Peter Brindley
About Peter Brindley
Peter Brindley, age 48, is Executive Vice President, Head of Real Estate at Paramount Group (PGRE), serving in this role since February 2021 after leading leasing from 2017–2021 and earlier roles since joining PGRE in 2010. He holds a B.S. in Business from Ithaca College and an M.S. in Real Estate Finance & Investment from New York University . During his tenure, PGRE’s cumulative TSR (value of $100 investment) declined from 65 in 2021 to 42 in 2024, underperforming the office REIT peer index (97 to 75), while NOI remained broadly stable at $360–374 million during 2020–2024 and was $363.9 million in 2024; net loss was $(46.3) million in 2024 . He led development and launch of Paramount Club, a 32,000 sq ft bespoke amenity center for PGRE’s New York portfolio, a notable execution initiative in 2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Paramount Group (PGRE) | EVP, Head of Real Estate | Feb 2021–present | Oversees portfolio strategy and leasing; led launch of Paramount Club |
| Paramount Group (PGRE) | EVP, Leasing | Dec 2017–Feb 2021 | Led leasing across portfolio |
| Paramount Group (PGRE) | SVP, Leasing (NY portfolio) | Sep 2015–Dec 2017 | Drove New York leasing performance |
| Paramount Group (PGRE) | VP, Leasing | Dec 2010–Sep 2015 | Joined PGRE to lead leasing |
| Tishman Speyer | Senior Director (NY) | 2004–2010 | Institutional landlord leasing execution |
| CB Richard Ellis | Brokerage Services Group | Pre-2004 | Agency/tenant rep experience |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years |
|---|---|---|
| Avenue of the Americas Association | Board of Directors, Treasurer | Current |
| Real Estate Board of New York (REBNY) | Member | Current |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $560,000 | $560,000 | $577,500 |
| Year-over-Year Change (%) | – | 0.0% | 3.1% |
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| All Other Compensation ($) | $37,954 | $39,733 | $40,233 |
| Components (Life/Disability; 401k match; Car/Parking) ($) | — | — | $2,676; $22,557; $15,000 |
Performance Compensation
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual Payout ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Short-Term Incentive Compensation (STIC) – Total ($) | — | $433,125 [50%] | $866,250 [100%] | $1,732,500 [200%/150%] | $1,283,000 [148% of target] |
| Core FFO per Share | 20% | $0.76 | $0.78 | $0.80 | $207,900 |
| Square Footage of Signed Leases | 25% | 650,000 | 775,000 | 900,000 | $153,416 |
| Same Store Leased Occupancy | 25% | 86.1% | 87.1% | 88.1% | $0 (below threshold) |
| Corporate Overhead | 10% | $62.0mm | $61.0mm | $60.0mm | $103,950 |
| Fundraising (JV & Funds) | 10% | $100mm | $200mm | $300mm | $31,183 |
| Corporate Responsibility | 10% | 12 points | 16 points | 20 points | $94,205 |
| Individual Objectives (e.g., launch Paramount Club) | 40% of STIC | — | — | — | $692,346 [200% of target] |
Long-Term Incentive Compensation (LTIC) – Incentive & Retention Awards (granted Sep 8, 2023; in lieu of 2024–2025 annual grants):
| Component | Grant Date Fair Value | Vesting | Performance Hurdles | Status (as of 12/31/2024) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| P-AOLTIPs (Performance-based) | $1,600,000 | Earned based on stock price; then 20% vests Oct 1, 2026; 80% vests Oct 1, 2027; 1-year post-vesting transfer restriction | 20-day avg stock price vs $5.12 grant price: $6.40 (33% earn), $7.68 (67%), $8.96 (100%); linear interpolation | None earned to date |
| T-LTIPs (Time-based) | $1,600,000 | 50% vests Oct 1, 2026; 50% vests Oct 1, 2027; 1-year post-vesting transfer restriction | N/A | Scheduled |
| Total (2024 “target attribution”) | $800,000 (time), $800,000 (performance) | See above | See above | See above |
Additional equity activity:
- Exchanged $100,000 of 2023 cash bonus into LTIP units with $25,000 premium recognized in 2024 grant table (6,143 units) . No participation in 2024 Bonus Exchange Program (cash-for-equity) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Category (as of March 1, 2025) | Count |
|---|---|
| Common Shares Beneficially Owned | 0 |
| Total Shares & Units Beneficially Owned | 1,782,512 |
| Breakdown: OP Common Units | 473,450 |
| Breakdown: LTIP Units (incl. vesting status) | 866,183 (656,073 unvested) |
| Breakdown: Common Units Underlying Convertible AOLTIP Units | 442,879 |
Alignment policies and practices:
- Anti-hedging and anti-pledging: Executives may not hedge or pledge company securities without NCGC approval; no executives currently have pledges; no executive hedging reported .
