1,680,038 |
| Target RSUs ($) | 585,057 | 720,048 |
| Target Total Cash ($) | 1,404,900 | 1,567,500 |
| Target Total Compensation ($) | 3,354,995 | 3,967,586 |
Perquisites/401(k) match: 401(k) company match $13,800 in 2024; perquisites included items such as automobile/parking and home security across NEOs; no tax gross-ups except certain relocation .
Performance Compensation
Annual incentive (MICP) design emphasizes non-GAAP Operating EPS, business scorecards (People/Safety, Reliability/Customer, Sustainability) and strategic initiatives; payout opportunity 0–200% of target . Long-term incentives (LTIP) are 70% PSUs and 30% RSUs for NEOs .
2022 PSU result (paid in 2025):
| Metric | Weight | Target Definition | Actual Outcome | Payout Factor | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Relative TSR vs peers | 40% | 50th percentile = 100%; 75th = 200%; 25th = 20% | Top quartile | 200% | Cliff (retirement-eligible vest 1/36 monthly) |
| EPS Growth | 20% | Yr-3 op EPS; 2025 guidance supports 5–7% CAGR | Exceeded 2024 target; low end of 5–7% 2025 range | 69% | Cliff (retirement-eligible vest 1/36 monthly) |
| ESG Index | 20% | Methane reduction; energy efficiency (electric/gas); carbon-free gen; Sustainalytics rating | High-end electric savings; above target gas; high methane reduction; above target carbon-free gen; top-quartile Sustainalytics | 148% | Cliff (retirement-eligible vest 1/36 monthly) |
| Relative ROIC vs peers | 20% | 50th = 100%; 75th = 200%; 25th = 20% | Top quartile | 200% | Cliff (retirement-eligible vest 1/36 monthly) |
| Total PSU Payout | 100% | — | — | 163% | Shares delivered 2025 |
2024–2026 PSU structure (granted Feb 13, 2024):
| Metric | Weight | Target Calibration | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Relative TSR vs peers | 50% | 50th percentile target; 25th threshold; 75th max | Peer-based ranking |
| EPS Growth | 25% | Average 5–7% non-GAAP Operating EPS CAGR; midpoint = target; ±0.5% bounds for threshold/max | Aligns with stated growth range |
| ESG Index (Methane, Carbon-free Gen, EE Electric/Gas) | 25% | Methane: -45.5% target; Carbon-free GWh: 94,496 target; EE Electric target range 1,229–1,843 GWh; EE Gas 43,202–64,803k therms | Sub-weighted equally |
2024 grants detail:
| Award | Grant Date | Target Units/# | Max Units/# | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | 2/13/2024 | 25,811 | 51,622 | 1,680,038 |
| RSUs | 2/13/2024 | 12,298 | — | 720,048 |
| MICP (possible payouts) | 2024 | Target $742,500 | Max $1,485,000 | — |
2021 PSU result (paid in 2024) – context: TSR ranked 10th (100% payout) while ROIC ranked 16th (0% payout) due to fossil portfolio sale; overall 50% payout .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial ownership and outstanding equity:
| As of | Owned Shares (#) | Stock Units/RSUs (#) | Total Beneficial Ownership (#) | % of Class |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 21, 2025 | 124,459 | 60,971 | 185,430 | <1% |
| Feb 16, 2024 | 110,252 | 63,789 | 174,041 | <1% |
Outstanding at 12/31/2024:
| Category | Count/Value |
|---|---|
| Unvested RSUs (# / $) | 35,431 / $2,993,575 |
| Unearned PSUs (target # / $) | 24,915 / $2,105,102 |
Vesting mechanics and schedules:
- RSUs: Retirement-eligible NEOs vest 1/12 per month; 2024 RSUs graded vesting from grant date; 10/12 vested at 12/31/2024; Cregg’s 2023 retention RSU vests Jan 1, 2025 .
- PSUs: Retirement-eligible vest 1/36 per month over the 3-year period; vesting tranche counts scheduled for 2025 and 2026 .
Ownership policy and alignment:
- Executive stock ownership guideline: EVP must hold 4x salary; retain 100% of net shares until met; all NEOs have met requirements .
- Hedging/pledging prohibited; pre-clearance required for trading by officers/directors .
- No stock options outstanding; no option repricing allowed without shareholder approval .
Deferred compensation and pension:
- Deferred Compensation (2024): Executive contributions $460,287; registrant contributions $194,415; aggregate year-end balance $2,777,981 .
- Pension present value (2024 measurement): Years credited 33.17; total present value $3,999,000 .
Employment Terms
Severance and change-in-control economics:
- Key Executive Severance Plan:
- Termination without cause (non-CIC): Cregg entitled to 1.0x salary + target bonus; pro-rata MICP; benefits and outplacement; equity per grant terms .
- Change-in-control (double-trigger): 2.0x salary + target bonus; pro-rata MICP; accelerated RSU vesting; PSU pro-rata based on actual performance; welfare benefits; outplacement; payments capped to avoid excise tax .
