Patrick NJ Schnegelsberg
About Patrick NJ Schnegelsberg
Patrick NJ Schnegelsberg (age 61) is Chief Executive Officer and a Director of Picard Medical, Inc. (PMI). He previously served as CEO of Syntach AB (Dec 2022–Jul 2023) and held COO/CEO roles at Occlutech Group (2012–2021), with prior director-level roles on Wall Street; he conducted research at MIT and graduated from Harvard Medical School and Clark University . He joined PMI as CEO on July 5, 2023 . Company performance during 2025 shows revenue of $3.93M for the nine months ended Sept 30, 2025 vs $3.56M in 2024 (+11% YoY) and a net loss of $22.71M vs $12.22M, reflecting higher other expenses tied to convertible note accounting .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Syntach AB | Chief Executive Officer | 2022–2023 | Executive leadership in medtech |
| Occlutech Group & subsidiaries | Chief Operating Officer; Chief Executive Officer | 2012–2021 | Executive leadership in medtech |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years |
|---|---|---|
| Acorai AB | Independent Chairman, Advisory Board | N/A |
| Scandinavian Real Heart | Former Board Member | N/A |
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Target Bonus (%) | Target Bonus ($) | Actual Bonus Paid ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 400,000 | 50% | 200,000 | 0 (none reported for 2024) |
Performance Compensation
| Incentive | Metric(s) | Weighting | Target | Actual Payout | Vesting/Timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Cash Bonus (2024) | Financial and operating performance metrics (not specified) | N/A | $200,000 | $0 (none reported) | Annual (2024 performance year) |
Equity Awards (Options) – Structure, Sizing, and Vesting
| Award Type | Grant Date | Shares Granted | Vesting Commencement | Cliff/Installments | Vested (12/31/2024) | Vested (3/31/2025) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Options (ISO) | 2024-06-28 | 1,104,871 | 2023-07-05 | 25% after 1 year from vesting commencement; then equal monthly over 36 months | 391,308 | 460,362 |
Notes:
- Exercise price and expiration date for the 2024 grant were not disclosed in retrieved filings specific to Mr. Schnegelsberg; company-wide options had a weighted average exercise price of $0.66 as of 9/30/2025 .
- The Amended and Restated 2021 Equity Incentive Plan permits acceleration or other treatment of awards at a Change of Control at the plan administrator’s discretion . The S-1 discloses a specific acceleration construct for “2022 Options”; Mr. Schnegelsberg’s 2024 options are governed by standard plan terms (no separate cash CIC benefit disclosed) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (common shares) | 0 shares; 0.00% as of Sept 26, 2025 (all named directors/executives listed at 0%) |
| Outstanding option grant | 1,104,871 options (grant 6/28/2024) |
| Vested options | 391,308 as of 12/31/2024 ; 460,362 as of 3/31/2025 |
| Ownership guidelines | Not disclosed in retrieved filings |
| Pledging/Hedging | Not disclosed; plan includes transfer restrictions (Right of First Refusal) and Market Standoff provisions |
| Lock-up post-IPO | 6-month lock-up for officers/directors following the Sept 2, 2025 IPO |
| Clawback | Plan includes recoupment subject to stock exchange/Dodd-Frank requirements |
Implication: Near-term insider selling pressure is structurally limited by the 6-month IPO lock-up and plan transfer/market standoff provisions .
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Current role start | CEO since July 5, 2023 |
| Severance | None disclosed for CEO; filings state NEOs (other than a Teo severance) are not eligible for termination or CIC payments |
| Change-in-control (cash) | None disclosed for CEO; no CIC cash multiple |
| Equity treatment at CIC | Plan administrator may assume, substitute, accelerate vesting, lapse repurchase rights, cancel for consideration, or pay spread; treatment may differ by grant |
| Clawback | Awards subject to clawback per listing/Dodd-Frank |
| Non-compete / non-solicit | Not disclosed |
| Lock-up | 6 months post-IPO |
Board Governance (Director Service)
| Attribute | Detail |
|---|---|
| Role | Director (also CEO) |
| Committee memberships | Not disclosed in retrieved filings |
| Independence | Company is a “controlled company” post-IPO (Hunniwell controls ~54.8%); intends to rely on NYSE American controlled-company exemptions |
| Board service start | CEO joined July 5, 2023; director service disclosed without a separate start date |
| Director compensation | Non-employee director compensation policy anticipated post-IPO; amounts not yet determined |
Dual-role implications: As a controlled company with a CEO serving on the board, PMI may rely on governance exemptions that reduce independent oversight versus non-controlled peers .
Company Performance Context (during Schnegelsberg’s tenure)
| Metric | 9M 2024 | 9M 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($000s) | 3,555 | 3,931 |
| Gross loss ($000s) | (248) | (615) |
| Operating loss ($000s) | (10,140) | (10,254) |
| Net loss ($000s) | (12,217) | (22,711) |
Notes: 2025 net loss reflects higher “other expense” driven by derivative accounting and debt discount amortization around convertible notes/IPO conversion .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags (for incentive alignment and execution risk)
- Going concern: Substantial doubt about continuing as a going concern; operations funded via equity/debt; IPO proceeds provide run-way but further capital likely needed .
- Material weaknesses in ICFR: Lack of segregation of duties, formal review processes, controls over related-party transactions; remediation in progress .
- Controlled company governance: Reliance on NYSE American controlled company exemptions reduces mandatory independent oversight .
- Customer concentration: In 9M’25, Customer A represented 49% of revenue; Serbia accounted for 12% of total revenue .
- Beneficial ownership alignment: Executives reported 0% beneficial ownership as of 9/26/25; equity alignment primarily via options, not common shares .
- Regulatory/compliance backdrop: EU CE mark withdrawn in 2022; MDR pathway planned; U.S. plan amendments for equity; product field notices disclosed historically –.
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Cash vs equity mix: 2024 reported cash compensation only (no bonus paid); large option grant in 2024 adds long-term equity exposure (four-year vest) .
- Performance-based pay: Target bonus established at 50% of base with financial/operational metrics but no 2024 payout disclosed; metrics not detailed .
- Change-in-control protection: No CEO-specific severance or CIC cash multiple disclosed; equity subject to plan-level discretionary treatment, which can be shareholder-friendly if not guaranteed .
- Clawback and transfer limits: Plan-level clawback, right of first refusal, and market standoff provisions mitigate misconduct risk and short-term selling .
Director Compensation (for governance quality)
- Non-employee director compensation to be implemented post-IPO; specifics not yet determined .
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- Not applicable; newly public in September 2025 (limited proxy history; no say-on-pay results disclosed) .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Equity grant scale and four-year vesting create long-term exposure; however, executives reported no beneficial ownership of common stock as of 9/26/25, so alignment is largely via options rather than current share ownership .
- Retention risk: No disclosed CEO severance or CIC cash protections; options vest monthly after a one-year cliff (commenced 7/5/2023), which supports retention through 2027 but leaves limited downside protection in adverse scenarios .
- Near-term selling pressure: IPO lock-up and plan transfer/market standoff provisions limit insider sales for six months post-IPO, reducing immediate overhang .
- Execution risk: Going-concern uncertainty, material control weaknesses, and revenue concentration heighten operational risk; regulatory milestones (e.g., MDR CE mark, U.S. indication expansions) are pivotal for value creation –.
- Governance: Controlled company status can limit independent oversight; dual CEO-Director role without disclosed committee structures increases reliance on majority shareholder stewardship .