Lonnie Bellar
Executive Vice President-Engineering, Construction and Generation at PPL
Executive
About Lonnie Bellar
Lonnie E. Bellar is Executive Vice President–Engineering, Construction and Generation at PPL, effective April 4, 2025; he previously served as COO of LG&E and KU Energy and began his energy career in 1987 at Kentucky Utilities . In PPL’s 2024–2025 reorg, Bellar’s remit expanded to include enterprise engineering, construction services, energy supply/analysis, environmental compliance, and direct responsibility for Kentucky generation, reporting to the CEO . Company performance context for incentives: 2024 ongoing EPS was $1.69 (GAAP EPS $1.20), dividend growth >7%, and PPL’s stock rose nearly 20% in 2024, with O&M savings ~$130mm since 2021 and >$3B infrastructure investments executed .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| LG&E and KU Energy (subsidiary of PPL) | Chief Operating Officer | Not disclosed (prior to 2025) | Led operations and safety transformation; prepared fleet and grid modernization in Kentucky . |
| PPL Corporation | EVP–Engineering, Construction and Generation | Appointed April 4, 2025 | Enterprise engineering and construction, energy supply/analysis, environmental compliance; assumes responsibility for Kentucky generation fleet . |
| Kentucky Utilities | Early career entry | Began 1987 | Foundation in utility operations; career-long operational expertise . |
External Roles
No public external directorships disclosed for Bellar in company filings. Skip.
Fixed Compensation
Not disclosed for Bellar (not a 2024 NEO). Skip.
Performance Compensation
PPL’s LTI structure (applies to executives, including Bellar’s SIP grants) emphasizes performance-aligned equity.
| Metric | Weighting | Target Definition | Vesting/Measurement | 2022–2024 Payouts (NEO cohort) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Relative TSR | 50% of PSUs | 3-year TSR vs PHLX Utility Sector Index (UTY) and beginning 2024 vs compensation peer group | Vests at end of 3-year period (0–200%); dividends accrue as additional units | 157% of target for 2022–2024 awards . |
| Earnings Growth (EG) | 25% of PSUs | 3-year CAGR from mid-point of 2024 ongoing EPS guidance to actual ongoing EPS | 3-year measurement; cert in January after period ends | 146% of target for 2022–2024 awards . |
| Long-term Sustainability (LTS) | 25% of PSUs | 3-year performance on safety and building energy reduction | 3-year measurement; cert in January after period ends | 196% of target for 2022–2024 awards . |
| RSUs | 20% of LTI | Full-value shares; dividends accrue as RSUs | 3-year restriction period | Standard RSU terms (restricted for three years) . |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Stock ownership guidelines and anti-pledging/hedging create alignment and limit leverage risk.
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Executive ownership guideline | EVP level: 3x base salary (SVP: 2x) with five-year compliance period; if below threshold, no sales, retain vested equity net of tax, and PCC may deliver AIP as RSUs . |
| Anti-hedging/anti-pledging | Officers/directors prohibited from pledging, hedging, and trading derivatives of PPL stock . |
| Trading controls | Section 16 persons must preclear trades; generally trade only via approved 10b5‑1 plans; trading windows post-earnings; no short sales/options; shares custodied at Fidelity . |
Current beneficial ownership (Form 3 filed upon role change):
| Security | Amount | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Common Stock | 28,536 | Direct | Initial statement of beneficial ownership . |
| Stock Units (ICPKE) | 1,735 | Deferred units | Non-derivative equity under ICPKE . |
| Stock Units (SIP) | 2,106 | Deferred units | SIP stock units; time-based . |
| Stock Units (SIP) | 2,462 | Deferred units | SIP stock units; time-based . |
| Stock Units (SIP) | 318 | Deferred units | SIP stock units; time-based . |
| Stock Units (SIP) | 3,914 | Deferred units | SIP stock units; time-based . |
| Performance Units (SIP) | 2,278.669 | Contingent | Earn based on 3-yr relative performance ending 12/31/2026; determination Jan 2027 . |
Ownership as % of shares outstanding (direct common shares only): 28,536 / 738,294,081 ≈ 0.0039% .
