Michele Peppers
PERDOCEO EDUCATIONAbout Michele Peppers
Michele A. Peppers, age 49, is Vice President—Accounting & Reporting and Chief Accounting Officer at Perdoceo Education Corporation (PRDO). She joined the company in April 2004, became VP—Accounting & Reporting in October 2014, and has served as principal accounting officer since April 2015; she holds a B.S. in Accounting from the University of Illinois at Chicago and is a certified public accountant . Company performance during her tenure shows resilient profitability: Net Income and Operating Income were $147.6M and $194.6M in 2024, respectively, with total shareholder return (value of $100 investment) rising to $145.08 in 2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Perdoceo Education Corp | Director of Financial Reporting | Mar 2009 – Nov 2012 | Accounting and financial reporting leadership (per company biography) |
| Perdoceo Education Corp | Vice President & Assistant Controller | Nov 2012 – Oct 2014 | Accounting and financial reporting leadership (per company biography) |
| Perdoceo Education Corp | VP—Accounting & Reporting | Oct 2014 – present | Accounting and reporting leadership; principal accounting officer since Apr 2015 |
| Perdoceo Education Corp | Principal Accounting Officer | Apr 2015 – present | Company’s principal accounting officer |
| RJ Nelson Enterprises | Accounting Manager | Pre-2004 | Restaurant owner/operator; accounting role prior to joining PRDO |
External Roles
No external directorships or outside roles are disclosed in the PRDO executive officer biographies reviewed .
Fixed Compensation
Not disclosed. Ms. Peppers is an executive officer but not a named executive officer (NEO), and her specific salary/bonus amounts do not appear in PRDO’s Summary Compensation Tables (which list NEOs only) .
Performance Compensation
The company’s executive long‑term incentive (LTI) design has evolved:
- 2019 design: 30% stock options (four equal annual vesting), 20% time‑based RSUs (four equal annual vesting), 50% stock‑settled performance‑based RSUs (cliff vest at 50% or 100% after three years) with relative TSR performance metric .
- 2020–2021 design: 30% time‑based RSUs (four equal annual vesting) and 70% performance‑based RSUs (cliff vest at 50% or 100% after three years) with a two‑year adjusted EBITDA performance measure, subject to Committee discretion for unusual/nonrecurring items .
| Component | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs (time-based) | N/A (retention) | 20–30% depending on year | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | 25% per year over 4 years |
| PSUs | Relative TSR (2019) | 50% (2019) | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Vest at 50% or 100% | Cliff after 3 years |
| PSUs | Adjusted EBITDA (2020+) | 70% (2020–2021) | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Vest at 50% or 100% | Cliff after 3 years |
Note: Annual cash incentive program is recalibrated yearly; specific annual metrics/targets for Ms. Peppers are not disclosed .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Shares sold | 13,091 shares on May 2, 2025 at $30.00 per share; proceeds $392,730 |
| Post-transaction holdings | 49,914 shares directly owned following the sale |
| Unvested RSUs | 24,619 unvested RSUs noted in the same Form 4 aggregation |
| Rule 10b5-1 plan | Pre‑arranged plan adopted Dec 11, 2024 to sell up to 4,038 owned shares plus all net vested RSUs/PSUs that vest between Mar 14, 2025 and Dec 10, 2025 |
| Stock ownership guidelines (2024 policy) | Multiples of base salary: CEO 6x; CFO/COO 3x; EVP/equivalent 2x; all other officers subject to guidelines 1x; retain 50% of net shares until guideline achieved (75% for CEO) |
| Stock ownership guidelines (Jan 2025 update) | CEO 5x; CFO 3x; SVPs 1.5x; same retention ratios; most recent measurement indicates all designated officers attained the guideline |
| Hedging/pledging | Executives and directors are prohibited from hedging or pledging company stock |
| Clawback | Compensation recovery policy (adopted Jan 2010) requires reimbursement of incentive pay in cases of material restatement and intentional misconduct |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Executive Severance Plan | Lump sum equal to annual base salary + target bonus; partially subsidized COBRA so executive pays active-employee rates for ~1 year; outplacement assistance |
| Conditions | Severance conditioned on signing a release and entering non‑competition, non‑solicitation, and confidentiality agreements for at least one year (Separation Agreement); intended to be exempt from/comply with 409A |
| Equity treatment (termination) | RSUs immediately vest on death/disability; otherwise forfeited on termination; options fully exercisable on death/disability and remain exercisable until the earlier of option expiration or one year post‑termination |
| Change-of-control | No distinct multiples disclosed for non‑PEO executives in reviewed sections; standard equity plan provisions apply as noted; specific CIC terms for Ms. Peppers not disclosed |
Company Performance Context
| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Income ($ Millions) | 124.3 | 109.6 | 95.9 | 147.7 | 147.6 |
| Operating Income ($ Millions) | 170.6 | 183.6 | 175.8 | 199.2 | 194.6 |
| TSR – value of $100 investment | $68.68 | $63.95 | $75.58 | $96.74 | $145.08 |
Investment Implications
- Compensation alignment and governance: Stock ownership guidelines with net‑share retention and a strict prohibition on hedging/pledging indicate strong alignment and reduced agency risk; clawback policy adds downside accountability .
- Insider selling pressure and vesting cadence: A 10b5‑1 plan covering net‑vested RSUs/PSUs through Dec 10, 2025 plus her May 2025 sale suggests predictable supply around vesting dates, but the plan structure and retention ratios mitigate discretionary selling risk .
- Retention risk: Very low—20+ year tenure at PRDO and a decade in the principal accounting officer capacity implies deep institutional knowledge and continuity in financial reporting .
- Pay‑for‑performance levers: PSUs tied to adjusted EBITDA (and earlier to relative TSR) create incentives aligned with operating performance and market outcomes; Committee discretion on unusual items reduces gaming risk .
- Performance backdrop: Sustained profitability and improving TSR through 2024 support the view that accounting/reporting leadership has operated amid stable fundamentals, reducing execution risk in core financial controls .