William Fink
PROVIDENT FINANCIAL SERVICESAbout William Fink
William J. Fink, age 66, is Executive Vice President and Chief Lending Officer (CLO) of Provident Bank, appointed in January 2025 after a long career at TD Bank leading U.S. Middle Market Banking and strategic partnerships . Management introduced him as the new CLO with 30+ years of commercial banking, credit administration, and risk management experience, including responsibility for a $24 billion portfolio at TD; his mandate is to drive responsible commercial lending growth at Provident . Company performance context during his tenure: Q3 2025 net income was $71.7M, ROAA 1.16%, and net interest margin 3.43%; efficiency ratio improved to ~51% . Prior year context: FY2024 net income was $115.5M; ROAA 0.57%; NIM 3.26%; total assets grew to $24.1B following the Lakeland merger .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Provident Bank | EVP & Chief Lending Officer | Since Jan 2025 | Leads commercial lending growth strategy; adds senior talent; expands PA/Westchester presence, with strong credit quality focus . |
| TD Bank (U.S.) | EVP; Head of U.S. Middle Market Banking and Commercial Bank Strategic Partnerships | Past 20 years | Led middle market and asset-based lending businesses, overseeing a $24B portfolio; deep credit risk and operational strategy background . |
External Roles
- Not disclosed in company filings for Fink; no public board or committee roles cited .
Fixed Compensation
- Executive compensation framework at Provident is pay-for-performance with a mix of base salary, annual cash incentives, and long-term equity awards (predominantly performance-based), plus benefits and limited perquisites .
- 2024 target long-term equity award guidelines (as % of base salary) were 100% for CEO/Executive Vice Chairman and 60% for certain Tier II executives (CFO/CAO/Chief Wealth/Chief Digital); CLO-specific targets were not disclosed .
- Perquisites are limited (e.g., automobile, club membership for select roles, executive health plan) and apply broadly to NEOs; Fink-specific perquisites not disclosed .
Performance Compensation
- Annual cash incentive metrics (2024 plan): Net Income (40%), EPS (40%), Efficiency Ratio (20%) with a 50–150% payout curve; proration across pre-close (target-plus), integration (target), and post-close (maximum) periods due to the Lakeland merger .
- Long-term equity design: 75% performance-vesting and 25% time-vesting; performance measured over three years on Core ROAA (60%) and Core ROATE (40%), modified ±20% by relative TSR vs KBW Regional Banking Index; vesting is cliff at 3 years (performance) and ratable over 3 years (time-based) .
| Metric | Weighting | Target Definition | 2024 Plan Actuals | Payout/Curve | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Income (Annual) | 40% | Period targets; CECL add-back, net charge-offs subtracted (net of tax) | Pre-close: 43.8 vs target 39.5; Integration: set at target; Post-close: 100.5 vs target 88.7 | 50% at Threshold; 100% at Target; 150% at Max; results: target-plus overall | Annual cash payout following year . |
| EPS (Annual) | 40% | Period EPS targets under adjusted definition | Pre-close: 0.58 vs target 0.52; Integration: 0.57 at target; Post-close: 0.77 at max | Same curve; overall target-plus | Annual cash payout . |
| Efficiency Ratio (Annual) | 20% | Non-interest expense / net revenue | Pre-close: 61.14% (near target-plus); Integration: 53.29% at target; Post-close: 55.26% at max | Same curve; overall target-plus | Annual cash payout . |
| Core ROAA (LTIP) | 60% | Multi-year: 92 bps target; 78–97 bps range | Framework disclosed; 2022–2024 achieved maximum for ROAA | 50–150% of target; performance-based | 3-year cliff vest . |
| Core ROATE (LTIP) | 40% | Multi-year: 10.58% target; 8.41–11.40% range | Framework disclosed; 2022–2024 achieved maximum for ROATE, TSR at 17th percentile applied -20% modifier; net payout 138% | 50–150% w/ TSR modifier | 3-year cliff vest . |
Note: These plan structures and results were disclosed for NEOs; Fink’s individual targets and payouts were not disclosed.
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | As of | Amount/Status |
|---|---|---|
| Common stock beneficially owned (Form 3) | Jan 28, 2025 | 0 shares; officer title listed as EVP & Chief Lending Officer . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Policy scope | Directors, officers, and employees are prohibited from hedging and should avoid pledging shares as collateral . |
| Stock ownership guidelines | Policy scope | Robust ownership guidelines apply; specific multiples disclosed for NEOs (Tier I: 6x salary; Tier II NEOs: 1.5x salary); Fink’s required multiple not disclosed . |
| Clawbacks | Policy scope | Company-wide clawback compliant with NYSE/SEC; cash and equity incentives subject to recoupment after restatements or misconduct . |
Employment Terms
- Start date and role: EVP & CLO since January 2025 .
- Executive Severance Plan (adopted July 24, 2025): Provides severance to selected participants; baseline severance equal to 1× base salary + 1× target annual cash incentive, up to 12 months of healthcare continuation (COBRA) and outplacement; CIC severance equals 2× or 3× salary + target bonus depending on level, plus healthcare continuation multiples; no excise tax gross-ups, uses best-net cutback; 409A-compliant timing; participation requires Compensation Committee selection and avoiding duplicative benefits .
- Company executive compensation governance: Anti-hedging, clawbacks, risk assessments, independent consultant (FW Cook), peer benchmarks, and say‑on‑pay approval (~97% in 2024) .
Investment Implications
- Alignment signals: Anti-hedging/pledging and clawbacks strengthen alignment; robust incentive structures tied to ROAA/ROATE with relative TSR modifier support long-term value creation and risk control .
- Retention and execution risk: Fink’s appointment addresses credit growth and portfolio management capabilities post-merger; early tenure with zero initial beneficial ownership suggests equity alignment will build as awards accrue, but individual grant/vesting details for Fink are not disclosed, limiting visibility into near-term selling pressure .
- Pay-for-performance context: Company’s incentive payouts in 2024 were target-plus overall due to strong post-close results, and LTIP payouts for 2022–2024 were 138% after TSR down‑modifier—indicating discipline on relative returns while rewarding core profitability; this framework will likely govern Fink’s incentives even if his specific targets are undisclosed .
- Credit quality and growth: Under management, asset quality metrics improved and NIM expanded in 2025; with Fink tasked to lead commercial lending, additions to lending talent and geographic expansion could be catalysts, tempered by broader cycle and integration execution risks .