James Connolly
About James Connolly
James M. Connolly (age 62) is Executive Vice President/Asset Management at Plymouth Industrial REIT, responsible for overseeing operating activities across the property portfolio; he has served as Director of Asset Management since May 2011 and previously held senior global real estate roles at Nortel, Bay Networks, and Raytheon . He holds a BSBA from the University of Massachusetts and an MBA in Real Estate Financial Management from Northeastern University and is a member of NAIOP and other real estate organizations . Company performance metrics used in executive pay assessments include TSR and Core FFO/share; in 2024, the value of a $100 investment in PLYM was $124.15 vs. $123.47 for the MSCI US REIT Index peer group, with Net Income of $142.367 million and Core FFO/share of $1.83 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nortel Corporation | Global Leader Real Estate Asset Management | 1998–Dec 2003 | Led asset, property, and facilities management across global office, industrial, and distribution portfolios; managed internal/external teams globally . |
| Nortel Corporation | Director of Real Estate Finance | Jan 2004–Dec 2008 | Directed real estate finance across the portfolio . |
| Nortel Corporation | Director of Real Estate (EMEA) | Dec 2008–Mar 2009 | Oversaw EMEA real estate operations . |
| Nortel Corporation | Director of Real Estate Asset Management | Apr 2009–May 2011 | Led asset management functions across the global portfolio . |
| Bay Networks | Facilities Finance & Property Administration | 1996–1998 | Finance and property administration responsibilities . |
| Raytheon | Facilities Finance & Property Administration | 1986–1996 | Finance and property administration responsibilities . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| NAIOP | Member | N/A | Member of several real estate organizations including NAIOP . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | 300,000 | 300,000 | 343,750 |
| Stock Awards ($) | 239,982 | 623,987 | 649,989 |
| Non-Equity Incentive ($) | 200,000 | 215,475 | 155,000 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 45,518 | 40,518 | 55,794 |
| Total ($) | 785,500 | 1,179,980 | 1,204,533 |
| Employment Agreement Target Bonus % of Base | 100% | 100% | 100% |
Performance Compensation
2024 Cash Incentive Program – Metrics, Targets, and Outcomes
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout Mechanics |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Core FFO per Share | 15% | $1.88 | $1.90 | $1.92 | $1.83 | Linear interpolation; no payout below threshold . |
| Net Debt + Preferred to Adj. EBITDA | 15% | 7.30x | 7.00x | 6.80x | 6.0x | Linear interpolation . |
| Same-Store Cash NOI Growth | 15% | 7.00% | 7.25% | 7.50% | 4.10% | Linear interpolation . |
| G&A as % of Cash NOI | 15% | 11.25% | 11.00% | 10.75% | 10.40% | Linear interpolation . |
| Discretionary: Overall Company/Individual | 40% | See program | See program | See program | See program | Committee limited payouts to ≤ target given short-term pressure . |
| Individual Outcome | 2024 Target Cash Incentive | 2024 Cash Incentive Paid | Payout as % of Target |
|---|---|---|---|
| James M. Connolly | $200,000 | $155,000 | 77.5% |
Long-Term Equity Incentive Structure and Awards
- Structure: 50% time-based restricted stock (4-year ratable vesting), 50% performance-based RSUs granted to motivate sustained long-term performance .
- Performance PSU framework: Earned 50%–200% of target over a 3-year period based on TSR—65% weight on 3-year relative TSR vs. MSCI US REIT Index (threshold −1,200 bps, target index return, max +1,200 bps), 35% weight on 3-year absolute TSR (threshold 21%, target 30%, max 39%); straight-line interpolation, zero payout below threshold .
| Award | Grant Date | Number | Fair Value per Unit/Share | Grant Date Fair Value | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Time-Based Restricted Shares (2024 program) | Feb 14, 2024 | 14,774 | $21.93 | Included in $649,989 2024 stock awards | 4 equal annual installments, starting first anniversary of grant . |
| Performance Units (2024 program) | Apr 15, 2024 | 15,900 | $20.44 (probable outcome via Monte Carlo) | $324,996 | Vest Dec 31, 2026, subject to TSR hurdles . |
| Max Potential Value for 2024 PSUs | Apr 15, 2024 | — | — | $649,992 (at max performance) | — |
| Time-Based Restricted Shares (granted for 2024 performance) | Feb 14, 2025 | 19,484 | — | $324,993 | 4 equal annual installments beginning Feb 14 following grant . |
Status: As of Dec 31, 2024, in-cycle performance-based equity awards tracked to earn no payout, illustrating rigorous performance hurdles and pay-for-performance alignment . Company reported no stock options outstanding and none granted during 2024 .
