Benjamin Coues
About Benjamin Coues
Benjamin P. Coues is Senior Vice President and Head of Acquisitions at Plymouth Industrial REIT, responsible for all acquisition activity across the platform; he joined Plymouth in 2019 and has over 30 years of commercial real estate experience across acquisitions, dispositions, portfolio management, and valuation . He holds a B.A. from the University of Colorado Boulder . Plymouth’s recent operating performance includes Core FFO per share of $1.83 in 2024, same‑store cash NOI growth of 4.1%, 92.3% occupancy at year‑end, and Net Debt plus Preferred over Adjusted EBITDA of 6.0x, providing the backdrop for acquisition execution and pay-for-performance alignment at the company . Company TSR tracked to a value of $124.15 on a $100 base in 2024 versus $160.34 in 2023, illustrating the volatility Coues has operated through .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| High Street Logistics Properties | Senior Vice President of Acquisitions | 2004–2009 | Acquired over $125M of income-producing industrial property along the East Coast and Midwest . |
| High Street Logistics Properties | Managing Director/Principal | 2009–2013 | Led workout/repositioning and resolution of distressed investments during the recession . |
| High Street Logistics Properties | Chief Operating Officer/Principal | 2013–2018 | Oversaw a $1.3B, 15M sq ft industrial portfolio across the eastern U.S. . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | No external board or public company roles disclosed . |
Fixed Compensation
No individual compensation details for Mr. Coues are disclosed in Plymouth’s proxy statements (NEO disclosure covers CEO, President/CFO, and EVP Asset Management only) . Company policies relevant to executives include market-median base salary targeting, annual review, and adjustments based on performance and responsibilities .
| Policy Element | Company Practice |
|---|---|
| Base salary positioning | Targeted around peer median; reviewed annually with adjustments for performance and responsibilities . |
| Perquisites | Executives generally receive standard health, welfare, and retirement benefits; excessive personal benefits are not provided . |
| Clawback | Board can claw back incentive compensation in the event of accounting restatement . |
Performance Compensation
Plymouth’s incentive design (for NEOs) emphasizes formulaic annual cash metrics and long-term performance-based RSUs (PSUs) using absolute and relative TSR hurdles; while Mr. Coues’ participation is not disclosed, these programs frame company-wide pay-for-performance .
| Component | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Cash (2023 NEO program) | Core FFO per Share | 12.5% | $1.85 | $1.84 | Applied 108% overall based on metric achievement and discretionary assessment . | Paid annually . |
| Annual Cash (2023 NEO program) | Net Debt to EBITDA | 12.5% | 7.0x | 6.5x | 108% overall . | Paid annually . |
| Annual Cash (2023 NEO program) | SS Cash NOI Growth | 12.5% | 7.50% | 7.56% | 108% overall . | Paid annually . |
| Annual Cash (2023 NEO program) | G&A as % of Cash NOI | 12.5% | 11.70% | 11.11% | 108% overall . | Paid annually . |
| PSU (2024–2026 cycle) | 3‑Year Relative TSR vs. MSCI US REIT | 65% | Index return at target; -1,200 bps at threshold; +1,200 bps at max | In‑cycle tracking as of 12/31/24 projected 0% payout (illustrative) . | 50–200% of target based on results . | Cliff vest end of 3‑year period . |
| PSU (2024–2026 cycle) | 3‑Year Absolute TSR | 35% | 30% at target; 21% at threshold; 39% at max | In‑cycle tracking as of 12/31/24 projected 0% payout (illustrative) . | 50–200% of target based on results . | Cliff vest end of 3‑year period . |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (as of 4/23/2025) | Executive officers and directors as a group: 750,815 shares, 1.6% of outstanding; individual holdings for Mr. Coues not disclosed . |
| Shares outstanding reference | 45,547,898 shares outstanding as of 4/23/2025 . |
| Hedging/pledging | Company prohibits executives and directors from hedging and pledging (including margin accounts), enhancing alignment . |
| Stock ownership guidelines | Adopted April 2025: CEO 5x base salary, other NEOs 3x; guideline multiples for non‑NEO SVPs like Mr. Coues are not specified . |
Employment Terms
Specific employment agreement terms for Mr. Coues are not disclosed. Company-wide constructs include employment agreements for key executives and robust change‑in‑control (CIC) and severance frameworks for NEOs .
- Employment agreements: Company has agreements for CEO, Managing Director, CFO, and EVP Asset Management with base salaries between $350k–$650k and discretionary cash/stock awards, plus termination/severance provisions; no Coues agreement is detailed in filings .
- CIC/Severance (NEOs): CEO 2.5x; other NEOs 2.0x of salary + average bonus + average equity; accelerated vesting; 18 months healthcare; “best pay cap” to avoid 280G excise tax inefficiency .
- Merger treatment: Under the October 2025 Merger Agreement, outstanding equity awards and employee benefits will be treated per merger terms; OP unit holders receive $22 cash per unit; warrants with strikes ≥$22 become worthless at close; closing targeted for early 2026 subject to conditions and shareholder approval .
Performance & Track Record
| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Company TSR – $100 initial | $88.23 | $195.57 | $122.70 | $160.34 | $124.15 |
| Core FFO per Share | $1.86 | $1.71 | $1.83 | $1.84 | $1.83 |
| Net Income ($mm) | $(14.462) | $(15.267) | $(17.096) | $13.807 | $142.367 |
Additional 2024 operating achievements: same‑store cash NOI growth 4.1%; 92.3% occupancy; rent collection 99%; executed $250M strategic partnership with Sixth Street to fund growth leverage‑neutral .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and structure: Strong emphasis on performance-based awards (PSUs) with absolute and relative TSR hurdles; time-based RSUs vest over 4 years to support retention; no stock option grants to NEOs in 2024, reducing repricing risk .
- Annual cash metrics: Balanced scorecard featuring Core FFO/share, leverage (Net Debt to EBITDA), SS Cash NOI Growth, and G&A efficiency; weighting increased to 60% for objective metrics in 2024, signaling stricter pay-performance linkage .
- Governance safeguards: Independent compensation committee; clawback policy; peer benchmarking at median; prohibition on hedging/pledging to protect alignment .
Related Party Transactions and Legal/Red Flags
- Related party transactions: Reviewed under a written policy by the Nominating & Corporate Governance Committee; executive agreements described in proxy; no specific related party dealings for Mr. Coues disclosed .
- Legal proceedings: Company disclosed no current legal proceedings involving directors or executive officers; Mr. Coues not explicitly covered in that disclosure .
- Merger litigation risk: Shareholder attorneys announced investigations into adequacy of price/process in the proposed $22/share sale to Makarora/Ares, typical in REIT take-privates .
Investment Implications
- Execution capability: Coues’ track record managing and acquiring large industrial portfolios, including $125M of acquisitions and oversight of a $1.3B/15M sq ft platform, supports disciplined underwriting and integration in industrial assets .
- Alignment and selling pressure: Anti‑hedging/pledging policies improve alignment; lack of Form 4 detail for Mr. Coues limits visibility into insider selling pressure. PSU hurdles currently tracking to 0% payout as of 12/31/24 suggest rigorous performance thresholds and limited windfalls absent durable TSR outperformance .
- Retention risk: Individual compensation and severance terms for Mr. Coues are not disclosed, constraining assessment of retention economics; company’s broader CIC/severance framework for NEOs indicates potential acceleration at close, but Coues‑specific treatment is unknown .
- Deal dynamics: The pending $22/share take‑private includes specific treatments for OP units and warrants and standard equity award provisions; closing timing and final equity award outcomes may influence executive retention incentives post‑transaction .