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Martin Sjolund

President and Chief Executive Officer at PRA GROUPPRA GROUP
CEO
Executive
Board

About Martin Sjolund

Martin Sjolund, age 52, became President and CEO of PRA Group effective June 17, 2025, after leading PRA Group Europe since 2018; he previously served as COO–Europe (2015–2018) and Director of Group Strategy and Corporate Development in Europe following PRA’s 2014 acquisition of Aktiv Kapital, where he held the same role (2011–2014) . He holds an MBA from the University of Chicago and a BS in International Business from Georgetown University . Under management’s 2024 program, PRA highlighted record global portfolio purchases, double‑digit cash growth, and a strengthened capital structure; 2024 company metrics disclosed in the proxy’s Pay‑Versus‑Performance table included GAAP Net Income of $71M and Adjusted EBITDA of $1,138M . Prior to CEO appointment, the Board cited Sjolund’s European track record, including nearly $3B of portfolio investments, improved regional profitability, modernization of IT and analytics, and expansion into new markets .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
PRA GroupPresident & CEO2025–presentCEO appointment as part of planned succession; focus on long-term, profitable growth .
PRA Group EuropePresident2018–2025Led across 15 markets in Europe, Canada, Australia; oversaw nearly $3B of investments; improved profitability; modernized IT/analytics; expanded into two new markets .
PRA Group EuropeChief Operating Officer2015–2018Oversight of Europe collections operations .
PRA Group (post Aktiv Kapital acquisition)Director – Group Strategy & Corporate Development (Europe)2014–2015Continued European strategy/corp dev integration post-acquisition .
Aktiv KapitalDirector – Group Strategy & Corporate Development (Europe)2011–2014Led strategy and corporate development prior to PRA acquisition .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
McKinsey & Company (Singapore, London)Management Consultantn/aEarly career consulting roles; prior leadership in global technology companies (not named) .

Fixed Compensation

YearBase Salary (USD)Notes
2024$486,800Salary converted from GBP at £1=$1.2511; unchanged vs 2023 .
2025n/aAs of Apr 7, 2025, no new CEO compensation determinations disclosed; prior terms continue .

Performance Compensation

  • Annual Bonus (Short‑Term Incentive) design (company wide for NEOs in 2024): metrics and weightings below. For Sjolund, target and payout shown.
MetricWeight2024 Target2024 Actual/OutcomePayout factor
Net Income (as adjusted)50%$71M$75M125% .
Adjusted EBITDA30%$1,260M$1,147M78% .
Strategic Objectives20%QualitativeSignificantly exceeded expectations150% .
Executive2024 Bonus Target (USD)2024 Bonus Paid (USD)Paid as % of Target
Martin Sjolund$486,800$584,160120% .
  • Long‑Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) – 2024 Grants to Sjolund:
    • Mix: 50% PSUs, 50% RSUs; RSUs vest ratably over three years; PSUs cliff‑vest after 3‑year performance period (2024–2026) based on Adjusted EBITDA, ROATE, and Relative TSR .
    • One‑time retention RSU (supporting leadership continuity): vests 100% on March 7, 2026 .
Grant dateInstrumentUnitsFair value (USD)Vesting
Mar 7, 2024PSUs (target)24,694$625,005Performance 2024–2026; cliff vest based on metrics .
Mar 7, 2024RSUs24,693$624,9801/3 per year over 3 years .
Mar 7, 2024RSUs (Retention)3,951$100,000100% on Mar 7, 2026 .
  • 2022 LTIP performance (companywide result for 2022–2024 cycle): PSUs earned at 23% of target; illustrates historical pay‑for‑performance calibration .

PSU Metric Framework (2024 LTIP)

MetricDescriptionPayout curve (illustrative points)
Adjusted EBITDA (3‑yr cumulative)Non‑GAAP operating performance measure as defined; excludes FX, certain items .<80% target=0%; 100%=100%; 125%+=200% (linear interpolation) .
Relative TSR (vs. S&P SmallCap 600 Financials)30‑day and 90‑day averaging conventions at start/end .<30th pct=0%; 50th=100%; 90th+=200% (linear interpolation) .
ROATE (3‑yr avg)Net income over average tangible equity (as defined) .<80% target=0%; 100%=100%; 125%+=200% (linear interpolation) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Beneficial ownership (as of Apr 21, 2025): 60,142 shares; less than 1% of shares outstanding .
  • Outstanding unvested awards at 12/31/2024 for Sjolund:
    • Unvested RSUs: 3/7/2022: 3,341 ($69,793); 3/7/2023: 7,234 ($151,118); 3/7/2024: 24,693 ($515,837); 3/7/2024 retention: 3,951 ($82,536) .
    • Unearned PSUs (target): 3/7/2022: 10,022 ($209,360); 3/7/2023: 10,851 ($226,677); 3/7/2024: 24,694 ($515,858) .
  • Ownership guidelines: CEO 5x base salary; other executive officers 3x. Newly promoted executives have five years to comply; committee may require holding 50% of net shares until compliant . (In 2024 proxy, Sjolund was previously on a three‑year path for the then‑role; he was “on track” as of year‑end 2023) .
  • Hedging and pledging: Prohibited for directors, officers, and employees .