Illustrative payments (hypothetical at 12/31/2024):
| Scenario | Severance ($) | Pro-Rata MICP ($) | RSUs ($) | PSUs ($) | Health/Welfare ($) | Outplacement ($) | Aggregate ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without cause | 1,567,500 | 742,500 | 2,993,575 | — | 12,092 | 25,000 | 5,343,667 |
| CIC termination (double-trigger) | 3,135,000 | 742,500 | 2,993,575 | — (pro rata, table assumes target) | 26,939 | 25,000 | 6,933,014 (before any parachute forfeiture) |
Clawback:
- Company maintains two clawback practices: (1) three-year look-back for misconduct/material Standards of Conduct violations or restatements; (2) Dodd-Frank/NYSE-compliant recovery for executive officers upon accounting restatement regardless of fault .
Other terms:
- No hedging/pledging and trading pre-clearance for officers/directors .
- Retirement Notice Program (effective 2024): retirement-eligible employees providing 6-month notice become fully vested in 2024 RSUs/PSUs at retirement; shares released on normal distribution date .
Compensation Structure vs Performance Metrics
- Pay mix is heavily at-risk: NEO LTIP 76% and CEO 89% at-risk in 2024; MICP and PSUs link payouts to Operating EPS, TSR, EPS growth, and ESG goals .
- PSU performance rigor: 2024–2026 awards tie 50% to relative TSR and 25% to EPS CAGR within 5–7% range; ESG components include methane reduction, carbon-free generation, and energy efficiency with defined thresholds/maximums .
- Peer benchmarking: Utility peer group (Ameren, AEP, CenterPoint, ConEd, Dominion, DTE, Duke, Edison Intl, Entergy, Eversource, Exelon, FirstEnergy, PPL, Sempra, Southern, WEC, Xcel) underpins market-competitive targets; unchanged into 2025 .
Vesting Schedules and Insider Selling Pressure
- RSU vesting cadence for retirement-eligible executives (including Cregg) is monthly (1/12), creating regular share delivery; PSUs vest monthly (1/36) over performance periods; 2023 retention RSU vests 1/1/2025 .
- Trading controls (pre-clearance, open windows) and prohibition of hedging/pledging mitigate opportunistic selling; no Form 4 summary available here, but governance practices curb selling pressure signals .
Equity Ownership Alignment and Pledging
- Cregg’s beneficial ownership increased from 174,041 (2024) to 185,430 (2025), with RSUs and PSUs outstanding; percent-of-class remains <1%. Executive stock ownership guidelines (4x salary for EVPs) are met, and pledging/hedging is prohibited .
Employment Contracts, Severance, and Change-of-Control Economics
- Double-trigger CIC protection at 2x salary+target bonus; pro rata incentive and equity treatment; parachute payments capped to avoid excise tax; non-CIC severance at 1x salary+target bonus with benefits/outplacement; clawbacks overlay both cash and equity .
Performance & Track Record
| Indicator | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Operating Revenues ($M) | 11,237 | 10,290 |
| Operating Earnings (non-GAAP) ($M) | 1,742 | 1,839 |
| Year-end Market Price ($) | 61.15 | 84.49 |
| PSU Payout (prior cycles) | 2021 grant: 50% (TSR 100%, ROIC 0%) | 2022 grant: 163% (top-quartile TSR/ROIC, strong ESG) |
Say-on-Pay and shareholder feedback:
- Approval 93.2% (2023) and 94.1% (2024), indicating strong investor support for pay design .
Compensation Committee Analysis & Peer Group
- O&CC practices include independent advisor (CAP), clawbacks, double-trigger CIC, no option repricing, robust ownership guidelines; peer group reaffirmed for 2025 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Guideline | Requirement | Status |
|---|---|---|
| EVP Stock Ownership | 4x salary; retain net shares until met | Met for all NEOs |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for employees/officers/directors | Enforced (pre-clearance required) |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Termination (non-CIC) | 1x salary+target bonus; pro-rata MICP; benefits/outplacement; equity per grant terms |
| CIC (double-trigger) | 2x salary+target bonus; pro-rata MICP; RSU acceleration; PSU pro-rata; benefits; excise cap |
| Clawbacks | Misconduct/material violation/restatement (3-year look-back) and Dodd-Frank restatement recovery |
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High proportion of at-risk pay (PSUs/RSUs), explicit TSR/EPS/ESG metrics, and robust ownership/clawback/anti-hedging policies support investor alignment and reduce agency risk .
- Retention: A 2023 $2M retention RSU vesting 1/1/2025 indicates targeted retention actions; monthly vesting for retirement-eligible executives smooths equity distribution but may create regular liquidity events managed by pre-clearance rules .
- Performance signals: Strong 2022 PSU payout (163%) and 2024 share price appreciation signal execution momentum; prior 2021 PSU underperformance on ROIC highlights sensitivity to portfolio moves (e.g., fossil divestiture) .
- Downside protection/cost: Double-trigger CIC severance at 2x and non-CIC at 1x are standard utility benchmarks; excise tax cap and clawbacks mitigate excess payouts risk .