
Mark Van Genderen
About Mark Van Genderen
Mark Van Genderen, 56, is President & CEO and a director of Douglas Dynamics (NYSE: PLOW) effective March 3, 2025, after serving as COO (Sept 2024–Mar 2025) and leading the Work Truck Attachments segment (Jan 2023–Feb 2025) . He previously held leadership roles across manufacturing, product, go-to-market, and regional P&L at Harley-Davidson over 21 years; he holds a B.A. in Business Administration (Hope College) and an MBA from Kellogg (Northwestern) . Recent company performance context: 2024 Adjusted EBITDA was $79.3 million vs $68.1 million in 2023, and 2024 Net Income was $56.2 million; five-year TSR value of $100 stood at $51.12 in 2024 versus peer TSR $133.66 (Russell 2000) . 2024 say‑on‑pay support exceeded 97%, with pay programs emphasizing profitability, FCF, and margin efficiency .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Douglas Dynamics (PLOW) | President & CEO; Director | Mar 2025–present | CEO and board member; separation of Chair/CEO roles supports governance continuity . |
| Douglas Dynamics (PLOW) | Chief Operating Officer | Sep 2024–Mar 2025 | Enterprise operations leadership during CEO transition . |
| Douglas Dynamics (PLOW) | President, Work Truck Attachments | Jan 2023–Feb 2025 | Led core snow & ice attachment business; segment performance embedded in 2024 AIP outcomes . |
| Douglas Dynamics (PLOW) | President, Commercial Snow & Ice | Sep 2021–Jan 2023 | Ran CSI business prior to WTA promotion . |
| Douglas Dynamics (PLOW) | VP, Strategy & Business Development | Nov 2020–Sep 2021 | Corporate strategy and BD leadership . |
| Harley-Davidson Motor Company | Multiple leadership roles | ~1999–2020 | Led Latin America business, parts & accessories product dev., and apparel/eCommerce divisions . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lutheran Social Services Foundation (WI & Upper MI) | Director; Chair, Finance/Investment/Audit Committee | Not disclosed | Nonprofit fiduciary and committee leadership . |
| Hope College | Past Trustee | Not disclosed | Governance experience at academic institution . |
Fixed Compensation
| Element | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 (Plan/Current) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary (rate) | $340,000 | $340,000; increased to $420,000 on 9/17/24 | $700,000 (CEO) |
| Salary Actually Paid | $340,000 | $362,951 | N/A |
| Target Annual Bonus (% of Base) | 75% (executive) | 75% (executive) | 100% (CEO) |
| Target Long‑Term Incentive (% of Base) | 75% | 75% | 160% (CEO) |
| 2024 All Other Compensation (401k/insurance, etc.) | $26,114 | $27,069 | N/A |
Notes:
- 2024 increase to $420,000 base upon COO appointment effective Sept 17, 2024 .
- CEO compensation terms effective March 3, 2025 per Amended and Restated Employment Agreement .
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – Metrics, Targets, Outcomes (company framework; individual payout adjusted)
| Metric | Weight | Target/Threshold | Actual | Payout Mechanics | Van Genderen Payout (% of base) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Operating Income | 50% | Target $75.2m; 0 payout <75.8% of target | $70.5m | Below target scaled linearly; baseline and adjustments disclosed | 16.4% (after 50% discretionary reduction) |
| Free Cash Flow (FCF) | 30% | Threshold $21.1m; Target $32.0m | $50.0m (ex‑sale‑leaseback adj.) | Linear above target; plan cap 150% of base | 22.5% (after 50% discretionary reduction) |
| Adjusted EBITDA Margin | 20% | Threshold 12%; Target 14% | 14.2% (ex‑SLB +0.2%) | Linear above target; plan cap 150% | 7.9% (after 50% discretionary reduction) |
| Total AIP Payout | — | — | — | — | 46.8% of base (50% reduction requested by executive) |
Additional details:
- 2024 AIP added Adjusted EBITDA margin to sharpen cost discipline and reduce snowfall-driven volatility; metrics were consolidated results for NEOs; Van Genderen requested a 50% discretionary cut reflecting sub‑target performance in Work Truck Attachments while he led the segment before becoming COO .
