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Aric Coffman, M.D.

Aric Coffman, M.D.

Chief Executive Officer and President at P3 Health Partners
CEO
Executive
Board

About Aric Coffman, M.D.

Aric Coffman, M.D. (age 52) was appointed Chief Executive Officer and President of P3 Health Partners Inc. on May 8, 2024. He holds a B.S. in Chemistry and an M.D. from the University of Oklahoma and an MBA from the University of Texas at Dallas, with prior leadership roles at Honest Medical Group and DaVita/Optum. Company performance context: 2024 “compensation actually paid” to the CEO was $4.36 million amid a cumulative TSR of 3.19 (from a $100 base starting 12/31/2021) and net loss of $310.4 million for 2024 .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Honest Medical GroupCEO and DirectorDec 2021 – Apr 2024Led a physician-led value-based care enablement organization; board-level oversight .
DaVita Medical Group (pre-Optum)CEO, The Everett Clinic; President, Washington MarketJan 2018 – Jul 2019Ran one of the nation’s leading independent medical groups; market leadership .
Optum (post-acquisition of DaVita Medical Group)CEO, The Everett Clinic; EVP, Pacific NorthwestDec 2019 – Dec 2021Continued PNW leadership through integration under Optum .

External Roles

No additional current public company directorships or external board roles for Dr. Coffman are disclosed in the proxy .

Fixed Compensation

Component2024 ValueNotes
Base salary$750,000As per CEO Employment Agreement dated May 8, 2024 .
Target bonus %75% of baseMaximum 90% of base .
Actual bonus paid$0No 2024 annual bonus earned; one spot bonus paid to former CFO only .
PerquisitesJet card (40 hours/year); cellphone reimbursement $589Jet card for business purposes; 2024 cellphone reimbursement disclosed .

Performance Compensation

Annual Bonus Plan (Cash)

MetricWeightingTargetActualPayout
RevenueNot disclosedNot disclosedNot disclosed$0 (no 2024 bonus earned) .
Operating ExpenseNot disclosedNot disclosedNot disclosed$0 (no 2024 bonus earned) .
Adjusted EBITDANot disclosedNot disclosedNot disclosed$0 (no 2024 bonus earned) .

Equity Awards (2024 Grants)

Award TypeGrant DateNumber of SharesGrant-Date Fair ValueVestingPerformance ConditionExercise/PriceExpiration
Stock Options (Coffman Option Award)May 9, 202412,100,000$5,723,89325% at 1-year anniversary; remaining 75% quarterly over 3 years, service-based .None$0.73 per shareMay 9, 2034 .
RSUs (Coffman RSU Award)May 2024 (in connection with appointment)4,400,000$3,212,000Same schedule as options, service-basedVests only upon closing of first underwritten offering of Class A common stock after employment start .N/AN/A

Note: Option and RSU counts/fair values do not reflect the 1-for-50 reverse stock split executed April 11, 2025 .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

MeasureValueDetail
Beneficial ownership – Class A3,025,000 sharesAll via options exercisable within 60 days of April 10, 2025 .
Ownership % of Class A1.8%Based on 163,159,548 Class A shares outstanding (pre-reverse split basis) .
Total voting power0.8%No Class V holdings disclosed for Coffman .
Unvested RSUs (12/31/2024)4,400,000Market value $989,560 at $0.2249 closing price on 12/31/2024 .
Unexercisable options (12/31/2024)12,100,000Strike $0.73; service vesting over ~4 years .
Hedging/PledgingHedging prohibited; pledging not disclosedInsider Trading & Anti-Hedging Policy bans hedging instruments; no pledging policy disclosed .
Ownership guidelinesNot disclosedNo executive stock ownership guideline disclosure for CEO found .

Supply overhang observations:

  • Quarterly option vesting beginning May 9, 2025 through 2028 may create incremental exercisable supply; RSUs add supply only upon underwritten offering completion due to dual service/performance conditions .