Vesting/performance schedules (from Form 3 footnotes):
| Award | Units | Metric | Performance Period End | Determination |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Units (SIP) | 2,278.669 | Relative performance vs peer group | 12/31/2026 | PCC determination Jan 2027 . |
| Performance Units (SIP) | Not stated in Form 3 table (additional PSU grants) | Earnings Growth | 12/31/2027 | PCC determination Jan 2028 . |
| Performance Units (SIP) | Not stated in Form 3 table (additional PSU grants) | Long-term Sustainability | 12/31/2027 | PCC determination Jan 2028 . |
| Performance Units (SIP) | Not stated in Form 3 table (additional PSU grants) | Relative performance vs peer group | 12/31/2027 | PCC determination Jan 2028 . |
| RSUs (SIP) | Various stock units listed | Time-based | 3 years from grant | Restricted for three years; dividends accrue as RSUs . |
Employment Terms
Change-in-control protection and clawbacks reinforce retention and pay-for-performance.
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| CIC Severance Agreement (double-trigger) | Applies to Bellar per Q1 2025 10‑Q exhibit list . Benefits upon qualifying termination post‑CIC: lump sum equal to 3× (base salary + average annual bonus over last 3 FYs), lump sum COBRA equivalent for 24 months, payout of unpaid/prorated cash incentives based on actual performance, up to $50,000 outplacement, and certain post‑retirement benefits eligibility; automatic annual renewal; CIC definition includes board change, ≥30% ownership change, merger reducing control <70%, or sale of substantially all assets . |
| Clawback | NYSE-compliant clawback policy; recoup incentive comp in restatement scenarios per Board discretion . |
| Insider Trading Policy | Section 16/Restricted Persons trade via precleared 10b5‑1 plans; windows enforced; no pledging/hedging; confidentiality and tipping prohibitions . |
Performance & Track Record
| Company Performance Indicator | 2024 Detail |
|---|---|
| Ongoing EPS (non-GAAP) | $1.69; GAAP EPS $1.20 . |
| Dividend growth | >7% increase in 2024 . |
| Share price | ~20% increase in 2024; among best-performing regulated utilities . |
| O&M efficiency | Cumulative annual savings ~$130mm vs 2021 baseline . |
| Grid/generation investments | >$3B in 2024; retired Mill Creek Unit 1 (300 MW); commenced Mill Creek Unit 5 (640 MW NGCC; mid-2027 COD) . |
| Strategic growth | Hyperscale data center project: 400 MW campus in Louisville (first 130 MW expected Oct 2026), plus ~9 GW data center demand in Pennsylvania planning; positions for load growth and reliability . |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- High at-risk equity mix: Executive LTI is 80% performance units (TSR/EG/LTS) and 20% RSUs with 3-year restrictions, aligning pay with TSR, earnings growth and sustainability metrics .
- Strong ownership/behavioral guardrails: 3× salary ownership guideline for EVPs with forced retention if below target, and strict anti-pledging/hedging and 10b5‑1 trading controls mitigate forced selling pressure and leverage risks .
- CIC terms are competitive but shareholder-friendly: Double-trigger only, no tax gross‑ups, and standardized 3× cash multiple; clear definitions reduce disputes .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Hedging/pledging risk: Prohibited by policy for officers/directors—reduces misalignment risk .
- Related-party transactions: None disclosed for directors or executive officers in 2024 .
- Section 16 compliance: Company noted certain late/misfiled Forms 4 in 2024 for other executives due to technical issues; corrected—no specific issues noted for Bellar .
Compensation Committee & Governance
- PCC members (2025): Natica von Althann (Chair), Craig A. Rogerson, Phoebe A. Wood, Raja Rajamannar; all independent .
- Independent compensation consultant: FW Cook; annual market reviews; no conflicts .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: Bellar’s significant performance‑tied equity, ownership requirements, and double‑trigger CIC protection support retention and long‑term alignment; anti‑pledging/10b5‑1 rules reduce near‑term selling pressure .
- Execution leverage: His mandate over Kentucky generation and enterprise engineering aligns with major capital programs (Mill Creek NGCC, battery storage, solar, emissions controls) and load growth from data centers—KPIs in EG/LTS frameworks are directly under his span of control .
- Pay-for-performance signals: Recent PSU payouts above target (157% TSR; 146% EG; 196% LTS for 2022–2024) indicate strong operational delivery; future awards will hinge on sustaining TSR/EG amid regulatory and project execution risks .