- Former CEO received 100% of target per transition agreement; other NEO payouts disclosed for context .
Long‑Term Incentives (LTIs)
- 2024–2026 PSUs: 50% of LTI; metrics are adjusted EPS (50%) and RONA (50%), each measured annually (2024–2026) with a ±25% relative TSR modifier vs S&P Small Cap 600 Industrials; payout after 2026 .
- 2024 PSU actual (year 1): EPS 33% of target; RONA 42.5% of target; subject to TSR modifier at end of 2026 .
- 2024 RSUs: 50% of LTI; 3‑year ratable vesting (service-based) .
- Special retention (2024): $300,000 in RSUs granted 9/3/2024, generally service‑based through March 6, 2027 .
| 2024 LTI Grants (target counts) | Threshold | Target | Max |
|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (2024–2026) – Van Genderen | 1,263 | 5,050 | 10,100 |
| RSUs (time‑vested, Mar 11, 2024) – Van Genderen | — | 5,049 | — |
| Special RSUs (Sep 3, 2024) – Van Genderen | — | 10,988 | — |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership: 33,786 shares as of the March 3, 2025 record date; under 1% of outstanding . Company shares outstanding at record date were 23,098,441 .
Calculation: Ownership ≈ 0.15% = 33,786 / 23,098,441 (inputs cited) . - Unvested/Unearned awards at 12/31/2024 (value at $23.63/sh): RSUs 18,270 ($431,720); PSUs (target) 7,819 ($184,763) .
- Upcoming vesting schedule for Van Genderen’s RSUs:
- 3,045 on 3/6/2025; 2,554 on 3/6/2026; 12,671 on 3/6/2027 .
- Options: None outstanding for NEOs at YE 2024 (no stock options listed) .
- Ownership guidelines: CEO must hold 3x base salary in stock; executives have up to 5 years from appointment to comply; all executives either compliant or within grace period .
- Hedging/Pledging: Hedging prohibited; insider trading policy in place; no explicit pledging allowance disclosed in proxy excerpts .
- Clawback: NYSE- and SEC-compliant compensation recovery policy applies to covered officers for three completed years preceding a restatement .
Employment Terms
- Agreement: Amended & Restated Employment Agreement effective March 3, 2025 (CEO) .
- Base salary: $700,000; AIP target ≥100% of base; LTI target moves to 160% of base .
- Severance (no change in control): If terminated without Cause or resigns for Company Material Breach, severance equals 12 months of base salary plus target annual bonus, paid over 12 months, subject to release; 60‑day release period and timing rules apply .
- Change‑of‑Control (double trigger): If terminated without Cause or resigns for Good Reason within 24 months after a qualifying CoC, severance equals 1.75x (base + target bonus), lump sum within 60 days, subject to release; Good Reason includes material salary/target bonus reduction, material adverse responsibility change, or required relocation >35 miles .
- Benefits: COBRA‑equivalent coverage at employee cost for up to 18 months after termination (various scenarios) .
- 280G excise mitigation: “Best‑net” approach with cutback order (no excise tax gross‑up) .
- Restrictive covenants: Separate Confidentiality and Noncompetition Agreement remains in full force; arbitration provision for disputes .
- No single‑trigger equity acceleration; equity treatment follows plan/award agreements (consistent with Company disclosure) .
Board Governance and Director Service
- Board service: Appointed to the Board simultaneously with CEO appointment on March 3, 2025; fills expanded board size to seven directors .
- Roles structure: Chairman (Janik) is not independent; CEO and Chair roles are separated; Lead Independent Director is Donald W. Sturdivant with defined authorities to balance governance and agenda/flow control .
- Committee roles: None disclosed for Van Genderen as of appointment .
- Director compensation: Employee‑directors historically receive no additional director compensation; in 2024, executives serving on the Board received no extra fees while employed (illustrated by CEO/Chair transitions) .
- Board operations: In 2024, nine board meetings; all directors met ≥75% attendance; executive sessions held nine times .