- Stock ownership guidelines: 3× base salary for Section 16 officers; achieve within 5 years of appointment and retain 50% of net vested awards until met; officers in place at adoption achieved by Feb 23, 2021 .
- Clawback policy: Recovery of incentive-based compensation after restatements, regardless of fault .
Upcoming vesting/supply considerations:
- Feb 15, 2025/2026/2027 tranches on legacy T-LTIP awards; Feb 4, 2026 cliff on promotion-related T-LTIPs; Oct 1, 2026 and Oct 1, 2027 major vest dates for 2023 Incentive & Retention awards (with one-year post-vesting transfer restrictions for NEOs) .
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Current Agreement | Amended & Restated Employment Agreement effective March 10, 2025; term to March 10, 2026; auto-renewal unless notice 180 days before year-end |
| Target Bonus | Minimum target = 150% of base salary per agreement; STIC structured with corporate and individual objectives |
| Severance (no CIC) | Lump sum of 1× (base salary + average bonus over prior 3 years; floor $866,250 for Brindley) + prorated target bonus + 1.5× health/dental premiums + time-based equity acceleration; performance awards per terms |
| Severance (with CIC; double-trigger) | 2× (base + average bonus) + 2× health/dental premiums + time-based equity acceleration; performance awards per terms; rabbi trust funding upon CIC |
| Non-Compete/Non-Solicit | Non-competition and non-solicitation for 12 months post-termination (Brindley) |
| Incentive & Retention Awards (CIC/termination) | Double-trigger vesting; service-based vesting deemed satisfied 50% before Feb 1, 2026 and 100% on/after Feb 1, 2026 upon qualified termination; performance hurdles continue to apply |
| Clawbacks & Tax Gross-ups | Clawback policy; no 280G gross-ups; cutback to avoid excise tax if better after-tax |
Multi-Year Compensation (Reported)
| Component ($) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | $560,000 | $560,000 | $577,500 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation (Cash STIC) | $900,000 | $883,000 | $1,283,000 |
| Stock Awards (incl. exchange premiums) | $1,250,000 | $2,831,250 | $25,000 |
| Option Awards (incl. Incentive & Retention grants) | $412,500 | $2,000,000 | $0 |
| All Other Compensation | $37,954 | $39,733 | $40,233 |
| Total | $3,160,454 | $6,313,983 | $1,925,733 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix shift and front-loaded equity: PGRE front-loaded 2024–2025 LTIC into Sep 2023 to reinforce retention and align awards with rigorous stock price hurdles; no long-term equity grants to NEOs in 2024–2025 and return to annual cadence expected in 2026 .
- Pay-for-performance rigor: 2024 STIC metrics spanned Core FFO/share, leasing volume, same-store occupancy, overhead, fundraising, and corporate responsibility with thresholds, targets, and caps; occupancy target was missed (zero payout), while cost discipline, FFO, and ESG targets paid out .
- Shareholder feedback and say-on-pay: 2024 say-on-pay failed (just under 50% support), with concerns centered on front-loaded grants; PGRE committed to transparency and resuming balanced annual LTI awards starting 2026 .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: Significant unvested equity with back-weighted vesting in Oct 2026/Oct 2027 and one-year post-vesting transfer restrictions, plus anti-hedging/anti-pledging policies and stock ownership guidelines, provide strong retention and alignment through 2027 .
- Near-term execution signals: Brindley’s high individual STIC payout reflects execution on strategic initiatives (Paramount Club) despite occupancy shortfalls; corporate overhead discipline and Core FFO performance were rewarded, indicating focus on controllable levers amid market headwinds .
- Potential selling pressure: Major vest dates in 2026–2027 could increase tradable supply; mitigated by post-vesting transfer restrictions for NEOs and absence of pledging, but warrants monitoring of Form 4 activity around vesting windows .
- Governance and pay risk: The failed 2024 say-on-pay vote elevates scrutiny; investors should watch 2026 LTI design, performance hurdles (NOI/TSR), and changes in severance/CIC terms for ongoing pay-for-performance discipline .