Employment Terms

ProvisionKey TermNotes
AgreementAt-will employmentCEO Employment Agreement dated May 8, 2024 .
Severance (termination without cause or for “cause” by CEO)12 months base salary; up to 12 months company-subsidized health coverageMitigation applies if re-employed during severance period .
Change-of-control treatmentFull accelerated vesting of Coffman Option/RSU Awards if termination occurs within one year following qualifying corporate transactionsDouble-trigger acceleration (transaction + qualifying termination) .
Non-Compete18 months post-employmentStandard restrictions .
Non-Solicit (service provider/customer)24 months post-employmentStandard restrictions .
ClawbackCompany Clawback Policy administered by Compensation & Nominating CommitteeGovernance of recovery framework .
Anti-HedgingProhibits hedging and offset transactionsApplies to directors, officers, employees; filed policy referenced in 10-K .

Board Service and Governance Context

  • Board composition: nine directors; independent Chair (Mark Thierer); majority independent board with executive sessions at least twice annually .
  • Dr. Coffman is disclosed as Chief Executive Officer and President, but is not listed as a current member of the Board of Directors in the 2025 proxy; thus no dual-role CEO/Chair concerns at P3 for 2025 .
  • Committee structure and roles:
    • Audit Committee: Jeffrey G. Park (Chair), Thomas E. Price, M.D., Greg Wasson; met 6 times in 2024 .
    • Compensation & Nominating Committee: Mary Tolan (Chair), Lawrence B. Leisure, Thomas E. Price, M.D., Greg Wasson; met 5 times in 2024; no external comp consultant engaged in 2024 .
  • Board meeting attendance: each director attended at least 75% of Board and committee meetings in 2024 .

Director Compensation (Context)

For non-employee directors: annual retainers, committee fees, and annual option grants are disclosed; not applicable to Dr. Coffman as he is not disclosed as a director .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Equity-heavy mix: Large 2024 option grant ($5.72M fair value) plus RSUs ($3.21M), while no annual cash bonus was earned; indicates emphasis on long-term equity alignment amid turnaround/liquidity needs .
  • RSU performance condition tied to completion of an underwritten offering (capital-markets milestone), not operating metrics; potential misalignment with pure pay-for-performance on TSR/EBITDA .
  • No tax gross-ups and limited perquisites (jet card for business, minor cellphone reimbursement) suggest restraint on non-performance pay elements .
  • Company-wide “Pay vs Performance” shows 2024 CEO CAP down relative to SCT total amid very low cumulative TSR and significant net loss, signaling challenged alignment outcomes in 2024 .

Related Party & Financing Signals (Context)

  • February–March 2025 financing: $30.0 million unsecured Promissory Note at 19.5% with warrants to VBC Growth SPV 4 (affiliate of principal stockholder), requiring shareholder approval for warrant exercise; highlights liquidity posture and potential dilution risk .
  • Warrants have 49.99% beneficial ownership caps and expire in 2032; Board recommended approval to support working capital .

Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2025 advisory say-on-pay proposal on ballot; majority of votes cast required; outcome not in this proxy .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Substantial equity awards (options at $0.73 pre-split; RSUs contingent on underwritten offering) create high leverage to successful capital markets execution and operational turnaround; anti-hedging policy supports alignment, while pledging status is not disclosed .
  • Retention: Non-compete (18 months), non-solicit (24 months), and 12-month severance with double-trigger acceleration within one year after qualifying transactions are supportive but not overly generous versus peers; RSU performance contingency may delay realizable value, aiding retention .
  • Selling pressure: Quarterly vesting for options through 2028 and RSU vesting upon an underwritten offering could create episodic supply; monitor timing of offering and vesting cliffs for potential overhang .
  • Governance risk: CEO is not Board Chair and not listed as a director, mitigating dual-role independence concerns; majority-independent Board and formal clawback/anti-hedging policies are positives .
  • Performance risk: Pay-for-performance reception may hinge on shifting RSU performance gates from capital markets to operating metrics (revenue/Adjusted EBITDA) given 2024 losses and weak TSR; lack of 2024 cash bonus indicates disciplined outcomes under existing metrics .