Deferred Compensation and Perquisites (2024)
| Item (2024) | Amount |
|---|---|
| Executive’s 401(k) company contribution | $15,525 |
| Company‑paid insurance premiums | $11,544 |
| Executive physical | Not listed for Van Genderen in 2024 |
| Deferred Compensation Plan – executive contribution | $16,033; year‑end balance $18,181 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Cash vs equity mix: As COO/segment leader, target AIP 75% of base and LTI 75% of base; as CEO, at‑risk pay increases materially (AIP 100%, LTI 160%), heightening pay-for-performance leverage .
- Metric design: Shifted 2024 AIP to add Adjusted EBITDA margin (20% weight) to mitigate snowfall variability and emphasize cost control; PSU design moved to annual EPS/RONA tranches with a relative TSR modifier to better align with stock outcomes .
- Discretionary elements: 2024 included a 50% voluntary reduction of Van Genderen’s AIP payout to reflect segment underperformance—positive signal on accountability .
- Option usage: No options outstanding; equity uses PSUs and RSUs; 2024 mix moved to 50/50 PSUs/RSUs from 60/40 prior year to manage uncontrollable weather volatility .
- Governance safeguards: No single-trigger CoC severance; no option repricing; clawback policy; hedging prohibited; 280G best‑net cutback (no gross‑up) .
Related-Party Transactions and Other Risks
- Related-party transactions: None >$120,000 involving directors/executives reported since Dec 31, 2023 .
- Section 16 compliance: Proxy notes a late Form 4 in 2024 for another director due to administrative error; no such disclosure for Van Genderen .
- Say‑on‑pay: 2024 advisory approval >97% signals strong shareholder support for compensation design .
Equity Ownership & Vesting Details (Expanded)
| Category | Shares/Value | As‑of |
|---|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (common) | 33,786 shares | Record date Mar 3, 2025 |
| RSUs unvested | 18,270 sh; $431,720 (@$23.63) | 12/31/2024 |
| PSUs unearned (target) | 7,819 sh; $184,763 (@$23.63) | 12/31/2024 |
| Options (exercisable/unexercisable) | None | 12/31/2024 |
Vesting schedule (RSUs):
- 3,045 on 3/6/2025; 2,554 on 3/6/2026; 12,671 on 3/6/2027 .
PSUs: 2024–2026 tranche vests/pays after 2026 subject to EPS/RONA results and TSR modifier .
Ownership guideline and compliance runway:
- CEO guideline 3x base salary; 5‑year compliance window for newly appointed executives .
Employment Terms (Key Provisions Summary)
| Term | Provision |
|---|---|
| Base/bonus/LTI | $700k base; AIP target ≥100% of base; LTI target 160% of base |
| Severance (no CoC) | 12 months base + target bonus, paid over 12 months; release required |
| Severance (CoC double trigger) | 1.75x (base + target bonus) lump sum within 60 days; release required; 24‑month CoC protection window |
| COBRA/Benefits | Up to 18 months at employee cost after termination (varies by scenario) |
| 280G | Best‑net cutback ordering; no excise tax gross‑up |
| Restrictive covenants | Separate Confidentiality and Noncompetition Agreement remains in effect |
| Dispute resolution | Binding AAA employment arbitration; Company pays arbitrator fees |
Investment Implications
- Alignment and incentives: CEO package meaningfully increases at‑risk pay (AIP 100%; LTI 160%), with PSUs tied to EPS, RONA, and relative TSR, reinforcing multi‑year value creation levers (profitability, asset efficiency, stock performance) .
- Near‑term supply overhang: RSU vesting cadence in March 2025/2026/2027 and a sizeable special grant vesting by March 2027 could introduce periodic selling pressure absent 10b5‑1 plans or retention choices; PSUs defer to post‑2026, creating longer‑dated alignment .
- Governance risk moderated: Separation of Chair/CEO roles, an empowered Lead Independent Director, clawback, no single‑trigger CoC, and 280G cutback reduce governance and parachute risk perception .
- Ownership: Direct ownership is modest (~0.15% of outstanding), but stock ownership guidelines (3x base) and multi‑year equity mix provide a path to greater “skin in the game” over the five‑year compliance window .
- Execution lens: 2024 results showed improved Adjusted EBITDA ($79.3m) and Net Income ($56.2m), but five‑year TSR underperformed the small‑cap peer benchmark; the AIP metric changes and PSU TSR modifier indicate a programmatic response to drive improved relative performance under the new CEO .
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