Sign in

You're signed outSign in or to get full access.

Kevin Shook

President, Eastern Alliance Insurance Group at PROASSURANCEPROASSURANCE
Executive

About Kevin Shook

Kevin M. Shook is President of Eastern Alliance Insurance Group (ProAssurance’s Workers’ Compensation segment), promoted effective May 13, 2019 after serving as Eastern’s Executive Vice President and formerly its Chief Financial Officer . His annual incentive metrics are weighted toward consolidated non-GAAP operating results (40%), individual performance (30%), and Workers’ Compensation underwriting results (30%), with 2024 achievement at 134% of target for his role . Company performance in 2024 improved: consolidated combined ratio to 109.4%, non-GAAP operating income of $48.6M ($0.95 per diluted share), net investment income +11.7% to $141M, book value per share to $23.49, and net income of $52.7M ($1.03 per diluted share) .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Eastern Alliance Insurance Group (PRA subsidiary)Executive Vice President; formerly Chief Financial OfficerPre-2019 → 2019Promoted to President of Eastern; leadership transition in Workers’ Compensation segment
Eastern Alliance Insurance Group (PRA subsidiary)PresidentMay 13, 2019 → presentLeads Workers’ Compensation and Segregated Portfolio Cell Reinsurance segments

Fixed Compensation

Metric202220232024
Base Salary Paid ($)463,609 468,398 479,947
Annualized Base Salary at Year-End ($)469,650 (as of 4/1/2023) 469,650 (as of 4/1/2023) 483,740 (as of 4/1/2024)
Target Annual Incentive (% of Salary)90% 90% 90%
Non-Equity Incentive Paid ($)439,634 189,548 583,390
Other Compensation ($)45,616 52,103 55,165
Perquisites ($, included in Other)25,383 25,383 26,405

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive Mechanics (2024)

MetricWeightThresholdTargetMaximumActualCredit Achieved
Consolidated Non-GAAP Operating Results Improvement40%$10M $20–$40M $55M $68M 80%
Individual Performance (Workers’ Compensation)30%N/A N/A N/A 80% of target 24%
Underwriting Results Improvement (Workers’ Compensation)30%$3M $8–$18M $25M $12M 30%
Total Achievement134%

Equity Awards and Vesting

Award TypeGrant DateShares (Target)Grant Date Fair Value ($)Vesting Terms
Performance Shares (PSUs)2/22/20229,084 $225,000 3-year performance period; payable if criteria met; target paid upon death/disability; prorated on retirement/good reason with prior-year achievement
RSUs (LTI)2/22/20229,084 $225,000 Vest after 3 years or upon death/disability/good reason; cash+stock settlement equal to market value at vest
PSUs2/28/202311,941 $237,500 3-year performance period; same terms
RSUs (LTI)2/28/202311,941 $237,500 3-year time-based vest; same terms
PSUs5/23/202423,058 $335,956 3-year performance period; same terms
RSUs (LTI)5/23/202423,058 $335,959 3-year time-based vest; same terms

2022–24 PSU cycle paid 0% due to below-threshold TSR and CAGR in book value, eliminating LTI payouts for executives (including Shook) for that cycle .

Recent Vesting (Cash/Stock Settled)

EventShares VestedValue Realized ($)
2024 RSUs vested12,106 149,630
2023 RSUs vested6,116 121,647

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial Ownership (3/24/2025)39,027 shares; less than 1% of shares outstanding; excludes unvested RSUs/PSUs; no stock options outstanding
Unvested RSUs at FYE 20249,084 (2022 grant), 7,961 (2023 grant), 23,058 (2024 grant)
Target PSUs Unearned at FYE 20249,084 (2022 grant), 11,941 (2023 grant), 23,058 (2024 grant)
Stock Ownership GuidelinesPresidents of operating segments must hold 3× base salary; five-year compliance window; one-year holding period on stock awards; anti-hedging policy prohibits hedging transactions
OptionsNo executive officers hold unexercised stock options

Employment Terms

ProvisionTerms
Agreement TypeRelease and Severance Compensation Agreement, effective May 13, 2019
Severance (Involuntary w/o Cause or Good Reason)Cash severance equal to current base salary plus average annual incentive (prior 3 years)
Severance (After Change of Control)Double the above (salary + average incentive) under double-trigger (termination w/o cause or good reason post-CoC)
Non-Compete1–3 years tied to severance multiple; severance paid monthly during restricted period; payments cease if covenant breached
Tax Gross-UpNo new agreements with 280G/4999 excise tax gross-up; Shook’s agreement does not include gross-up (Lisenby’s legacy agreement does)
Equity Vesting on Termination/CoCRSUs vest at 3 years or accelerated upon change of control or specific terminations; PSUs pay at target on death/disability; prorated if retirement/good reason with prior-year achievement

Estimated Payments if Event Occurred 12/31/2024 (Illustrative from Proxy)

ScenarioCash Severance – Salary ($)Cash Severance – Avg Incentive ($)Equity Vesting ($)Deferred Comp ($)Medical ($)Outplacement ($)Total ($)
Retirement/Voluntary Termination480,239 157,705 637,944
Death/Disability1,339,390 157,705 1,497,095
Involuntary Termination483,740 404,191 157,705 29,162 10,000 1,084,798
Involuntary After Change of Control967,480 808,381 1,339,390 157,705 43,743 10,000 3,326,699
Change of Control (no termination)1,339,390 157,705 1,497,095

Deferred Compensation

Metric20232024
Executive Contributions ($)8,060 8,060
Company Contributions ($)6,920 8,060
Aggregate Earnings ($)24,993 20,056
Year-End Balance ($)193,334 229,510

Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • Historical say-on-pay favorable vote outcomes: 2020 87%, 2021 96%, 2022 97%, 2023 94%, 2024 85% .
  • 2025 Annual Meeting advisory approval of 2024 NEO compensation: For 38,143,958; Against 2,085,964; Abstain 39,841; 4,691,013 broker non-votes .
Proxy YearFavorable Vote (%)
202087
202196
202297
202394
202485

Additional Governance and Policies

  • Stock ownership guidelines: CEO 5× salary; CFO/GC/Presidents 3× salary; five-year compliance window; one-year minimum holding period on stock awards .
  • Anti-hedging policy prohibits employees/directors from hedging company stock .
  • Compensation governance practices: double-trigger severance, clawback on cash and equity, no stock option repricing, no tax gross-ups in new executive agreements .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment and pay-for-performance: Shook’s 2024 cash incentive was 120.6% of salary (earned 121% vs 90% target), reflecting strong improvement in consolidated operating results and WC underwriting performance; however, 2022–24 PSUs paid 0%, demonstrating long-term at-risk pay discipline and sensitivity to TSR/book value metrics .
  • Retention/CoC dynamics: Double-trigger severance (2× salary+average incentive) and accelerated vesting treatment for equity upon certain events could raise near-term retention costs if the pending acquisition closes, but supports stability through integration .
  • Insider selling pressure: Time-based RSUs vest on 3-year schedules with a mandated one-year holding period on stock awards, and anti-hedging restrictions reduce short-term sell pressure; options are not in use for executives, limiting forced exercises .
  • Segment execution: WC segment achieved target credit on underwriting results and contributed to consolidated non-GAAP improvement, with documented initiatives in systems, PPO/therapy networks, and AI tools—supportive of continued operating ratio focus in 2025 plan design .