Dean Del Vecchio
Executive Vice President and Chief Technology & Innovation Officer at PPL
Executive
About Dean Del Vecchio
Dean A. Del Vecchio is Executive Vice President and Chief Technology & Innovation Officer (CTIO) at PPL, appointed effective February 19, 2024 to lead a newly created function central to PPL’s “utility of the future” strategy focused on advanced technology and digitalization . Under the broader leadership team, PPL delivered 2024 ongoing EPS of $1.69, up ~7% vs the midpoint of the 2023 target, raised the dividend >7%, and saw its stock price increase nearly 20% in 2024; incentive plans reference relative TSR, earnings growth, and long-term sustainability metrics as core performance levers .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 Amount / Metric |
|---|---|
| SCT Salary (paid during 2024) | $550,000 |
| Base Salary used for incentive calculation | $650,000 |
| Target Annual Bonus (% of Salary) | 85% |
| Corporate EPS “funding gate” | $1.60 |
| Earned Annual Cash Incentive (% of target) | 114.62% |
| Earned Annual Cash Incentive ($) | $633,276 |
| All Other Compensation (perquisites and benefits) | $57,709 |
Breakdown of All Other Compensation (per SCT):
- 401(k) match: $2,250
- 401(k) fixed contribution: $10,350
- Nonqualified DC employer contributions: $6,150
- Financial planning/tax prep: $10,000
- Other (personal use of company car and residential security system): $28,959
Performance Compensation
Annual cash incentive formula and 2024 outcome
| Component | Weight | 2024 Result Factor | 2024 Earned Award |
|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate Financial Performance (EPS) | 65% | 100% | |
| Corporate Strategic Initiatives | 15% | 166.54% | |
| Corporate Operational Performance | 10% | 96.44% | |
| Individual Performance | 10% | 150% | |
| Total | 100% | 114.62% of target |
Long-term equity awards granted in 2024
| Award | Grant Date | Target Value ($) | Units | Vesting / Performance Period |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual LTI – Total | 2/19/2024 | $1,300,000 | 3-year performance/vesting | |
| Annual LTI – RSUs (20%) | 2/19/2024 | $260,000 | 9,760 units (at $26.64) | Time-based; restrictions lapse 3 years after grant |
| Annual LTI – Performance Units (80%) | 2/19/2024 | $1,040,000 | TSR: 19,520; EG: 9,760; LTS: 9,760 | 2024–2026; payout 0–200% based on metrics |
| Sign-on Equity – RSUs (75%) | 2/19/2024 | $750,000 | 28,153 units (at $26.64) | Time-based; restrictions lapse 3 years after grant |
| Sign-on Equity – Performance Units (25%) | 2/19/2024 | $250,000 | TSR: 4,693; EG: 2,347; LTS: 2,347 | 2024–2026; payout 0–200% based on metrics |
Performance unit metrics and weights for 2024 grants:
- TSR (relative to UTY and compensation peer group): 50%
- Earnings Growth (EG): 25% (3-year CAGR from 2024 guidance mid-point to actual)
- Long-term Sustainability (LTS): 25% (employee/contractor safety and building energy reduction targets with specified 0–200% thresholds)
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (incl. RSUs) | 47,642 (includes RSUs) |
| Unvested RSUs at 12/31/2024 | 38,929; market value $1,263,620 (at $32.46) |
| Unearned Performance Units (TSR) | 49,722; payout value $1,613,970 (at $32.46) |
| Unearned Performance Units (EG) | 24,862; payout value $807,018 (at $32.46) |
| Unearned Performance Units (LTS) | 24,862; payout value $807,018 (at $32.46) |
| Stock ownership guideline for EVPs | 3x base salary; attain within 5 years |
| Compliance status with guidelines | NEOs not yet at 5 years are on track (includes Del Vecchio) |
| Hedging/pledging policy | Anti-hedging and anti-pledging for officers and directors |
| Option grants | None; company does not currently grant options |
Vesting schedule and key dates:
- RSUs: restrictions lapse on third anniversary; Del Vecchio’s 2024 grants vest on February 19, 2027 (aggregate RSUs shown with dividend equivalents) .
- Performance Units: 3-year period ends December 31, 2026; Committee certifies results in early 2027; payout range 0–200% per metric .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Summary |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | PPL generally does not enter into employment agreements; NEOs are at-will |
| Executive Severance Plan (non-CIC) | If involuntary termination not for cause: 2 years base salary, lump-sum COBRA for 24 months, outplacement up to $50,000; release required |
| Change-in-control protection | Double-trigger CIC agreements (no tax gross-ups) |
| CIC cash severance formula | Lump-sum = 3x (base salary at termination or higher “good reason” salary + average annual bonus over last 3 years) |
| CIC other benefits | Lump-sum COBRA for 24 months; outplacement up to $50,000; certain post-retirement benefits if eligibility within 24 months |
| CIC equity treatment | RSUs: restrictions lapse (ICPKE at CIC; SIP upon termination within 24 months post-CIC); PUs: performance deemed concluded pre-CIC, pro rata vest at target with additional payout per agreement |
| Clawback policy | NYSE-compliant recoupment for erroneously awarded incentive comp after accounting restatements (3-year lookback); supplemental policy for VP+ |
Change-in-control economics (illustrative values as of 12/31/2024):
| Component | Amount |
|---|---|
| Cash severance (termination following CIC) | $3,849,828 |
| Other separation benefits (COBRA, outplacement est. PV) | $104,397 |
| RSUs immediate vest value | $1,263,620 |
| Accelerated PUs – TSR | $268,995 |
| Accelerated PUs – EG | $134,503 |
| Accelerated PUs – LTS | $134,503 |
Deferred Compensation
| Plan | Executive Contributions (2024) | Registrant Contributions (2024) | Aggregate Earnings (2024) | Aggregate Balance (12/31/2024) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PPL Executive Deferred Compensation Plan | $0 | $6,150 | $(77) | $6,073 |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Incentives tied to TSR, multi-year earnings growth, and sustainability KPIs provide balanced levers; 2024 annual bonus paid at 114.62% of target on strong execution across strategic and operational goals . Equity-heavy LTI with 80% in performance units supports longer-term value creation and mitigates near-term cash risk .
- Retention and selling pressure: Three-year cliff vesting on 2024 RSUs (vesting Feb 19, 2027) and performance certification in early 2027 create retention hooks; anti-hedging/anti-pledging policy reduces misalignment risks and limits leverage-based selling signals .
- Change-in-control economics: Double-trigger protection at market-consistent levels (3x salary+bonus) implies meaningful potential costs in a transaction; equity acceleration mechanics (RSUs and pro rata PUs at target) should be factored into deal modeling .
- Governance safeguards: Robust ownership guidelines (3x salary for EVPs), NYSE clawback, no tax gross-ups, and absence of employment contracts support investor-friendly posture; no related-party transactions disclosed and Section 16 compliance noted by exception (not involving Del Vecchio) .
Note: Past roles, education, and external directorships for Mr. Del Vecchio are not detailed in the latest proxy; sections are omitted per “skip items not disclosed.”