Vesting calendar indicators (potential selling pressure mitigants):

  • Annual RSU tranches from the Mar 7, 2024 grant vest on Mar 7 of 2025/2026/2027; retention RSU vests Mar 7, 2026; earlier RSUs from 2022/2023 vest on their anniversaries (1/3 per year), subject to holding requirements under ownership guidelines .

Employment Terms

ProvisionKey terms
Employment agreement (pre‑CEO terms)Provides salary, bonus, and specified severance benefits upon termination for any reason for 6 months unless breach/misconduct; no excise tax gross‑ups .
Severance multiples (illustrative values at 12/31/2024)Involuntary termination (no CIC): Base salary severance $240,608; no bonus severance; no benefits shown .
Change‑in‑control (double‑trigger)Equity awards accelerate upon CIC plus qualifying termination within 6 months before or 24 months after CIC; equity value for Sjolund under CIC termination scenario estimated at $1,771,180 at $20.89/share (12/31/2024) .
ClawbackExecutive incentive compensation subject to recovery under SEC/Nasdaq‑compliant clawback policy .
Non‑compete/solicit/confidentialityEnforced via employment and equity award agreements (company‑favorable restrictive covenants) .

Board Governance

  • Board service: Sjolund was appointed to the PRA Group Board upon assuming the CEO role on June 17, 2025; he is not independent as an executive director . Board committees consist solely of independent directors; executive directors do not serve on committees .
  • Dual‑role implications: PRA separates the roles of Executive Chairman and CEO, and maintains a Lead Independent Director with specific authorities (agenda approval, executive sessions, performance evaluation of Chair/CEO), mitigating independence concerns associated with a CEO‑director dual role . Hedging/pledging prohibitions, majority‑vote director elections, and stock ownership guidelines further align interests .

Additional Context: Performance & Track Record, Say‑on‑Pay, and Peer Benchmarking

  • 2024 executive accomplishments included enhancements to underwriting, record global portfolio investments at attractive pricing, U.S./EU operational improvements, and capital structure strengthening (amend/extend facilities; $550M 2030 notes issuance) .
  • Say‑on‑Pay support: Over 91% approval at the 2024 Annual Meeting; compensation design remained largely consistent .
  • Compensation peer group and philosophy: Total direct compensation targeted to median of a defined peer group; 2024 peer group adjustments disclosed (e.g., additions of NMI Holdings and Regional Management; removal of WEX, MoneyGram) .

Related Party Transactions and Risk Indicators

  • Related party transactions: None in 2024 under the company’s Related Party Transaction Policy .
  • Section 16 compliance: Company reported compliance for 2024 (noting one delayed Form 4 for another executive); the company assists insiders with filings .
  • Hedging/pledging: Prohibited; reduces misalignment risk .
  • Option repricing: Company does not currently grant stock options; no repricing activity disclosed .

Investment Implications

  • Pay‑for‑performance alignment is robust: 50% PSU / 50% RSU equity mix with three independent performance metrics (Adjusted EBITDA, ROATE, Relative TSR), and a 2024 bonus outcome of 120% reflecting above‑target net income, mixed EBITDA, and strong strategic execution .
  • Selling pressure likely modest: Upcoming RSU tranches and a 2026 retention RSU vest create supply events, but ownership guidelines (5x CEO/3x other execs) and 50% post‑tax holding requirements plus hedging/pledging prohibitions should temper net sells; note <1% ownership levels .
  • Retention risk appears contained: As CEO, severance is not excessive (historical terms show ~6 months base for Sjolund’s prior role), with double‑trigger equity acceleration on CIC; one‑time 2024 retention RSU supports continuity through 2026 .
  • Governance offsets dual‑role risk: Separate Executive Chair and a strong Lead Independent Director framework reduce independence concerns from CEO board service .
  • Execution upside: Documented European operating success (profitability, $3B+ investments, IT modernization) and recent strategic/capital actions could support performance‑based award attainment if sustained under Sjolund’s CEO tenure .