2024 Stock Vested
| Name | Shares Acquired on Vesting | Value Realized on Vesting ($) |
|---|---|---|
| James M. Connolly | 11,644 | $255,353 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total Beneficial Ownership | 97,218 shares; <1% of outstanding shares (45,547,898 shares outstanding as of Apr 23, 2025) . |
| Unvested Restricted Stock (12/31/2024) | 38,043 shares; market value $677,165 (at $17.80 closing price on 12/31/2024) . |
| Performance Units (in-cycle) | Tracking to 0% payout as of 12/31/2024; 2023 PSUs vest 12/31/2025; 2024 PSUs vest 12/31/2026 (subject to TSR hurdles) . |
| Options | None outstanding; none granted in 2024 . |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | Adopted Apr 2025: NEOs required to hold ≥3x base salary in shares within five years; until met, 50% of any equity awards cannot be sold except for tax settlement . |
| Hedging & Pledging | Prohibited; directors/officers may not hold Company securities in margin accounts or pledge them as loan collateral . |
Employment Terms
| Term | Provision |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | Executed Sept 2021; automatically extends for successive one-year periods; initial term ended Dec 31, 2024 . |
| Target Annual Cash Incentive | Target amount equal to 100% of base salary per employment agreement; actual targets set by Compensation Committee (2024 target cash incentive $200,000) . |
| Termination (without cause / good reason / company non-renewal) | Severance equals 2x the sum of (1) current base salary, (2) average annual bonus for prior two fiscal years (use target if fewer than two years), and (3) average value of annual equity awards for prior two fiscal years (excluding specified initial/non-recurring awards); paid over 12 months; accelerated vesting of all outstanding equity awards; company-paid continuation healthcare for 18 months; subject to release . |
| Change in Control Severance | If terminated other than for cause or resign for good reason post-CIC (or terminated without cause in anticipation of CIC): 2x the same compensation+equity-average formula; accelerated vesting of equity awards and nonqualified deferred compensation; 18 months of healthcare; subject to “best pay cap” to optimize net after-tax value vs. excise tax under IRC §4999 . |
| Quantified Severance (as disclosed) | Without Cause/Good Reason/Non-Renewal: $2,344,451; Accelerated Equity Awards: $677,165; Medical Premiums: $56,322 . |
| Quantified CIC Benefits (as disclosed) | Change of Control: $2,344,451; Accelerated Equity Awards: $677,165; Medical Premiums: $56,322 . |
| Death/Disability | Accelerated vesting of all outstanding equity awards . |
| Non-Solicit | 12 months post-employment; confidentiality provisions included . |
| Clawback | Incentive-Based Compensation Recoupment Policy adopted Oct 31, 2023; covers cash/equity incentive awards received during the prior three completed fiscal years if a restatement is required; Compensation Committee will recoup erroneously awarded incentive compensation . |
Performance & Track Record (Company-level context used in pay-versus-performance)
| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Value of $100 Investment – PLYM TSR ($) | 88.23 | 195.57 | 122.70 | 160.34 | 124.15 |
| Value of $100 Investment – MSCI US REIT Index TSR ($) | 92.43 | 132.23 | 99.82 | 113.54 | 123.47 |
| Net Income ($mm) | (14.462) | (15.267) | (17.096) | 13.807 | 142.367 |
| Core FFO per Share ($) | 1.86 | 1.71 | 1.83 | 1.84 | 1.83 |
Compensation Committee & Peer Benchmarking
- Peer group targeted at the median; 2024 peer group unchanged from 2023, constructed so PLYM approximates median size; PLYM ranked ~44% percentile on total capitalization and ~42% on implied equity market cap vs. peers (as of 12/31/2024) .
- Governance practices include prohibition of hedging/pledging, clawback enablement, independent Compensation Committee, and stock ownership requirements (CEO 5x salary; other NEOs 3x) .
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2025 advisory vote on executive compensation: For 35,738,777; Against 595,019; Abstain 98,703; Broker non-votes 2,601,762—indicating strong support for the compensation program .
- Advisory vote frequency: Shareholders favored annual votes (34,994,012 “1 year”) .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment appears rigorous: in-cycle PSUs are tracking to zero payout through 12/31/2024 under TSR hurdles, reducing windfall risk and aligning equity payouts with shareholder outcomes .
- Retention vs. selling pressure: Connolly has material unvested restricted stock (38,043 shares; $677,165 market value at 12/31/2024) with four-year ratable vesting, which supports retention; vested awards in 2024 (11,644 shares; $255,353) suggest periodic supply from tax settlement and vesting, though pledging/margin use is prohibited, which limits leverage-related forced sales .
- Severance/change-of-control economics: Double-trigger-style CIC agreements (no single-trigger benefits per governance policy) with 2x multiples, accelerated vesting, and best-pay cap mitigate 280G excise tax drag; quantified severance/CIC amounts for Connolly are disclosed, implying moderate retention protections without excessive parachute risk .
- Ownership alignment: Beneficial ownership is <1%; stock ownership guidelines (3x salary for NEOs) with sale restrictions until compliance bolster alignment; clawback adoption adds downside accountability for incentive awards tied to restated results .